Washington should condition air-defense interceptors to its Gulf partners on their burden-sharing efforts.

On September 24, the United States, Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco met in New York for the first meeting of the Abraham Accords partners since October 7, 2023. Weeks earlier, Pakistani, Turkish, and Saudi Arabian officials in Istanbul negotiated the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed in August, which now has a permanent secretariat in Riyadh.

Washington regards the two meetings as a clash between an Israel-centered order and a Muslim one, but the defense of the Gulf has depended on neither throughout the Iran War. The Abraham Accords normalized diplomatic relations; they didn’t build the region’s air defense. American air defense has been the real security guarantor, and Washington decides who gets it and when. That gives Washington more sway than either pact. It should ration interceptors by rules that its partners can observe and threaten to withhold them only rarely.

Central Command’s (CENTCOM) effort to integrate regional air and missile resources began in 2020 and extends from early warning through Air Forces Central’s Combined Air Operations Center in Qatar. That warning was strengthened when Israel was placed under Central Command’s jurisdiction during President Donald Trump’s first term. Many Arab states that never signed the accords are part of it and quietly work with Israel. Saudi recognition of Israel would make little military difference to that cooperation, even if it would make cooperation public and harder to reverse.

After the United States and Israel hit Iran on February 28, the UAE took on more than half of the missiles and drones fired at Gulf states, and Israel deployed an Iron Dome battery to Emirati soil. On April 28, as Gulf leaders held an emergency meeting in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi decided to leave OPEC. It decided that the best protection was open cooperation with Washington.

Saudi Arabia responded to weak protection by hedging. It went up against Washington to oppose the strikes, let US forces occupy its bases and skies, and, according to some accounts, struck Iran itself. After Iranian drones hit Ras Tanura, Riyadh, through Pakistan, agreed with Tehran to remove most of the Saudi infrastructure from Iran’s target list. The Mecca Pact builds on that and gives Riyadh a channel to Tehran and other partners beyond the United States.

Both are dependent on air defense from the US Air Force. Each Gulf state has its own air network. The Emirati one, however, connects THAAD, Patriot, South Korea’s M-SAM, and other systems into a national air picture. Washington can’t control these networks, but it has the interceptors, early warning, and secure communications that no other country can provide at the scale required for war. When interceptors ran out in the war, each country could defend itself only as long as the supply was there.

Washington controls that supply: it picks up government contracts and decides who gets interceptors and when. On May 1, Secretary of State Marco Rubio used emergency authority to approve $25.8 billion in interceptors and other arms for Israel, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE without going to Congress. Saudi Arabia was not on that list.

Days later, Saudi Arabia canceled basing access and forced the United States to withdraw from Project Freedom, an operation intended to protect shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait also restricted access. The Wall Street Journal reported that the White House threatened to withhold interceptor deliveries to the kingdom. Riyadh restored access. Pakistan and Turkey had no Patriot missiles to provide.

The threat worked, but it came at a price: Project Freedom was never officially relaunched. Riyadh signed the Mecca Pact three months later, and it is reasonable to view the pact as insurance against the next threat. Every time Washington talks about withholding interceptors, Riyadh will have more reasons to buy South Korean or Chinese systems or to build its own.

The United States is short too. American forces have used about two-thirds of their Patriot interceptors and half of their THAAD interceptors, and rebuilding those stocks will take years. Scarcity makes a place in line worth more, but a promise of priority is only as good as the production behind it.

Scarcity also means Washington ranks its partners, whether they admit it or not. It should lay out in advance what earns a higher place. Riyadh should be given a clear path up. A threat to break that order in a crisis is a different tool, and Washington should keep it in reserve for a few goals it can achieve.

One of those is the Mecca Pact. Pakistan sent thousands of troops, fighter aircraft, and an air-defense system to Saudi Arabia. The vast majority of its weapons are Chinese or developed with Chinese assistance. Turkey purchased Russia’s S-400 and has relations with Tehran. Both could threaten American systems in Saudi Arabia, even though Gulf militaries already run equipment from several countries and American systems on their own networks.

The risk is proximity. A foreign radar operating near American aircraft and batteries could read their signatures and tactics, and the United States has no control over where the data goes. Washington needs to watch where foreign radars are located relative to American forces, and who has access to American sites. Its security agreements with host countries already cover American sites and forces. They don’t cover where Riyadh places Pakistani or Turkish radar on the American-built systems it operates, including the F-35s it has already bought. Washington did indeed consider that risk as disqualifying before, in 2019, when it dropped Turkey from the F-35 program.

President Trump has hailed the Mecca Pact as a way for regional states to pay more of their own defense costs. Burden sharing needs clear rules, though.

First, Congress and the administration should continue funding CENTCOM’s regional air and missile defense efforts for all partners. Shared warning protects American forces, and withdrawing from a partnership leaves them vulnerable to loopholes that put them at risk.

Second, Washington should stop making normalization with Israel a prerequisite for security ties with Riyadh and instead make hedging more costly. With the current Israeli government and Gaza unsettled, this type of conditionality gets nowhere, and the latest US-Saudi agreements were concluded without it. Normalization should be a reward Riyadh can obtain when it is ready, not a price it must pay for protection. Hedging is different: Riyadh should not receive resupply at the same level as countries that have taken Iranian fire alongside the United States, and it should be made aware of that in advance.

Third, interceptors are not Washington’s only leverage. It should tie the Strategic Defense Agreement in November 2025 and the delivery, basing, and sustainment of the F-35s to Saudi commitments to its new partners. These steps will take years, long after Congress has reviewed the sale. Riyadh would need to keep Pakistani and Turkish radars out of reach of American assets, including its own American-made aircraft and batteries, and bar their personnel from American sites.

The UAE and Bahrain bore the brunt of Iranian fire, and they should be the first to receive interceptors and joint production. When American stocks are this low, joint production is what makes that priority a reality. Saudi Arabia can move up by following the new agreements and keeping its bases open to American forces. Recognizing Israel should earn it the most, as it would likely soften Congress’ resistance to selling it advanced arms.

Abu Dhabi sided with Washington and Riyadh hedged, but both got through the war with American interceptors. The ability to decide who gets them and when is Washington’s best card in the Gulf. Washington should set the order by rules its partners can see and hold the threat of withholding for a few clear goals.

About the Author: Eric Alter

Eric Alter is the dean of the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in Abu Dhabi and a professor of international law and diplomacy, as well as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. A former UN civil servant and a senior consultant/team leader with various international organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank, IFC, UNDP, UNEP, and FAO. Professor Alter has been seconded abroad and has worked with embassies in an advisory capacity, in particular in Aden, Beirut, and Cairo. He received his PhD from Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.

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