To many in the region, US policy in the Middle East now appears to contain a distinctly anti-Shia dimension.

Twenty-five years ago, the 9/11 terrorist attacks gave birth to the American-led Global War on Terrorism. This decades-long war largely focused on combating Sunni Muslim radical groups such as Al Qaeda and its allies in the Afghan Taliban. The United States and a “coalition of the willing” also toppled the Sunni Baathist regime in Iraq. Washington then proceeded to implement policies that “de-Baathified” the Iraqi army, civil service, and police and favored the Shia community in the country. This ultimately fed the perception across the Islamic world of an American plot to marginalize Sunnis.

Following the emergence of the ISIS terrorist group, Washington’s “Sunni-centric” policy arguably became even more evident, reflected in an approach that appeared to consider Iran and its Shia allies the lesser of two evils compared to the Sunni Salafi-Jihadi strain. That period saw the Obama administration team up with Iran and its network of Shia allies in Iraq. President Barack Obama also abandoned a push for regime-change policy in Syria in favor of focusing on ISIS. 

A quarter of a century after the attacks that marked the beginning of the “Sunni-centric” approach, there is a strong case to be made that the United States under the Trump administration is moving towards what could be described as a “Shia-centric” approach.

Two major events best capture such a shift: the recent removal of Syria from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from the list of global terrorist organizations, and the ongoing conflict with Iran.

The decision to lift Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism confirms a Sunni-to-Shia pivot at least in the realm of appearances. After sanctioning the governments of notable Alawites Hafez and Bashar al-Assad since 1979, Washington removed this designation after the Sunnis led by Ahmed al-Sharaa came to power. Given that Alawism is an offshoot of Shia Islam, the sectarian symbolism of this decision cannot be overstated, even if sectarian favoritism had little to do with Washington’s real intentions for supporting al-Sharaa.

Perhaps even more importantly, the United States has relaxed its Syria policy despite the dangers that continue to be posed by both ISIS and foreign fighters in that country. A UN report released earlier this year warned that ISIS has infiltrated state security services, while also highlighting member states’ concerns over the “extremist ideologies of some foreign terrorist fighters” that had been incorporated into the Syrian army. So far, there have been no indications that these challenges have been adequately addressed since these warnings were made. 

The Soufan Group describes the latest American measures toward Syria as driven by Washington’s focus on Iran, noting that the Trump administration sees in post-Assad Syria a potential ally in a wider regional struggle. Statements by senior American officials support this argument. Following Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Washington in November 2025, US Special Envoy Tom Barrack announced that Damascus would become a partner against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah (in addition to ISIS and Hamas).

There is also evidence that the United States wants to enlist Syria against Hezbollah. A Reuters report last March revealed that American officials put forward such a request to their Syrian counterparts. While Barrack denied such a request was made, Trump himself has publicly expressed on more than one occasion his desire to have Syria take on Hezbollah. These dynamics illustrate how the US approach to counter-terrorism since 9/11 has shifted, with a heavier focus on “Shia radicals” while deprioritizing “Sunni radicals.”

The Iran War meanwhile risks appearing like an anti-Shia campaign for more reasons than one. The assassination of former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sent shockwaves throughout Shia communities worldwide. Following his assassination, thousands of Shia protesters took to the streets in countries like Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, with similar rallies being held as far afield as India and Nigeria.

The perception of US anti-Shiism can also be linked to the Islamic Republic’s attempts to cast itself as synonymous with the Shia faith and its interests in the region. In 2015, Washington Institute analyst Phillip Smyth argued that Iran sought to cast itself as the vanguard of Shias against Salafi-Jihadi extremists in Syria during the civil war. In particular, Iran’s claims that its militias protected Shia shrines and mosques, such as the Sayyeda Zainab, in Damascus appealed to a broad segment of the Shia community and boosted Iran’s recruitment efforts in Syria.

By waging the Iran War, the United States runs the risk of appearing to be on an anti-Shia crusade. That Iran hawks and close Trump allies like late former Republican Senator Lindsey Graham framed the situation with Iran as a religious struggle against a “fanatical string of Shiism [sic]” serves to further feed these sentiments.

All of this is not to say that Washington is deliberately embracing anti-Shiism or fueling Sunni extremism. Rather, it is to say that America’s obsession with Iran is pushing it in that direction. The big question is if and how this could lead to the emergence of a new form of Shia extremism defined by a more vigorous religiously-motivated animosity towards the United States.

Should that scenario unfold, it would largely be of Washington’s own making, unlike its decades-long war with Sunni extremism. This owes to the fact that the “Sunni-centric” policy that emerged after 9/11 was justified on the grounds of a large-scale mass casualty attack on the American homeland.

Notwithstanding the anti-American rhetoric championed by Iran and its Shia allies, there exists no Shia extremist equivalent of such an attack. That could fuel sentiments of Shias being unfairly targeted, which could widely resonate given the history and collective memory of Shias as a minority and disadvantaged community. Perhaps more importantly, it could create a perception of unjustified American anti-Shiism that will further harden sentiments against the United States.

About the Author: Ali Rizk

Ali Rizk is a security analyst who holds a master’s in counterterrorism from Macquarie University in Australia. He has over 15 years of experience in journalism, including five years in Iran. He has written for various outlets, including The American Conservative, Responsible Statecraft, Amwaj.media, and Middle East Eye, and is a frequent commentator on Al Jazeera. Follow him on X: @AlipressRizk.

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