Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi speaks to the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2022. The Trump administration has taken a keen interest in UN reforms, and has done much to implement political and economic reforms ensuring the organization’s long-term viability, but more remains to be done. (Shutterstock/Wirestock Creators)
The Trump Administration Cannot Rest on Its Laurels at the United Nations
President Trump effectively has two more years with which to achieve his goals at the United Nations—and cannot count on his successor to follow through with his reforms.
The Trump administration is rightly proud of its efforts to reshape US policy toward the United Nations and other international organizations and to press for reforms. Its record of success is impressive: from securing budget cuts to reassessing US membership in UN organizations to ending failing UN peacekeeping operations, the Trump administration’s team at the UN, led by Ambassador Mike Waltz, has put many points on the board.
Much work remains to be done, however. And as Washington prepares for the upcoming transition of power on Capitol Hill in January, the Trump administration must remain focused if it hopes to build on these accomplishments and to secure its reforms for the future.
Here’s What Trump’s UN Team Can Still Do in the Next Two Years
One of the highest priorities over the final two years of President Donald Trump’s second term should be to make sure US taxpayer dollars are used as intended by international organizations, not misspent or diverted to support frivolous or sinister causes.
Congress enacted provisions in 2024 and 2026 requiring all multilateral entities receiving State Department funding to agree to global oversight access to US inspectors general. In general, UN organizations have resisted allowing such access. Yet, some organizations already have similar agreements with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). That the UN is resisting US oversight while allowing the EU such access should be a source of bipartisan indignation, both to Congress and the executive branch. In the coming year, the United States should make oversight access agreements mandatory before disbursing additional funding to UN organizations.
A key target for this effort is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Despite an unprecedented infusion of nearly $4 billion from the United States over the past year, OCHA refuses to comply with US requests for information on allegations of fraud, and has rejected access for US Inspectors General in its memorandum of understanding with the US. This point-blank and categorical refusal should be a deal-breaker for additional funds.
Another priority should be securing ongoing reforms to the United Nations in New York. The United States successfully persuaded the UN to cut its regular budget last year. But cuts to expenses where the US has expressed particular concern have not been fully realized. In particular, the United States’ repeated requests for the UN to reduce its salaries to the level of equivalent US civil servants and reform its benefits and pension plan—a common-sense program that would substantially reduce the organization’s long-term costs—have not yet been implemented. The review of over 40,000 UN activities to eliminate outdated, duplicative, or unnecessary mandates has likewise stalled.
Similarly, the United States has announced that it will no longer participate in or support the UN’s regional economic and social commissions—which the State Department has determined offer nothing that is not done better by the World Bank, IMF, regional development banks, or other UN programs. However, the UN regular budget proposal for 2027 would dedicate over 8 percent of the entire budget and over 15 percent of UN staff to the five economic commissions for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Western Asia. Eliminating them would cut more of the budget and posts than the US negotiated last year.
Similarly, organizations like the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and the UN Conference on Trade and Development—both of which the United States has withdrawn from—receive tens of millions from the UN regular budget. The UN charges the United States for these expenses. The US should seek to end obligatory funding for UNRWA and UNCTAD in the regular budget; if individual governments choose to support these agencies, they should do so voluntarily. It is worth noting that Congress has explicitly prohibited the US government from funding UNRWA, and when it provided funding to OCHA, it was with the understanding (and assurances from the UN) that the funding would not go to UNRWA. However, now that UNRWA is in deficit, it is seeking funding from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) which is managed by the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, who also heads OCHA. The US has given $100 million to CERF in 2026; it must vigorously block any use of these funds from going to UNRWA.
More broadly, the UN has two scales of assessment—one for the regular budget and one for peacekeeping—that are used to charge member governments their mandatory share of those budgets. The UN currently charges the United States 22 percent of the regular budget and over 26 percent of the peacekeeping budget. It charges China almost as much. Setting aside the concern of the cost to US taxpayers, it is not fiscally or politically healthy for the UN to rely on two major states for roughly half of its total expenses.
The scales are adjusted every three years, and the next opportunity for renegotiation will take place in the fall of 2027. The United States needs to begin its preparations now if it hopes to lower the US assessment for these budgets, which could lead to billions of dollars in savings for the United States. Payment of US arrears to the UN should similarly be conditioned on lowering the maximum assessments.
Even After Trump Leaves Office, UN Reform Must Continue
Finally, the Trump administration needs to engage with UN organizations, including those it has withdrawn from, to articulate a reform agenda that would result in continued or renewed US participation and support. The United States has successfully pressed for reforms in some organizations like the World Meteorological Organization and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. It has been less successful elsewhere. The World Health Organization (WHO), for instance, has not had serious reform discussions in Trump’s second term. A new Director General will be elected in 2027, and the United States—which withdrew from the organization in January and no longer funds it—should meet with candidates to discuss what reforms might elicit America’s return.
Likewise, the Human Rights Council remains unreformed, and its special procedures are, as even Secretary-General Antonio Guterres admitted, “totally out of control.” The United States should prod other governments to implement reforms to improve elections and root out institutional anti-Israel bias.
Why does this matter? When President Joe Biden entered office in January 2021, he reversed Trump’s decisions to withdraw from a number of UN-aligned organizations, and reengaged with the WHO and the Human Rights Council. Crucially, even though Biden and other Democrats agreed on the necessity of certain reforms to these bodies, he took that step without securing any, in the ultimately futile hope that reforms could be achieved from within. That step effectively erased four years of Trump’s efforts and ensured the work would start again from scratch in 2025. If past is prologue, a future Democratic president could do the same—so if the Trump administration wants to change the organizations for the better, it must work tirelessly to do so before he leaves office in 2029.
Trump and his staff deserve credit for resetting the US relationship with the UN and other international organizations, but the job is far from done. They are likely to run up against opposition from the Democratic Congress in the months ahead. But Congress is unlikely to easily secure the votes necessary to force policy changes given the 60-vote threshold in the Senate, much less overriding a presidential veto. This gives the Trump administration an opportunity to secure additional reforms over the next two years. Americans of all stripes should hope it seizes the opportunity.
About the Author: Brett D. Schaefer
Brett D. Schaefer is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he focuses on multilateral treaties, peacekeeping, and the United Nations and international organizations. Before joining AEI, Mr. Schaefer was the Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at the Heritage Foundation. Previously, he was a member of the United Nations Committee on Contributions and an expert on the UN Task Force for the United States Institute of Peace. Mr. Schaefer also served as an assistant for International Criminal Court policy in the Department of Defense. Follow him on X @BrettDSchaefer.
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