Kashmiri masked protester waving ISIS flags during clashes in Srinagar, India, after Friday prayers on December 21, 2018. The Islamic world is seeing a notable increase in Sunni-, rather than Shia-, inspired violent extremism, writes Ali Rizk. (Shutterstock/Musaib Mushtaq)
Why Middle East Terror Threats Haven’t Changed Much
Despite the Trump administration’s attempts to shift focus to Iranian-backed Shia terrorism, Sunni extremism is still going strong.
Salafi-jihadist violence has returned to the headlines in the last few months. Last September, I wrote in The National Interest that the “Sunni-centric” counterterrorism policy Washington embraced after the 9/11 attacks appears to be dissipating in favor of a more “Shia-centric” policy. This seemed especially clear following the removal of terrorism sanctions on Syria and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and the campaign against Iran.
Since that time, senior American officials have made statements that seem to confirm such a pivot. Speaking at the recent Federalist Society convention, Secretary of State Marco Rubio explicitly emphasized the Shia dimension of the struggle with Iran, describing its leadership as “radical Shia clerics—who are motivated in their decision-making by theology”.
In an earlier speech in Athens, Rubio appeared to place the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran at the center of a civilizational struggle, comparing it to the ancient Persian empire. Western civilization, he said, was incompatible with “fanatics like the radical mullahs of Iran, whose cult of death hails child suicide bombers as national heroes, and portrays martyrdom as an end to itself.”
This portrayal of Iran echoes the narrative traditionally reserved for the Sunni extremist brand of Salafi-jihadism espoused by groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
For example, on the fifth anniversary of 9/11 in 2006, President George W. Bush spoke of a civilizational struggle, and in separate remarks stated that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates “embraced a cult of death.” His successor, President Barack Obama, described ISIS as “a brutal, vicious death cult.”
Senior representatives of US allied Sunni states have also recently made arguments that appear to support the notion of Shia armed groups replacing Salafi-jihadis as the greater global terrorist threat.
In a New York Times op-ed, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington, Reema Bandar Al-Saud, likened the Yemeni Houthi movement (also known as Ansarallah) to ISIS during the latter’s earlier days. “The Houthis today are what ISIS was before it seized Mosul in Iraq and proclaimed a caliphate: a terrorist movement the world underestimated,” said Bandar, calling for a global coalition against Ansarullah akin to that which was formed against ISIS.
However, there is strong evidence that “Sunni extremism” remains a more pressing threat from a counterterrorism perspective than Iran and its Shia allies.
Two recent events in particular appear to support this verdict: the Flydubai incident in late September, and the more recent church massacre in the Jordanian city of Karak.
In the first case, an Omani co-pilot on a flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv attempted to seize control of the aircraft with the intention of crashing it into Ben Gurion Airport, only to be subdued by passengers. According to Emirati authorities, the Omani national, identified as Hamam al-Hammami, was inspired by the 9/11 attacks and started to embrace extremism during a stay in Australia, where he frequented a mosque that has been described as having Salafi-Wahhabi roots. Based on media reports, the Omani national sought to carry out his botched operation as an act of revenge for Israel’s war on Gaza.
There are interesting parallels between this case and that of the Bondi terrorist attack that happened in Australia in late 2025. That attack was carried out by the father-son duo Naveed and Sajid Akram, who opened fire during a Hanukkah festival, killing 15 people.
In both cases, there was a desire to kill as many Jewish people as possible, albeit by different means. Like al-Hammami’s case, Israel’s war on Gaza was also reportedly a major factor behind the Bondi massacre. Both cases were also Salafi-jihadi motivated, with al-Hammani being inspired by Al-Qaeda and the Akrams by ISIS. Like al-Hammami, Naveed—the younger Akram—also frequented a Salafi-affiliated mosque in Australia, which is suspected to have played a role in his radicalization.
Therefore, there is a case to be made about a potential pattern emerging where the Gaza War has catalyzed Salafi indoctrination, leading to a new anti-Jewish Salafi-jihadi phenomenon exemplified by the Flydubai terrorism attempt and the Bondi terrorist attacks. Given the recency of the Gaza War and the centrality of the Palestinian cause in the Muslim world, it is unlikely that this phenomenon will dissipate anytime soon.
The Jordan church massacre, meanwhile, marked the first time in which that country’s Christian community was deliberately targeted in a terrorist attack, with a small group of assailants killing nine people after opening fire during a funeral ceremony.
Following the capture of the perpetrators, the Jordanian army bombed what it described as terrorist targets in the southern Syrian province of Deraa believed to be linked to the church massacre.
According to the Jordanian government, over twenty ISIS terrorists were killed in the Deraa operation. This suggests that Amman likely obtained information from the perpetrators linking ISIS in Syria to the massacre.
There is reason to believe that what happened in Jordan reflects a broader pattern of an uptick in ISIS activity in Syria’s neighboring countries. In Iraq, for example, there has been a notable recent rise in the terrorist group’s attacks, while Lebanese security agencies recently discovered large quantities of weapons and explosives in a house in the northern city of Tripoli. According to local Lebanese media, the owner of the house is suspected of having ties with ISIS.
In the aftermath of the Jordan church massacre, Lebanese security officials also reportedly revealed that high-ranking ISIS members were in custody and warned of the threat posed by the terrorist group.
This suggests that the ISIS threat may be spreading from Syria to neighboring countries, and that Syria in its current state may be becoming an exporter of cross-border terrorism.
As is the case with the Gaza catalyst of Salafi-jihadism, it is unlikely that this threat will dissipate anytime soon, not least given UN reports of ISIS members being absorbed into Syria’s state security agencies.
Meanwhile, there is scant evidence supporting the notion that Iran and/or its Shia extremist allies pose a similar, let alone bigger threat.
This is not to say that Iran and its allies have not been suspected of recent involvement in terrorist activity.
Britain’s Prime Minister Andy Burnham stated that it was “highly likely” that Iran was behind a bombing plot targeting the RAF Fairford airbase. The American Department of Justice meanwhile accused an alleged member of the Iranian-aligned Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah of being behind the plot in collaboration with the IRGC. Tehran, however, has previously denied any involvement.
The same alleged member of Kataib Hezbollah had earlier been extradited to the United States on charges of orchestrating and planning attacks against Western civilian targets.
According to the American Department of Justice, the individual in question was seeking retribution for the assassination of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Kataib Hezbollah, however, denied that the individual was a member of the group.
Regardless of whether and how Iran and its Shia allies may have been involved in such plots, they appear to pale in comparison with the spectacular mass-casualty terror plots like the flydubai incident, and the religiously targeted acts of terrorism like the Jordan church massacre.
While they may yet emerge as a global Shia jihadi threat, not least given the Iran War and the Khamenei assassination, the Sunni extremist Salafi-jihadi strain of terrorist violence will likely remain the more ominous threat for some time.
About the Author: Ali Rizk
Ali Rizk is a security analyst who holds a master’s degree in Counterterrorism from Macquarie University in Australia. He has over 15 years of journalism experience, including five years in Iran. He has written for outlets including The American Conservative, Responsible Statecraft, and Middle East Eye, and he is a frequent commentator on Al Jazeera. Follow him on X: @AlipressRizk.
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