Tehran is betting that its strikes on US bases in Jordan will pull the Hashemite Kingdom out of its close relationship with the United States.

“To the honorable people and the courageous soldiers of Jordan, we thank you for your sincere cooperation and your accurate intelligence, which enabled the precise targeting by the fighters of Islam and the destruction of 20 hangars housing the forces of the child-killing US Army in the Al-Azraq area, resulting in the deaths of dozens of American terrorist forces.”

That was how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) chose to address the people of Jordan on Sunday. It is an extraordinary message, as Iran does not typically address the Jordanian public directly, let alone members of the Jordanian military—the choice to do so signals intent, not just rhetoric.

It is also a major and dangerous development. Since the Iran War resumed on July 7, Iran has intensified its attacks against Jordan more than against Gulf Cooperation Council states, while notably refraining from direct strikes on Israel. This asymmetry is not incidental. It reflects a deliberate operational and political calculation: Jordan is being singled out as a pressure point in Iran’s regional strategy.

Iran has concentrated its attacks on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base (MSAB), home to the largest US military presence in Jordan. Still, it has also struck Tower 22, Prince Hassan Air Base, King Faisal Air Base and a civilian airport, King Hussein International Airport in Aqaba. Since July 9, Iran has launched 70 missiles and 25 drones at Jordanian territory, with reported US deaths reaching three. These strikes reveal Iran’s deliberate effort to unleash sustained pressure on every Jordanian installation from which US forces operate, not merely MSAB.

Tehran seeks to portray Jordan as an accomplice of both Israel and the United States, a subordinate actor embedded in Western regional strategy. The IRGC statement reinforces this framing by referring to “US bases” in Jordan. This characterization is false and strategically important to contest. 

Under the 2021 Defense Cooperation Agreement between Washington and Amman, US forces are granted access to agreed Jordanian military facilities for training, operations, logistics, and humanitarian missions. The agreement authorizes pre-positioning of equipment and provides legal protections for US personnel, but it does not establish sovereign US bases. These are Jordanian installations. Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi has clarified this distinction, yet Iran’s messaging deliberately obscures it.

Even so, the practical reality remains: Iran is attacking Jordan directly. Technically, politically, and strategically, this marks an escalation. It places Jordan in a category distinct from that of states only indirectly affected by Iran’s regional network of proxies.

This escalation did not emerge in a vacuum. Jordan has been in Iran’s crosshairs for years. Iranian efforts to penetrate and influence the Jordanian domestic environment have been documented, including attempts to shape pro-Hamas protest movements as part of a broader strategy to cultivate pressure from within. Such activities are designed to erode internal stability while amplifying narratives aligned with Tehran’s regional posture.

Parallel to this influence campaign is narcotics trafficking. By 2022, Jordanian officials described the flood of Captagon from southern Syria, facilitated by Iran-backed groups under the Assad regime, as a “drug war” aimed at destabilizing the kingdom through societal harm and border pressure. Although the Assad regime is gone, the drug trade persists.

Iran is also expanding the battlefield beyond Jordan itself. Tehran has instructed the Houthis to stand ready to close the Bab El-Mandeb under certain conditions, exemplifying its willingness to weaponize another critical maritime chokepoint. On July 22, the Houthis fired upon two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea, demonstrating Tehran’s willingness to weaponize another critical maritime chokepoint. Such attacks will inevitably affect Jordan—and Iran knows it. Aqaba is the kingdom’s only port city, handling approximately 80 percent of its exports and 65 percent of Jordan’s imports, making any disruption to Red Sea shipping a direct source of economic pressure on Amman.

Taken together, these lines of effort—military strikes, information operations, illicit trafficking, and maritime and economic coercion—point to a coherent strategy. Iran is attempting to recast Jordan as an unreliable partner in the eyes of Washington while simultaneously weakening it from within. 

The timing is not accidental. Jordan’s traditional diplomatic centrality, particularly on the Palestinian issue, has been relatively fading in recent years in American eyes. Other regional actors, notably Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have assumed more prominent roles in mediation between Israel and Palestinian factions. Jordan was notably absent from the Gaza negotiations that led to the October 2025 ceasefire, a development that highlights its shifting position in the diplomatic hierarchy.

Iran appears to be exploiting this perceived vulnerability. By targeting Jordan, Tehran is testing whether Washington’s commitment is conditional or enduring. It is an attempt to probe the resilience of a longstanding alliance at a moment of regional recalibration.

Yet the evidence suggests that this effort is not succeeding. If anything, it is producing the opposite effect. US-Jordan relations are not weakening; they are deepening in both material and strategic terms.

The most visible indicator came in February, when the US House of Representatives passed the Fiscal Year 2026 Defense Appropriations Act. It allocated at least $1.65 billion for Jordan, including $845.1 million in direct budget support and $425 million in Foreign Military Financing. Another $400 million from National Security Investment Programs and $50 million more in FMF raised total assistance beyond $2 billion, up from roughly $1.45 billion annually throughout much of the past decade.

Political signaling has reinforced this trajectory. In early June, reports surfaced alleging that the United States was working with Israel to end the Jordanian monarchy’s custodianship over the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Secretary of State Marco Rubio swiftly rejected the claim, telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he had never heard it and emphasizing instead that “we have a great relationship with Jordan.” He also said the custodianship had never been disputed in US policy discussions. The prompt denial accentuates Washington’s recognition.

Economic ties are also expanding. On July 21, the United States and Jordan signed a new reciprocal trade agreement that, on the surface, focuses on tariffs but in substance reinforces a broader strategic partnership. Jordan maintains zero percent tariffs on US exports, eliminates a 51 percent special tax on new US-made vehicles, and removes import licensing barriers on American goods. The agreement also includes provisions for the transfer of US-manufactured aircraft and engines. For Jordan, the benefits extend beyond consumer pricing. The deal is designed to stimulate investment, enhance competitiveness, and support export-driven sectors such as manufacturing, garments, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.

More importantly, it positions Jordan within a larger strategic framework. The country’s value lies not in natural resources or low-cost labor, but in stability, geography, and reliability. Jordan functions as a logistical and infrastructural hub, capable of supporting regional distribution, aviation services, and strategic supply chains. In an increasingly fragmented Middle East, these attributes are not incidental; they are central to US planning.

Iran’s campaign, therefore, rests on a flawed premise. It assumes that Jordan’s perceived decline in diplomatic prominence translates into diminished strategic value. The opposite is true. As regional dynamics shift, the attributes that Jordan offers—predictability, cooperation, and geographic access—become more, not less, important.

Even moments of tension do not fundamentally alter this trajectory. Following the killing of three US troops in Jordan, President Donald Trump remarked, “They [Iran] did slip something through in Jordan. If we had other operators, that wouldn’t have happened. You know, when you let other people do your job, it sometimes doesn’t work so well.” While the statement reflects frustration, it does not indicate a strategic rupture. If anything, such incidents tend to generate increased coordination and deeper integration between US and Jordanian forces.

Iran’s greatest strategic miscalculation is believing pressure on Jordan will weaken its alliance with Washington. The opposite is unfolding. Every missile fired, every drone launched, and every act of coercion only reinforces Jordan’s indispensability to American strategy. Military cooperation is expanding, political support is unequivocal, and economic integration is accelerating. Jordan is no longer merely another ally but an indispensable strategic anchor. Tehran understands Jordan’s value. What it fails to understand is that every attack only increases that value.

About the Author: Abdullah Hayek

Abdullah Hayek is a senior contributor with Young Voices and an independent Middle East analyst and consultant based in Washington, DC. He previously specialized in the political, economic, and military affairs of the Levant, Iraq, and Arabian Gulf regions at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Follow him on X: @ahayek99.

The post Why Iran’s Jordan Gambit Will Fail appeared first on The National Interest.