An outside view of Tesla’s car factory in Fremont, California. Many US advanced technology companies rely heavily on Chinese components for import, an Achilles’ heel in a trade war between the two countries. (Shutterstock/Tada Images)
How America Can Break China’s Grip on Critical Minerals and Energy Supply Chains
American diplomacy to preserve access to Chinese rare earth minerals and other components is vital, but is not a long-term substitute for supply chains that avoid China altogether.
Last year, in response to escalating US tariffs on Chinese goods, China threatened to cut off America’s access to the rare earth minerals used in much of the sophisticated technology manufactured in America, from smartphones to fighter jets to electric vehicles.
The Trump administration’s subsequent diplomacy with China has bought time. Following an October 2025 meeting with President Donald Trump in South Korea, Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed to a truce that put those threats on hold until November 2026. On September 23, however, as Xi arrived in Washington for a summit, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that the truce would be further extended until January 10, 2027.
These repeated stays of execution are helpful, and indeed necessary. But a temporary truce is not a solution when China seems determined to weaponize its rare earths production. Even during the truce, Beijing still requires licenses for exports of several key rare earths, and it controls most of the world’s capacity to process them, so American factories remain dependent on its decisions.
If the truce expires and the restrictions take effect, this problem will become far worse. A factory in Ohio could need Beijing’s permission to sell certain products overseas if they contain even trace amounts of Chinese rare earths. China could also restrict access to the machines and expertise other countries need to process these minerals themselves. In effect, Beijing would gain unprecedented influence over global supply chains for electronics, cars, batteries and other in-demand goods.
Put simply, Beijing’s control of critical mineral processing is an unacceptable danger to US companies and workers that must end as quickly as possible. That danger extends to energy security as well: minerals and processed materials feed the factories that make batteries and other energy equipment, while China’s manufacturing dominance creates another point of dependence. The United States needs to be self-sufficient—either on its own or through linkages with trusted allies and partners—in producing both the crucial materials and the technologies critical to its energy infrastructure.
Breaking China’s Grip Requires Both Minerals and Manufacturing
The export controls Beijing put on hold last year didn’t stop at rare earths. They also covered lithium batteries and the processed graphite used to make them. Rare earths, graphite, and batteries are not interchangeable, but the restrictions expose the same problem: Beijing can exert leverage at multiple stages, from processing materials to supplying finished energy equipment.
This is the link between the mineral threat and America’s renewable energy supply chains. Even a factory that can buy American-made inputs remains vulnerable if it depends on Chinese-made batteries or other energy technologies. Meeting today’s electricity demand will take an all-of-the-above approach that pairs America’s dominance in oil and gas with nuclear, solar, and other sources. But the solar and battery parts of that mix still lean too much on China.
Against this backdrop, the Trump administration made the prudent decision to maintain a key manufacturing tax credit for renewable energy products known as Section 45X, originally passed as part of the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022. Section 45X has successfully drawn major investments into American factories making solar panels, energy storage batteries, and many clean energy components. But many of the base materials those factories need still are not made in the United States in large enough quantities. Building the factories without securing their inputs would simply shift the point at which America depends on China. Washington should continue incentivizing domestic production of these components while strengthening the material supply chains that support it.
Congress should also finish expediting permitting approvals for critical minerals. That is the other half of the manufacturing strategy: domestic factories need dependable sources of the materials they use. A set of four bills now before Congress would speed mine permits, create a $2.5 billion strategic reserve, and protect the supply of materials the military needs. The Senate should pass them as soon as possible in the upcoming lame-duck session.
The US Treasury also needs to get its China-content rules right. Congress last year preserved the 45X credit, but stipulated that a factory that sources too much of a product’s cost from Chinese suppliers would lose the credit. To be clear, a plant that has no choice but to buy a component from China simply because there is no American alternative should not lose its credit for doing so. If an overly-strict application of the rules causes US factories to close before those replacements exist, the only beneficiary will be Beijing.
The administration should treat every month of the trade truce as an opportunity to take a series of connected steps: expanding access to critical materials, building American manufacturing capacity, and keeping domestic factories competitive as alternative supply chains develop. Every pause buys America more time to build, and reducing dependence at both the materials and manufacturing stages is the only truly permanent answer to Beijing’s leverage.
Diplomacy can help manage a dependency, but only resilient supply chains can end it. The path forward involves more energy, more domestic processing and production, and more key technologies made right here in the United States or by trusted partners. That’s an investment that will make America stronger, safer, and more prosperous—and weaken Chinese leverage over American factories and US energy security.
About the Author: Nick Snyder
Nick Snyder is a nonresident senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where he focuses on the Indo-Pacific. He also serves as senior vice president at American Global Strategies. Snyder is a former distinguished member of the US Senior Foreign Service, where he spent 23 years. Most recently, he was chief of staff to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau. He also served as Vice President Mike Pence’s special advisor for Asia and the Pacific. Snyder has held numerous senior roles at the State Department, including director of the Office of Japanese Affairs, deputy coordinator of the Office of China Coordination, and acting principal deputy assistant secretary for the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy.
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