The grievances that fueled Islamist movements in the Middle East are by no means exhausted.

The devastation suffered by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the enfeeblement of its allies Hezbollah and Hamas has reopened the question about the strength and relevance of political Islam as an ideology in the Middle East. Many analysts have concluded that the Islamist forces in the region are in terminal decline. But this may be too hasty an assessment as it does not take into account the underlying societal conditions and aspirations that made political Islam attractive to diverse constituencies in the Middle East and the rest of the Muslim world. 

For nearly half a century, political Islam appeared to be the dominant ideological challenger to the region’s authoritarian political systems (whether traditional-monarchical or secular-nationalist), often supported by Western powers. From the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Iranian Revolution, from Hamas to the Islamic State, Islamist movements promised that the restoration of Islamic governance would solve the region’s political, economic, and moral crises. The Muslim Brotherhood’s most popular slogan was simply “Islam is the solution.”

Today, that confidence has largely evaporated. The collapse of Islamist governments following the Arab Spring, the military defeat of the Islamic State, the ideological moderation of Syria’s new rulers, and the weakening of Iran’s regional position all point toward a profound transformation. But declaring the death of political Islam would be premature. What is fading is not religion in politics but a particular model of Islamist governance.

The deeper aspirations that fueled political Islam—dignity, justice, autonomy, and resistance to foreign domination—remain remarkably resilient. Western analysts have often misunderstood political Islam by reducing it to merely a demand for the implementation of the traditional sharia legal code. That was certainly a component of Islamist ideology. But it was rarely the principal reason millions supported Islamist movements.

The Muslim Brotherhood built support less through theological arguments than through schools, clinics, welfare networks, and opposition to corrupt authoritarian governments. Hamas combined religious legitimacy with Palestinian nationalism. Even Iran’s 1979 revolution succeeded because it united clerics, liberals, leftists, bazaar merchants, and students against the Pahlavi regime and foreign influence. In the aftermath of the recent attacks on Iran, the Islamic regime finds sustenance because of a resurgence of Iranian nationalism rather than religious fervor. 

Political Islam became attractive in the Middle East by the 1970s because secular authoritarianism had failed to solve the social, economic, and political problems of the region. Arab socialism had stagnated. Liberal parties had been crushed. Military regimes became increasingly corrupt and dependent on foreign support. Islamists, when in opposition, offered clean government, social justice, and national dignity.

The Arab Spring briefly seemed to validate this promise. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood won the country’s first genuinely competitive elections. In Tunisia, Ennahda became the dominant political force while presenting itself as compatible with democratic politics. Islamist parties appeared poised to inherit a new Middle East. Instead, they demonstrated the limits of ideological politics.

In Egypt, the Brotherhood proved unable to govern an intensely polarized society or reassure secular opponents, minorities, and state institutions. The military’s return to power ended the experiment, but the Brotherhood had already lost much of the broad coalition and, therefore, the sheen that had brought it to office.

Tunisia followed a different but equally revealing trajectory. Ennahda gradually abandoned many of its Islamist ambitions, presenting itself as a “Muslim democratic” movement comparable to European Christian Democrats. Yet moderation failed to protect either democracy or the party itself. Public frustration focused less on ideological questions than on unemployment, inflation, corruption, and ineffective governance. The lesson was unmistakable. Winning elections proved easier than governing fractured societies burdened by weak institutions and failing economies.

The Islamic State represented an altogether different experiment. It attempted to construct the most uncompromising version of an Islamic state in modern history with the use of brutal force. Its savage, spectacular success briefly attracted recruits from across the world, but its equally dramatic collapse exposed the bankruptcy of governance based almost exclusively on coercion and religious fanaticism. Its defeat was not only military but also ideological. Few Muslims wished to live under such a regime once its reality became visible.

Equally striking has been the evolution of Syria’s Islamist leadership. Having emerged from one of the world’s most militant jihadist movements, Syria’s new rulers have increasingly emphasized order, reconstruction, diplomacy, and international legitimacy rather than the immediate enforcement of an uncompromising Islamist agenda. Whether this moderation proves durable remains uncertain. But the shift itself is significant. It reflects recognition that international acceptance, economic recovery, and domestic stability require ideological pragmatism rather than revolutionary purity.

Iran presents perhaps the most consequential case. For decades, the Islamic Republic projected itself as the successful model of revolutionary political Islam. Through Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, Hamas, and other allied movements, Tehran built what it proudly described as the “Axis of Resistance.”

Recent events have dramatically weakened that vision. Years of sanctions, economic decline, domestic unrest, regional setbacks, and devastating military losses have substantially reduced Iran’s regional influence. Even if the Islamic Republic survives domestically, its revolutionary appeal has diminished considerably. Few movements now look to Tehran as an attractive model for governance.

However, these setbacks should not be mistaken for the disappearance of the grievances that originally empowered Islamist movements. The central demand of the Arab Spring was not the establishment of Islamic law. It was dignity.

Young Arabs demanded accountable government, economic opportunity, freedom from corruption, and national independence. The slogan “bread, freedom, and social justice” captured aspirations that transcended ideology. Islamists succeeded because they appeared capable of delivering these objectives after corrupt authoritarian elites had failed to do so.

Their decline reflects disappointment with their performance rather than rejection of those aspirations. This distinction carries important implications. Western policymakers have frequently viewed political Islam primarily through the lens of religion or security.

The more important question is very different: Can political systems provide dignity, justice, and effective governance? Where governments remain corrupt, authoritarian, economically stagnant, and dependent on foreign support, new forms of political mobilization will inevitably emerge. They may not resemble the Muslim Brotherhood or Iran’s revolutionary model. They may be more nationalist than religious, more populist than ideological, or blend Islamic values with democratic politics. The underlying demand, however, will remain the same.

Political Islam’s apparent retreat therefore represents neither the triumph of secular liberalism nor pro-Western authoritarianism. Rather, it marks the exhaustion of one historical model. The future is likely to belong to movements that borrow selectively from Islamic values while placing greater emphasis on democratic legitimacy, competence, nationalism, economic performance, and state effectiveness. Religion may remain an important source of legitimacy, but increasingly as one element within broader political projects rather than as the exclusive organizing principle of the state.

For American policy, this transformation offers both opportunities and cautions. Washington should resist the temptation to interpret the decline of traditional Islamist movements as evidence that authoritarian stability has finally prevailed. Suppressing one ideological current does not eliminate the grievances that produced it.

Equally important, the United States should avoid treating all politically active Islamic movements as identical. The differences between democratic Islamists, nationalist Islamic parties, and transnational jihadist organizations are profound. Policies that lump them together have repeatedly produced strategic failures.

Most fundamentally, American policymakers should recognize that the central political struggle in the Middle East is about legitimacy. Governments that provide dignity, accountability, economic opportunity, and national autonomy are likely to command enduring public support regardless of whether they describe themselves as secular or Islamic. Governments that fail in these respects will continue to face challenges, even if political Islam as traditionally understood gradually recedes. The age of revolutionary political Islam may indeed be drawing to a close. But the search for dignity that made it possible is far from over.

About the Author: Mohammed Ayoob

 ​​Mohammed Ayoob is a university distinguished professor emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University. His books include The Many Faces of Political Islam (Second Edition, 2020), Will the Middle East Implode? (2014), and, most recently, From Regional Security to Global IR: An Intellectual Journey (2024). He was also the editor of Assessing the War on Terror (2013).

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