A civilian government in Gaza cannot take shape without the disarmament of the terrorist group.

Hamas announced last week that it is prepared to hand over the government of Gaza to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). The NCAG was established as part of the US-brokered Gaza ceasefire and peace plan that began in mid-October 2025. Despite Hamas’ claims that it may “dissolve” its role in the strip’s government, there has been no clear evidence that it is actually doing that. In addition, it is not handing over its arms, which have been the source of decades of terror attacks.

For the peace plan in Gaza to proceed, it will require more than words from Hamas. Hamas has shown in decades of its existence that ceasefires and words are not reliable. The October 7 attack, in which more than 1,100 people were murdered in Israel and 250 taken hostage, is the clearest example that Hamas cannot be trusted. Not only is Hamas untrustworthy, but also its control of Gaza’s political institutions is illegitimate and began with the 2007 coup against the internationally recognized Palestinian Authority.

The Hamas statement about dissolving its government in Gaza is the latest wrench to be thrown into the works. In October, the ceasefire in Gaza began. This was part of a 20-point plan brokered by the White House and then enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which was passed in mid-November. The US- and UN-backed plan led to the creation of a Board of Peace in January. This in turn established the NCAG and the peacekeeping International Stabilization Force (ISF).

On paper, the plan for Gaza looks promising. Hamas is supposed to be disarmed. Its governing institutions, such as they exist, are supposed to be handed to a technocratic committee. Reconstruction is supposed to begin, and an international force is supposed to provide security. Deprived of basic necessities under Hamas rule for 20 years, the 2 million civilians in Gaza need the strip’s government to take these steps urgently. 

Around half the people in Gaza are under the age of 18, which means they have grown up entirely under Hamas rule. This rule has brought one disaster after another. There were short wars with Israel in 2008–2009, 2012, 2014, 2021, and the more prolonged war that began on October 7, 2023. Even though a ceasefire remains in effect, the lives of civilians in Gaza are still in limbo.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) control 60 percent of Gaza. In May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to increase that portion to 70 percent. All of the civilians in Gaza live in the Hamas-run half of the enclave. They are not allowed to leave that area to move to the IDF-run part. The US-backed plan is supposed to lead to reconstruction and a technocratic committee running Gaza. So far that committee, the NCAG, hasn’t been able to govern.

The war on Hamas was waged very differently than the successful campaign to remove ISIS from the region. When the US-backed coalition was fighting ISIS in Mosul, for instance, the civilians were able to leave Mosul so the Iraqi army could remove ISIS. This worked well. It took nine months of fighting in the environs of Mosul and inside the old city in 2016–2017 to remove ISIS. Today, Mosul is a thriving and peaceful city. Gaza could turn out this way. However, it would require the removal of Hamas.

The peace plan for Gaza calls for Hamas to be disarmed. For that to happen, disarmament must be defined. There have not been many examples of terrorist groups as large as Hamas being disarmed in history. The example of peace in Northern Ireland in the 1990s is one of the few cases where militants voluntarily put down their guns and formed a power-sharing government. In other places, such as Mexico, Colombia, and Turkey, attempts to disarm the drug cartels, FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), respectively, have not gone smoothly. How will Hamas be disarmed now when 1,000 days of conflict did not succeed in that task?

On July 6, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar accused Hamas of pretending to dissolve its institutional structure in a manner similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon. He suspects that Hamas will hand over nominal administrative control to NCAG, while maintaining effective control of the strip through force or the threat of force. In Lebanon, this is what Hezbollah did each time it supposedly disarmed. 

For instance, after 2000, when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah kept its weapons. Other armed groups in Lebanon had laid down their arms as part of the Taif Agreement, which ended the civil war in 1989. Hezbollah refused to do so, claiming it was “resisting” Israel. In 2006, Hezbollah launched a new attack on Israel, leading to a new war. Despite international calls for the removal of  Hezbollah from southern Lebanon, the group stayed and grew more powerful.

Hamas has a slightly different backstory. Founded as a political party in the late 1980s, it has pursued a campaign of terror attacks in opposition to the two-state solution envisioned by the Oslo Accords. After Israel left Gaza in 2005, Hamas seized power in a coup. Hamas has been allowed to rule Gaza since 2007, with basically no attempt to remove it from power.

The challenge today is not just about getting Hamas to hand over governance. It is primarily about getting Hamas to disarm and allow a new government to enter Gaza and provide civilians with an alternative to Hamas. So long as the 2 million people have no alternative and are living under Hamas rule, there’s no possible way to remove Hamas.

The same is true of dealing with cartels, for instance. When cartels run a region or a city the way Pablo Escobar did to Medellín, Colombia, the only way to remove them is to reduce their power and provide alternatives. Terrorist groups and cartels, or authoritarian regimes, survive due to fear. They collapse when they can’t impose their will via fear and violence.

Hamas is talking about handing over governance. But its power has always stemmed from the force of arms. A path forward in Gaza will be one of two separate but coordinated tracks. One track has to address a civilian-led alternative government. The other has to go out and collect weapons from Hamas, by force if necessary.

About the Author: Seth Frantzman

Seth Frantzman is the author of Drone Wars: Pioneers, Killing Machine, Artificial Intelligence and the Battle for the Future (Bombardier 2021) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He is the acting news editor and senior Middle East correspondent and analyst at The Jerusalem Post. Seth has researched and covered conflict and developments in the Middle East since 2005 with a focus on the war on ISIS, Iranian proxies, and Israel’s defense policy. He covers Israeli defense industry developments for Breaking Defense and previously was Defense News’ correspondent in Israel. Follow him on X: @sfrantzman.

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