Despite Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan will likely provide just enough support to its ally to keep the Mecca Pact credible.

Only a few weeks after Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA), the arrangement is already facing its first test in West Asia. The Iran-backed Yemeni Houthis have pounded Saudi cities and energy infrastructure with drone and missile attacks since early September, including Riyadh and Aramco facilities. The Houthi movement, which controls most of northern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, seized the port city of Mocha, Perim Island, and the Hanish Islands in September, effectively taking control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. However, Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces have since launched a counter-offensive, stating that they have now secured the strait, recapturing control of this narrow, highly critical global maritime chokepoint.

Despite the escalating trajectory of the conflict, Saudi Arabia’s military partners in the pact—Pakistan and Turkey—initially constrained themselves to strong diplomatic statements. While the tepid response invited apprehensions about the viability of the trilateral defense pact, it is premature to conclude that the MJDA is hollow. On October 5, the three countries announced they would implement “deterrence measures” under the agreement in response to attacks on Saudi Arabia. Clearly, the Mecca Pact has not failed. However, the reality remains that the new alliance is operationally and institutionally ill-equipped for a challenge like the Houthis.

The Mecca Pact’s Operational Limitations

At their first Strategic Political and Defence Committee meeting in Istanbul on August 31, the member states agreed to establish a secretariat and begin ministerial coordination. The bloc, however, lacks a joint command structure, an interoperable framework, a shared military doctrine, and, most importantly, a history of trilateral military exercises. Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad have participated only in bilateral drills with one another. The member states agreed to deploy military forces in Saudi Arabia at the October 5 meeting; however, the nature of this deployment remains unknown.

While the pact’s merits remain untested, Pakistan is no stranger to regional security pacts. The Baghdad Pact of 1955, later renamed CENTO, intended to protect the Middle East and Central Asia from Soviet aggression. However, CENTO partners, including the UK, Turkey, and Iran, were unwilling to come to Pakistan’s rescue during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Ultimately, CENTO’s limited strategic utility compelled Islamabad to withdraw from the agreement in 1979. If precedent matters, diverging threat perceptions—including Iran and the Houthis for Riyadh, India and Afghanistan for Islamabad, and Israel for Ankara—will continue to cast a shadow of uncertainty over the new security pact.

Notably, Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly asked US President Donald Trump for American help after the recent Houthi assault, ignoring Islamabad, with whom Riyadh also has a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SDMA) signed in October 2025. The instinctive first call to the White House reflects the pact’s current standing, despite the lowered confidence in American security guarantees.

Pakistan’s Domestic Limitations

Pakistan will be cautious about involving itself in a Middle Eastern conflict. The country shares a 560-mile border with Iran. Moreover, Pakistan’s already overstretched security establishment can hardly afford another conflict outside its region. Pakistan’s military is already running a counter-insurgency campaign against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) along its border provinces with Afghanistan, as well as the Baloch insurgency along the Iranian border. At the same time, Pakistan must hold its permanent posture against its primary rival, India. Pakistan’s internal security challenge remains acute, with 2,786 fatalities recorded in the first seven months of 2026. 

Pakistan’s structural economic vulnerabilities, most notably its reliance on International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts, severely limit its capacity to finance, sustain, or scale external military operations in West Asia. The 8,000-strong force deployment and JF-17 squadron sent in April are currently stationed at King Abdulaziz Air Base in a defensive posture; no information indicates they will be involved in active conflict. In 2015, the Pakistani parliament voted against a military intervention in support of Saudi Arabia in Yemen.

Pakistan is also home to one of the world’s largest Shia populations outside Iran, which could complicate any state involvement in issues perceived as hostile to Tehran. Additionally, any active military participation could further dilute Pakistan’s position as a mediator between Iran and the United States. 

In that light, Pakistan will remain wary of extending significant military support to Saudi Arabia, even as it reaffirms its commitment to the Mecca Pact. Islamabad will likely point to its existing maritime contribution through the Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance and Combined Task Force 150 and hesitate to involve itself in anything resembling an offensive action against the Iran-backed Houthis. 

Islamabad could also use its credibility as the only signatory with an active channel to Tehran to push for de-escalation, even offering to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Amid growing and interconnected West Asian crises, the MJDA is unlikely to keep pace with the timelines of the conflicts unfolding around it. Its institutional mechanisms will likely take their sweet time in moving toward operational action, if at all. For India, Pakistan’s increasing entanglement in West Asia, a predicament of its own making, should offer a degree of strategic reprieve.

About the Author: Aishwaria Sonavane

Aishwaria Sonavane is the research analyst at the Pakistan Desk and the programme manager at the Network for the Advanced Study of Pakistan at the Takshashila Institute, an Indian think tank. Her work focuses on counter-militancy, foreign policy, and defense, with a broader regional emphasis on Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan. She tweets at @aishwaria_s.

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