The collapse of the Iran ceasefire reveals an important question: who is reshaping the region before diplomats begin negotiating its future?

Before the Iran War restarted last week, the June 15 Memorandum of Understanding between Washington and Tehran generated three different narratives: Washington presented it as a pragmatic deal, Tehran celebrated it as a “great victory,” while Jerusalem viewed it as an abandonment. Although all three narratives contain elements of truth, the MOU captures only a single episode in a much larger regional story. Stepping back from the ceasefire and viewing the regional war as a whole reveals a different picture. 

The region’s three competing axes entered this new phase from considerably different positions: the Shia axis led by Iran, battered but politically recovering; the Abraham Accords axis led by Israel, militarily dominant yet diplomatically more isolated; and the Sunni-pragmatic axis led by Turkey and Qatar, expanding its influence by benefiting from the strategic environment created by Israel’s campaign against the Shia axis. More significantly, it highlights the difference between power and using it. That distinction raises a broader question: are regional powers measured mostly by size and capabilities, or by the price they are willing to pay to reshape the regional order?

Iran’s Shia Axis: Bruised but Still a Regional Power

Iran has experienced one of its most significant strategic setbacks in the history of the Islamic Republic. Its senior leadership has suffered serious losses, its nuclear and missile capabilities have been degraded, and its domestic legitimacy has been weakened. Most importantly, Israel’s campaign against the Shia axis led by Iran severely damaged the “Ring of Fire” architecture that Iran spent years and billions on building. The elimination of Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, the degradation of its military and political position, the eroding of Hamas and the Houthis, and the fall of the Assad regime have dramatically reduced Iran’s ability to project power across the region.

The early collapse of the MOU illustrates an important fact: despite the significant setbacks the regime has suffered, it is still standing; it captures and utilizes the Strait of Hormuz and remains a pivotal actor that Washington cannot ignore. The important lesson is that a damaged regional power can still impose high costs, cause international instability, and influence its rivals’ strategic calculations.

The Abraham Accords Axis: Enabling a New Regional  Security Architecture 

One of the main paradoxes of the current moment is that many of the conditions that enabled the MOU were not established at the negotiating table. They were the result of a prolonged military campaign that significantly altered the regional balance. The blow delivered to Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis; the destruction of Iranian military and political assets; the removal of Hezbollah’s strategic umbrella protecting Assad’s regime were overwhelmingly the product of a sustained Israeli military campaign.

A growing narrative in certain political circles in Washington credits Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and his Turkish patrons as the force that defeated Assad and liberated Syria. The historical sequence, however, tells a different story. It is true that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) executed the final offensive, but only after Israel had systematically dismantled Hezbollah’s capacity to function as Assad’s shield and destroyed over 70 percent of the Syrian army’s capabilities. Those earlier actions left the regime exposed, allowing HTS and Turkey to move swiftly and exploit the opening. In Middle East politics, however, benefiting from a strategic transformation should not be confused with creating the conditions that made it possible.

The Sunni-Pragmatic Axis: Expanding, If Limited, Influence

Among the three competing regional axes, the Turkish-Qatari axis became one of the main beneficiaries of the MOU. While the regional war was largely constructed by the confrontation between the Iranian-led and the Abraham Accords axes, Turkey and Qatar wisely positioned themselves to harness its consequences.

Over the past decade, Turkey and Qatar have continuously increased their regional influence through economic engagement, mediation, activism and assistance for various non-state actors affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The rise of al-Sharaa’s government in Syria and Turkey’s dominant force in the country reinforced its ambitions to expand its regional standing. At the same time, Qatar’s role as an indispensable mediator rests on precisely that formula: maximum access, minimum exposure.

Turkey’s aspirations to regional power status are based on solid foundations, as it enjoys a unique strategic geographic position, maintains one of the largest standing armed forces in the region, has a large population, an expanding diplomatic reach, and aspirations to become a global power.

At the same time, the regional war also reveals an important distinction between power and influence. From this perspective, many would argue that Turkey’s recent expansion occurred in a strategic environment that others paid to construct. 

The Price of Regional Power Status in the Middle East

The regional war refines existing frameworks for understanding regional power. Drawing on the framework proposed by Cline et al. in their chapter Identifying Regional Powers and Their Status, a regional power is characterized by three elements: exceptional hard power capabilities, a willingness to use them, and recognition by both itself and other regional actors as a leading regional actor. However, the regional war suggests that the willingness to absorb costs ultimately becomes the decisive test of regional power.

The comparison between Pakistani and Turkish reactions to Iranian strikes may be useful. In January 2024, Iran launched a missile and drone attack on western Pakistan. Islamabad responded with retaliatory military action within 48 hours, despite the risk of escalation. In 2026, Turkey faced an even more protracted threat. 

During the regional war, Iran launched ballistic missiles that entered Turkish airspace on four separate occasions. Unlike Pakistan, which responded militarily, Ankara chose not to retaliate. Its response was limited to diplomatic protests, public threats, the summoning of the Iranian ambassador, and de-escalation.

This comparison does not aim to determine which government was right or wrong. It indicates contrasting approaches to paying the price: Pakistan accepted the risks of military escalation and involvement, while Turkey chose strategic restraint. 

Returning to the three competing axes, the regional war demonstrates that both Israel and Iran displayed a similar level of willingness. Despite their intense rivalry, both adhered to the same standard: a willingness to confront one another directly and to bear high costs in pursuing their strategic goals. Although Turkey meets the formal criteria of regional power: capabilities (classic hard power), willingness to utilize them, and status attribution, its standard of willingness is different from that of its adversaries.

For Washington, the lesson extends beyond the current ceasefire. Influence and demonstrated power are not necessarily the same. Naturally, mediation, diplomatic access, and political flexibility remain valuable strategic assets, but they should not be confused with the willingness to pay the price to reshape the regional order. That difference may become increasingly crucial as the United States reassesses its partnerships in a rapidly changing Middle East.

About the Author: Gad Yishayahu

Dr. Gad Yishayahu is a visiting lecturer in the Department of International Relations at City, St George’s University of London, and a senior fellow and lead researcher on Security and Crisis at the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum. His research focuses on contemporary foreign policy crises and their implications for the discipline of crisis management.

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