The only way to dismantle Hezbollah is to create the right incentives for the Lebanese government.

When I served as assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs during the first Trump administration, I spent much of my time trying to disabuse my French counterparts of their reflexive inclination to bail Lebanon out of its self-inflicted financial crisis. Instead of participating in another failed Paris donor conference, the administration pressed for conditionality, making US support for an IMF program and the disbursement of cash contributions contingent on Beirut implementing meaningful economic reforms. Seven years on, Lebanon has yet to embrace significant reform and the economic morass continues. Still, Washington’s approach—requiring tangible actions in return for billions of dollars of aid—remains the correct policy. 

The United States should take the same approach to military assistance to Lebanon. In June, Lebanon committed in negotiations with Israel, mediated by Washington, to disarming (and dismantling) the Iran-backed militia Hezbollah. Beirut’s signing of the Trilateral Framework agreement was a brave decision. Yet, regrettably, early indications suggest that—like so many previous pledges on economic reform—Lebanon is failing to meet its obligations. President Donald Trump says his administration has “concrete plans” to help the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) disarm Hezbollah. Before he obligates funds, he would be well advised to wait and see if the LAF shows any sign that it intends to carry out the mission.

Predictably, France isn’t waiting. Despite Beirut’s disarmament inertia, Paris is poised to hold yet another donor conference for Lebanon. On September 17, President Emmanuel Macron will host a preparatory session for a later meeting to raise funds to support the LAF and the state’s Internal Security Forces. The French initiative aims to strengthen these institutions’ operational capabilities and sustainability by providing equipment and training. A key objective is to provide the LAF with the capacity to deploy to the south and take over from the Israeli military forces that currently occupy Lebanese territory. 

Macron is right that the LAF needs help. The military is short on cash, can’t meet payroll, and is struggling to find gas money to fuel vehicles. Yet the main reason for LAF underperformance is not insufficient resources. Rather, the problem appears to be a matter of will. Either Beirut hasn’t issued clear guidance to the LAF, or the military isn’t following orders. Both scenarios bode poorly for the disarmament project.

This lack of will has been on clear display in Zawtar al-Gharbiya, the first pilot zone under the framework. Israeli forces withdrew from Zawtar in late July. Under the terms of the agreement, the LAF deployed to secure the area and prevent the return of Hezbollah personnel and assets. While the LAF reportedly has uncovered some arms caches, the Lebanese press is reporting that the army is not checking vehicles, and that Hezbollah-affiliated ambulances and personnel had been allowed to re-enter the town, including the militia’s local military representative.

Regrettably, additional funding, equipment, and training will not make the LAF carry out its duties in Zawtar. The LAF is sidestepping its obligations to avoid conflict with Hezbollah. While fear of the militia is understandable, the consequences of the LAF shirking its duties are considerable. If the Zawtar pilot zone doesn’t succeed, Israel is unlikely to withdraw from additional zones, and the framework’s envisioned process will stall. Ultimately, to end the Israeli presence in Lebanon and de-escalate the conflict, Beirut is going to have to compel the LAF—which ostensibly is answerable to the government—to do its job.

To be sure, Lebanon isn’t the only side falling short of expectations. Israeli officials, perhaps motivated by electoral considerations, talk brashly about digging into Lebanese positions for a long-term stay, as though the two sides didn’t just sign an agreement that envisions Israel’s departure. And there are almost daily Israeli military operations against Hezbollah terrorists or weapons caches, sometimes killing civilians in the process, reminding Lebanese that the ceasefire seems to exist in name only. Still, while Israeli actions may be unhelpful, LAF inaction in the pilot zones, if it persists, will ultimately prove the end of the framework agreement. 

While France may be looking to underwrite a recalcitrant LAF, the Trump administration shouldn’t be offering additional support to an institution actively undermining its efforts to change the status quo in Lebanon. Since 2006, Washington has provided nearly $3 billion to the LAF to strengthen the force’s capabilities in preparation for this very moment. To encourage Beirut and the LAF to seize this rare opportunity to assert state sovereignty, the administration should make clear to Lebanon that its performance to date in the pilot zones is inadequate and inconsistent with the obligations the government undertook. Washington should be explicit that additional US funding for the LAF will be contingent on performance. 

Proposed legislation—the Lebanon Sanctions, Stabilization, and Support Act—is a strong signal from Congress that it would endorse a tough-love approach by the administration. This bill conditions US support for the LAF on the military’s execution of government directives regarding Hezbollah and its weapons. It also demonstrates a keen awareness of Beirut’s long track record of unfulfilled commitments. 

The Trump administration has invested significant diplomatic capital in the Lebanese-Israel talks. Barring a change in the Lebanese approach to the pilot zones, however, the Trilateral Framework will lose all momentum and wither. It’s not clear that conditioning US military assistance will compel Lebanon to reverse course; the approach hasn’t worked on economic reforms. But Washington can’t—and shouldn’t—bankroll Beirut’s indecision. Whether on the economy or on disarming Hezbollah, the United States cannot help the Lebanese government if it doesn’t help itself.

About the Author: David Schenker 

David Schenker is the Taube senior fellow at The Washington Institute and director of the Linda and Tony Rubin Program on Arab Politics. Confirmed by the Senate on June 5, 2019, he served as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs through January 2021. In that capacity, he was the principal Middle East advisor to the secretary of state and the senior official overseeing the conduct of US policy and diplomacy in a region stretching from Morocco to Iran to Yemen, with responsibility for 18 countries, the Palestinian Authority, and Western Sahara.

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