Houthi aggression against Saudi Arabia will likely bring the Gulf states closer to more active hostilities with Iran.

On July 20, Yemen’s Houthi rebels announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia. While the decade-long Saudi-Houthi conflict has largely been frozen since 2022, the recent escalation in tensions came in response to the July 13 airstrikes launched by Yemen’s Saudi-backed government to prevent an Iranian plane carrying senior Houthi leaders from landing in Sanaa. The blockade is also widely perceived as being complementary to Iran’s efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz, as the Islamic Republic has long served as the Houthis’ largest benefactor and arms supplier. 

Since the blockade was announced, the Houthis have attacked four Saudi oil tankers, launched missiles at Saudi oil refineries, and scared several ships hoping to transit the Red Sea into reversing course, resulting in a slowdown in maritime traffic through this critical waterway. In addition to elevating the risk of sailing through the Red Sea and the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, the blockade threatens the nearly 4 million barrels of oil that Saudi Arabia exports daily through the Red Sea. 

This blockade could not come at a worse time for the global economy. The Iran War and the subsequent disruption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz have halted roughly 10 percent of global oil shipments, and the Houthis’ Red Sea blockade could impact another 7 percent. The Red Sea supports up to 15 percent of global maritime commerce and 30 percent of global container traffic annually. It has become increasingly essential for the transfer of oil and gas, with the number of barrels of oil transiting the Bab El-Mandeb nearly doubling within two months of the Iran War’s beginning. Saudi oil exports have become particularly important during this conflict, with oil shipments from its Red Sea port at Yanbu increasing by 400 percent since the start of the war.  

If Asia-bound oil tankers are forced to sail north through the Suez Canal, Mediterranean Sea, and around the Cape of Good Hope rather than south through the Red Sea and Bab El-Mandeb, it would add considerable time and expense to these shipments. Thus far, the blockade appears to be limited to Saudi vessels or ships doing business at Saudi ports, and some ships have successfully transited the Red Sea since it began. 

However, the mere threat of Houthi attacks on commercial ships could inflict considerable damage by diverting Red Sea maritime traffic and raising insurance costs for ship owners, particularly because the Houthis previously attacked several ships under the flags of countries with no connection to Israel. Accordingly, it is little surprise that oil prices surpassed $100 per barrel once the blockade was announced, or why some experts are warning that oil prices could surpass the previous record high price of $146 per barrel.

Much of the economic anxiety surrounds the Houthis’ proven capacity to disrupt maritime commerce. From 2023 to 2025, the Houthis targeted nearly 200 ships as part of their efforts to disrupt global shipping, resulting in a nearly 50 percent decrease in traffic through the Suez Canal. The Houthis can use their considerable arsenal of drones, rockets, and fast attack craft to harry vessels trying to reach the Gulf of Aden through the Bab El-Mandeb (which is only 18 miles wide at its narrowest point), and their deepening partnership with resurgent Somali pirates could increasingly allow them to target ships sailing further south. 

They have also proven highly resilient in weathering air campaigns by both the United States and the Saudi-led coalition, and their military assets are widely dispersed along the coast, making it difficult for the Saudis and their partners to target and disrupt anti-ship attacks effectively. The nightmare scenario involves the Houthis successfully degrading Saudi Arabia’s capacity to export oil from Yanbu, which the group attempted by firing missiles at oil installations in the city on Monday. 

Given the Houthis’ proven capacity to disrupt maritime commerce and their strong connections to Iran, it’s worth considering why they waited this long to initiate this blockade. Despite launching a few attacks against Israel this spring, the Houthis had mostly stayed out of the Iran War. Their decision to initiate the blockade has largely been characterized as an opportunistic bid to capitalize on the global economy’s increased reliance on Red Sea trade and their newly replenished arsenal, as well as a response to pressure from Iran to attempt to close the Bab El-Mandeb. 

However, if these factors alone had served as the Houthis’ motivation, the group likely would have imposed a blockade in the early weeks of the Iran War. Instead, three additional factors help explain why the Houthis picked this moment to play their cards in the Red Sea.  

First, the blockade is a pointed response to the Yemeni government’s July 13 strike on the Sanaa Airport. The fact that the flight which prompted the attack was carrying several senior Houthi officials is significant—while the airstrikes targeted the flight’s intended destination rather than the plane itself, the Houthis’ escalatory response to the attack seems consistent with how they might respond to an attempted decapitation strike. The Houthi leadership became increasingly concerned with potential assassination attempts following the 2025 killing of their Chief of Staff Muhammad al-Ghamari in an Israeli airstrike, and those concerns may have been further elevated by the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei this spring.

Notably, the Houthis alleged that, on July 3, Saudi warplanes violated their airspace attempting to target a plane that would carry the same Houthi delegation to Khamenei’s funeral. Just two days later, the Houthis launched a surprise attack on the governorate of Hodeidah, the deadliest Houthi offensive since the 2022 ceasefire. Through this lens, the blockade could be read as a signal to Saudi Arabia that targeting Houthi leadership will result in escalatory retaliation, regardless of whether decapitation was the actual intent of the July 13 attack. 

Second, the blockade is also intended to galvanize domestic support for the Houthis. As I’ve previously argued, the Houthis’ prior Red Sea attacks were largely designed to address legitimacy crises. Domestically, the Houthis face deep discontent due to Yemen’s economic struggles, continued governance failures, and endemic public corruption. Recent months have seen increased tensions between the Houthis and tribal leaders in the territory under their control, perhaps best characterized by recent anti-Houthi demonstrations in al-Jawf following the imprisonment of a local tribal leader. 

Just as the previous Red Sea campaign helped engender greater patriotic momentum, the Houthis hope to use this blockade to bolster their recruitment efforts and mobilize the public against Saudi Arabia, a country long distrusted by many Yemenis. Any retaliation by Saudi Arabia will invariably be spun to support the Houthi narrative that Yemen is besieged by foreign enemies on whom the public’s misfortunes should be blamed, much as the attack on Sanaa airport was erroneously characterized as part of a fictional Saudi blockade against Yemen.  

Third, and finally, the blockade appears designed to extract additional concessions from Saudi Arabia, primarily access to Yemeni oil revenue and funds to pay long-delayed public sector salaries. These issues were sticking points during previous Saudi-Houthi talks, and the Houthis have struggled to pay the roughly 400,000 public sector employees in their territory for much of the conflict. 

Given Saudi Arabia’s heavy reliance on oil exports and its desire to minimize its involvement in the Iran War and avoid another lengthy conflict with the Houthis (their previous campaign failed to unseat the group from power in Sanaa and resulted in several Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia), the Houthis likely believe they can use the blockade as leverage to bring the Saudis back to the table in hopes of receiving either short-term concessions or a more favorable final status settlement.  

Ironically, while the Houthis could reap short-term benefits from their blockade, it also risks their long-term position by inviting broader Saudi involvement in the Iran War. Like the Houthis, Saudi Arabia has largely remained on the sidelines in this conflict, launching only limited retaliatory strikes against Iran, but denying the US military use of its airspace to support its planned “Project Freedom.” Saudi involvement will likely focus on disrupting the Houthi blockade and attacking high-value military targets in Yemen, as Riyadh remains incentivized to avoid risking further attacks from Iran, which could threaten its economy and undermine its image as a stable and safe hub for tourism and trade. 

However, if the Houthis inflict enough economic damage on Saudi Arabia, it could incentivize Riyadh to target their Iranian benefactors in hopes of either disrupting the Houthis’ supply of weapons or degrading Tehran’s ability to prevent oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia recently participated in joint strikes with the United States on Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, displaying its willingness to target Iran’s axis of resistance more broadly. 

Further escalation would carry significant risks for Saudi Arabia. Still, it would also greatly increase the pressure on both the Houthis and Iran, particularly if the Saudis succeeded in drawing other Gulf states more actively into the conflict. The Houthi blockade may have placed Saudi Arabia and the global economy in an increasingly precarious position. Yet, if the Houthis aren’t careful, both they and their Iranian allies could ultimately suffer the greatest fall.

About the Author: Matthew Reisener

Matt Reisener is the senior national security advisor for the Center for Maritime Strategy. He previously served as the National Democratic Institute’s senior program manager for the Middle East and North Africa, managing international development programs in Yemen and Algeria. Before that, he worked at the Center for the National Interest from 2017 to 2021, where he served as the organization’s chief of staff and co-edited a report entitled Seapower in Stormy Seas: The Future of American Naval Power in the 21st Century.

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