Iran is now re-learning the strategic value of its most notorious proxy group.

It was not long ago when Hezbollah appeared to be on its way out. An intense Israeli military campaign in 2024 took out much of its senior leadership, including its former leader, Hassan Nasrallah. The subsequent downfall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad also dealt a major blow to the group, cutting off a vital logistical supply line and bringing to power Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former leader of the al-Nusra Front that fought Hezbollah during the Syrian Civil War. 

As a result, the Lebanese Shia movement went from being the world’s strongest non-state military with a vital land corridor to a largely depleted force besieged on all fronts. This situation has since, however, shifted considerably as the new national security doctrines of Iran and Turkey appear to be working to the benefit of Hezbollah.

The 2026 US-Israeli war on Iran has notably led Tehran to double down on its support for Hezbollah. Before the signing of the MOU between Iran and the United States, Tehran insisted that any agreement must include an end to Israeli military operations in Lebanon. 

Senior Iranian officials even cast Hezbollah as Iran’s partner in the agreement. “In our view there are two parties to this memorandum—one side is America and Israel, and the other side is Iran and Hezbollah,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told a gathering of foreign diplomats in Tehran following the signing of the agreement.

Iran also took the unprecedented step of attacking Israel in response to the latter’s bombing of Hezbollah’s stronghold in southern Beirut in early June.

This arguably unprecedented emphasis on the alliance with Hezbollah is best understood through a national security lens. Having fought an eight-year war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the Islamic Republic’s national security doctrine came to be centered around checking threats emanating from neighboring countries with whom it shares a border. Iran hence rushed to the aid of Iraq against ISIS in 2014, becoming the first country to support Baghdad after the terrorist group seized large swaths of Iraqi territory.

The situation changed, however, after the October 7 attacks, which gave rise to a new Israeli doctrine defined by a much greater willingness to go to war. Israel initiated attacks on Iran in what later came to be known as the 12-Day War in June 2025, and was Washington’s partner in, and instigator of, the more recent conflict with the Islamic Republic. 

This necessitated a shift in Iran’s national security prioritization beyond the immediate neighboring states to account for the fact that Israel now posed an imminent and existential threat. 

It can therefore be argued that support for Hezbollah became a vital national security necessity, which helps explain why Iran is doubling down on its support for the group.

Meanwhile, Iran managed to get the Trump administration to agree to its terms concerning Lebanon. To pave the way for the MOU, Washington pressured Israel to de-escalate in Lebanon, with a ceasefire with Hezbollah subsequently announced. While Israeli military operations in Lebanon have not completely stopped, their tempo has nevertheless decreased significantly. 

The Trump administration has announced a framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel according to which an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territories will be contingent on the disarmament of Hezbollah. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will amount to more than merely an empty attempt to placate Israel and its supporters who staunchly oppose including Lebanon in a broader deal between the United States and Iran.

The increased importance Tehran appears to attach to Hezbollah suggests that any attempts to disarm the group forcefully are likely to stir heightened tensions, potentially even leading to the complete collapse of the MOU, which already appears to have practically unraveled with the latest escalation between the United States and Iran.

Notwithstanding this escalation, it is unclear if Trump is willing to allow the MOU to collapse merely for the sake of Hezbollah’s disarmament. While declaring the MOU “over,” Trump has nevertheless kept the door open to talks with Iran. 

Before the latest tensions, Natan Sachs of the Middle East Institute observed that recent events made it clear that, for the Trump administration, an agreement with Iran outweighs the importance of developments in Lebanon; the same cannot be said for Israel.

While the latest escalation casts doubt on this assessment, it remains the case that the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz constitutes a far more vital American interest than Lebanon. Consequently, there exists a not-so-small possibility—given Iran’s intransigence concerning the strait and Washington’s reluctance to deploy the necessary military forces to open it—that the United States may still be forced to take a softer stance on Hezbollah as part of a broader bargain with Iran, if only to secure the unhindered flow of oil.

Likewise, Israel’s post-October 7 doctrine appears to have prompted Turkey to reassess its national security priorities. Against the backdrop of rising tensions with Israel, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently announced what effectively amounts to a new national security doctrine, where Israeli military operations in Lebanon and Syria are deemed a threat to Turkey itself.

“Turkey’s security does not begin in Hatay, but rather in Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut,” said Erdogan. “We will not allow a fait accompli in our brotherly countries, and we will not turn a blind eye to any attacks targeting them.”

That Erdogan linked Israeli operations in Lebanon to Turkey’s own security supports the notion that Ankara now considers Hezbollah’s armed struggle against Israel as inseparable from Turkish national interests.

Hezbollah lawmaker Ali Fayyad meanwhile stated in a media interview that Turkey’s ambassador to Beirut conveyed messages of support during a recent meeting. “What caught my attention (during the meeting) was the support expressed for the role of the resistance in Lebanon,” said Fayyad.

The most important factor in Turkey’s stance is how it applies to Syria. Not only has Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa shown reluctance to take on Hezbollah militarily, but he has even expressed a willingness to hold talks with the group. “If this [talks with Hezbollah] serves Lebanon’s interests and safeguards Syria’s interests, why not?” al-Sharaa told Al Mashhad TV in a recent interview.

The Syrian president has his own reasons for not wanting to get involved militarily against Hezbollah. Doing so would divert resources away from the far more imminent threat to Damascus posed by ISIS, and is even likely to work to the advantage of that group by inflaming Sunni-Shia sectarian tensions. 

This is especially the case with the recent uptick in ISIS-related terrorism that has struck the heart of the capital, Damascus. Earlier this month, a terrorist bombing at a café near the Palace of Justice left 10 people dead, with ISIS cited as one of the likely culprits. Syrian authorities meanwhile announced the capture of an ISIS-affiliated cell which they said was responsible for the bombings in Damascus during the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron.

However, given that al-Sharaa has previously expressed support for disarming Hezbollah, it is difficult not to draw a connection between his new conciliatory tone towards Hezbollah and the changing national security priorities of his main patron in Ankara.

This is further supported by Israeli media reports according to which Turkey pressed the Syrian government not to get involved in military operations against Hezbollah, to prevent Israel from benefiting from such a scenario.

Meanwhile, not only is there little to suggest that Turkish-Israeli tensions will ease any time soon, but also every indication that these tensions have risen to new heights. Recently, Israel moved to recognize Armenian deaths during World War I as an act of genocide, while also continuing to upgrade its ties with Greece, Turkey’s arch-nemesis. Senior Turkish officials, for their part, have issued unusually strong-worded statements against Israel, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan referring to it as “a burden that humanity can no longer bear.”

These dynamics should not necessarily be taken to mean that Hezbollah now operates in the same favorable strategic environment it once did, but rather that it is no longer as vulnerable as it appeared to be after the 66-day war and the subsequent demise of the Assad dynasty in Syria. 

Ironically, this owes in no small part to the policies of its arch-rival Israel, whose quest for regional hegemony and militaristic doctrine post-October 7 have inadvertently elevated Hezbollah’s status in the eyes of regional heavyweights. Importantly, this includes a NATO member and close American ally, which should prompt Washington to tread even more carefully in how it deals with Hezbollah.

About the Author: Ali Rizk

Ali Rizk is a security analyst who holds a Master of Counterterrorism from Macquarie University in Australia. He has over 15 years of experience in journalism, including five years in Iran. He has written for various outlets, including The American Conservative, Responsible Statecraft, and Middle East Eye, and is a frequent commentator on Al-Jazeera. Follow him on X: @AlipressRizk.

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