A mountaintop view of the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon. Hezbollah has bought land in Lebanon as a financial asset, for money laundering, and as a base of operations for hostile actions against other Lebanese factions and Israel. (Shutterstock/phil_berry)
Is Hezbollah Secretly Buying Up Christian Land in Lebanon?
For decades, Hezbollah has conducted illicit land purchases in Lebanon—both to expand its influence outside its traditional areas of influence and to launder money.
A series of controversial purchases of land and real estate by Shiite investors in several predominantly Christian areas in Lebanon surfaced in October as a subject of national political debate, raising questions of whether some of the buyers are connected to Hezbollah.
Throughout Lebanon’s history, its many confessional groups have periodically bought land from one another, most of the time for benign reasons. What is unusual about the recent spate of purchases is their rapid and expensive nature, involving large-scale transactions targeting vast tracts of land as well as adjacent properties potentially aimed at consolidating and expanding real estate holdings in specific areas—a pattern that suggests an organized land acquisition. Is there a centrally coordinated plan to acquire land in Christian areas? What are the implications? And is Hezbollah indeed behind it?
If such a plan exists, it could raise concerns about strategic and security repercussions as well as demographic implications. But there is also the risk that the land deal is tied to various forms of illicit finance, such as laundering criminal proceeds, concealing assets, and evading law enforcement. These concerns take on added significance in light of the Lebanese government’s recent decision declaring Hezbollah’s military and security activities unlawful and ordering their immediate prohibition.
Hezbollah’s land and real estate acquisition in predominantly Christian areas, particularly in strategic sites, is hardly a new trend. The issue dates back longer than a decade, and Hezbollah is well-known for expanding its presence into communities outside its support base through purchasing land it can use for militant activity. What is different today is that the group’s military and political dominance and regional influence have been eroded in the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and the subsequent regional conflicts—giving other factions in Lebanon a fighting chance at blocking further sales and maintaining peace.
Hezbollah Has Bought Land in Christian Areas Before
At the center of the controversy are recent reports of land acquisitions by a Shiite businessman involving dozens of properties across several municipalities in Lebanon’s Metn district east of Beirut. In addition to reaching the Lebanese judiciary—following a complaint submitted by Lebanese Member of Parliament (MP) Razi El-Hage before a Lebanese court requesting the source of funds be verified before the transaction can go through—the case has now come to the attention of the presidency.
According to a television report by Lebanon’s MTV news network, a Shiite businessman named Reda Jaffal purchased 83 properties across several neighboring areas in Upper Metn. Although the purchases in question were quite old—dating back to as early as 2008—the transaction sparked outrage when it became intertwined with concerns over Hezbollah’s broader influence in Lebanon. Indeed, some Lebanese commentators have argued that the funds could have been secured through Jaffal’s alleged ties to Nazem Said Ahmad, another businessman who was sanctioned by the United States over alleged Hezbollah financing. (Jaffal has denied ties to Ahmad, and denied that the properties were purchased on behalf of any political party in Lebanon.)
Beyond the controversy surrounding Jaffal’s land purchases, the broader issues pertain to the historical pattern of land and real estate acquisitions linked to Hezbollah in predominantly Christian areas of Lebanon, raising questions about their potential strategic, demographic, and illicit financial implications.
With respect to concerns over Hezbollah’s land acquisition in areas of key strategic importance, the historical precedents are well-documented. One of the most revealing examples of how land disputes intersect with broader questions of security and territorial control is the case of a Lebanese village called Lasa. While describing Lasa as a village where Shiite and Christian communities had coexisted peacefully, a study published by the Lebanese Center for Research and Studies highlighted a land dispute that involved encroachments by a Shiite religious cleric on church-owned lands in 2012, preceded by tensions dating back to 2001 over the legitimacy of historical land registrations. According to the study, Hezbollah’s then growing political power in the area, as well as the Maronite Church’s preference for compromise, favored a negotiated settlement rather than judicial adjudication. More significantly, the study noted Lasa’s strategic position along a corridor connecting the Bekaa Valley to the Mediterranean coast through a succession of Shiite villages, reportedly without passing through any Christian communities. This route was reportedly used during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war to transport Hezbollah militants and military assets from the Bekaa to coastal Mount Lebanon, and then to southern Lebanon.
More broadly, concerns over strategic land acquisition with alleged links to Hezbollah date back to at least 2007, with reports highlighting the group’s efforts to strengthen its strategic position in the aftermath of the 2006 war. These reports raised apprehensions that such purchases could potentially create a Shiite security belt linking Hezbollah’s strongholds in southern Lebanon to the Bekaa Valley. A 2007 investigation by The Sunday Telegraph reported that Hezbollah was buying lands owned by Christians and other non-Shiites north of the Litani River to rebuild its defenses in anticipation of a future war with Israel. The investigation documented land acquisitions by wealthy Shiite businessman Ali Tajeddine, who was alleged to have links to Hezbollah, although he denied any such association. In 2007, Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt likewise accused Hezbollah of purchasing large tracts of land in Jezzine, Aley, and Shouk el-Gharb to establish security perimeters.
Controversial land purchases by Shiite businessmen with links to Hezbollah were also the subject of an investigation by The New York Times in 2011, which more broadly reported on Hezbollah’s money laundering practices. Depicted as potentially the richest land deal in Lebanon’s history, the article examined a major purchase by the aforementioned Nazem Said Ahmad on the predominantly Christian Chouf coast, framing it as a deal that fit Hezbollah’s reported pattern of land acquisition in largely Christian areas that primarily serve strategic purposes. Local reports, including MTV, identified the property as located in Dalhamiyah, within the jurisdiction of Dibbiyeh in the Iqlim al-Kharroub region, and noting that the land was selected for its strategic location—offering access to the Chouf, control over key routes in Iqlim al-Kharroub, and overlooking the coastal highway between Naameh and Rmeileh.
By Controlling Land, Hezbollah Controls Lebanon
The demographic implications of an organized land acquisition, in terms of property ownership and settlement, can be detrimental to the composition of local communities in Lebanon. After all, Lebanon’s political system rests on a delicate sectarian balance, and any significant demographic shift would be consequential in this regard.
With that said, many instances of controversial purchases have been documented, potentially indicative of efforts to exert soft influence through demography. For instance, an October 2026 article by An-Nahar discusses the demographic ramifications of the above-referenced Upper Metn purchases, citing remarks by a land historian that acquisitions in key areas in Metn by Shiite investors could eventually facilitate the establishment of a Shiite residential presence linking Zahle in Bekaa in eastern Lebanon to northern Metn, while noting that demographic change remains hypothetical until residential construction projects materialize. A 2016 article by L’Orient-Le Jour pointed to Ali Tajeddine’s purchase of a large piece of land in Dibbiyeh and a proposed zoning change allowing residential development, describing fears by Christian and Druze communities that such development could form demographic continuity between predominantly Shiite areas, altering the character of the Chouf. A 2012 article by Ya Libnan discussed similar concerns by Christian Druze politicians and citizens, citing purchases in Aramoun, Jdeidh, and Hadath by Shiite businessmen reportedly linked to Hezbollah.
Land acquisition linked to Hezbollah could also enable illicit financial activities in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s links to money laundering and sanctions evasion networks are well-known. While broadly investigating the now-defunct Lebanese Canadian Bank’s alleged involvement in a global money-laundering network connected to Hezbollah and drug trafficking, the above-referenced NYT report examined the bank’s reported role in financing the purchase of a vast tract of land in Lebanon’s Chouf region, involving individuals reportedly linked to Hezbollah. As part of a subsequent US action, US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara announced in June 2013 that the Lebanese Canadian Bank had agreed to forfeit $102 million to the United States to resolve money-laundering and civil forfeiture claims brought by the United States against the bank and its assets.
More recently, in April 2023, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced sanctions on 52 individuals and entities for their involvement in an international money-laundering and sanctions-evasion network supporting Hezbollah financier Nazem Said Ahmad. According to the Treasury, several mechanisms were employed to conceal ownership and move funds across jurisdictions including using shell companies, fraudulent invoices, falsified diamond certificates, and transactions involving precious stones, luxury goods, and artwork. A separate US federal indictment in April 2023 identifies Nazem Said Ahmad’s involvement in real estate development and lists sanctioned companies with property-related names
The controversy has prompted calls for reforms, including proposed legislation to strengthen municipal oversight and greater transparency in land registration, alongside existing measures, such as a circular requiring notaries to verify parties’ identities and sources of funds in concerned transactions. It remains to be seen whether reported acquisitions of land and property in areas beyond Hezbollah’s traditional support base, if undertaken on its behalf, could provide the group with a means to recalibrate its geostrategic position.
About the Author: Rany Ballout
Rany Ballout is a New York-based political risk and due diligence analyst with extensive experience in the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in International Studies from the University of Montreal in Canada and a bachelor’s degree in Linguistics from Uppsala University in Sweden. His views are his own.
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