Peacekeepers from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) assist Lebanese forces in monitoring southern Lebanon and the Israel-Lebanon border on April 8, 2025. Replacing UNIFIL with a smaller UN security force won’t get Lebanon any closer to disarming Hezbollah. (Shutterstock/Sebastian Castelier)
Why a New UN Security Force Won’t Disarm Hezbollah
The expiration of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon’s mandate should not force the international community to suggest what is effectively the same failed approach to Lebanon’s old problems.
“Follow the liar to the door” is a Lebanese proverb akin to “give someone enough rope and they will hang themselves.” Since 2000, Israel has applied this policy by exposing its neighbor’s endless excuses for keeping Hezbollah armed. After Lebanon’s civil war ended in 1990, Beirut exempted Hezbollah from a national disarmament campaign to resist Israeli occupation of part of the country. When Israel withdrew in 2000 under UN Resolution 425, Hezbollah maintained its arms, citing minor border disputes.
In 2006, Hezbollah sparked a devastating 33-day war that ended with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, under which Lebanon pledged to disarm the Iranian-backed militia. The existing UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was expanded to 10,000 troops with heavy weaponry. Yet whenever UNIFIL tried busting Hezbollah’s arms depots, the Lebanese state and military obstructed peacekeepers, citing “Lebanese sovereignty.”
In October 2023, Hezbollah attacked Israel again, forcing Israel to establish a depopulated southern border security zone. Following UNIFIL’s failure to help Lebanon disarm Hezbollah, Washington rightly ended its mandate, and Israel offered to return the security zone if Beirut disarmed Hezbollah.
In June, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States signed the Trilateral Framework Agreement, creating withdrawal pilot zones. However, when Israel handed over a sliver of land, the Lebanese army deployed without forcefully confiscating Hezbollah’s weapons.
On Monday, US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz landed in Lebanon. “Wheels down in Beirut. Lebanon has a real opportunity to chart a sovereign, secure future,” he posted on X. “America is here to support that, and to be clear about what it takes. That is why I am here on the ground to hear the truth about the transition and next steps of the UN forces and aid.”
Washington seems willing to replace UNIFIL with a smaller UN force. It should not. On paper, a leaner, more focused verification mechanism makes sense. Without credible certification that Hezbollah’s military infrastructure has been dismantled, the Trilateral Framework Agreement cannot move forward, and Israel will remain reluctant to complete or sustain its withdrawals.
Yet before America invests in a successor mission, it must confront an uncomfortable reality: replacing UNIFIL with another UN-authorized verification force will not solve Lebanon’s crisis.
First, any UN-authorized verification mission will run straight into the same structural obstacles that paralyzed UNIFIL. From the moment a new force deploys, its mandate and freedom of movement will be systematically challenged by Hezbollah and the Lebanese state institutions it dominates. Whenever international monitors attempt to investigate suspected militant activity, they will be met with bureaucratic obstruction, roadblocks, and diplomatic pushback—all justified under the banner of protecting Lebanese “sovereignty.”
Second, in the lexicon of Hezbollah and its allies in Beirut, “sovereignty” has a very specific operational meaning: international monitors have zero authority to inspect private property. This restriction alone renders any verification mission hollow.
Hezbollah does not store its rockets, drones, and heavy munitions in clearly marked military bases out in the open. Virtually all of Hezbollah’s arsenals are hidden inside private residential homes and civilian buildings, which routinely double as the entry and exit points to the group’s vast underground tunnel networks. If a UN verification team is barred from entering private residences without the permission of local authorities—authorities who are either sympathetic to or intimidated by Hezbollah—then international observers will never be able to certify disarmament.
Third, Washington must recognize why the Lebanon-Israel peace process is actually stalled. The diplomatic impasse is not caused by the impending expiration of UNIFIL’s mandate at the end of 2026, nor is it the result of the lack of an international verification force. The process is frozen because of the behavior of the Lebanese state itself.
When Israeli forces withdrew from West Zawtar, in south Lebanon, the Lebanese army deployed into the vacated area, yet failed to confiscate Hezbollah’s weapons. A state army that arrives on the scene only to coexist with an illegal militia is not restoring state authority; it is merely providing official cover for a non-state actor.
Fourth, Lebanese leaders justify this paralysis by arguing that forcibly restoring state sovereignty and disarming Hezbollah would ignite a devastating civil war. Beneath that argument lies a grim political calculation: Beirut has effectively decided that true national independence is simply not worth fighting for.
American diplomacy cannot want Lebanese sovereignty more than the Lebanese government does. Ambassador Waltz is correct that Lebanon faces a defining choice about its future, and US aid and diplomatic backing should be tied strictly to tangible results on the ground.
No nation in history has ever achieved genuine independence without a fight, and Lebanon will be no exception. If Beirut truly wants a sovereign, secure future, it cannot outsource the job to a new UN verification force—Lebanon must fight Hezbollah for its sovereign independence.
About the Author: Hussain Abdul-Hussain
Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where he focuses on the Gulf region and Yemen. Hussain earned a degree in history and archaeology from the American University of Beirut. He joined FDD after a 20-year career in journalism, during which he served as a reporter and editor at The Daily Star in Beirut, helped set up and manage the Arabic satellite network Alhurra Iraq in Washington, DC, and headed the Washington bureau of Kuwaiti daily newspaper Alrai. He has also written for The New York Times and The Washington Post. He is the author of The Arab Case for Israel: And Other Essays from a Distant Conflict.
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