The lack of a “right to repair” rule for military equipment has cost the Pentagon billions of dollars per year. Now Congress may be on the verge of establishing one.

The United States military spends hundreds of billions of dollars purchasing sophisticated weapons every year. Yet the armed forces’ ownership of a physical weapon often does not include the necessary technical information—or even the legal right—to maintain or repair that weapon independently of the manufacturer. In a variety of military programs, outside contractors retain control over proprietary software, engineering drawings, and maintenance procedures. This in turn forces the military to depend on that contractor for ongoing repairs, driving up costs and hindering military readiness.

In recent years, Congress has considered legislation to reduce that dependence by requiring the military to maintain a “right to repair”: in other words, demanding that it be allowed to perform in-house maintenance on the new defense products it buys. This could save billions of dollars per year—but, predictably, has been fought tooth and nail by the defense industry, and obstructed up to the present.

Contractor Repairs Are Costing the Pentagon Billions Per Year

The military is not the only institution in the United States that has contended with the issue of a right-to-repair clause. The topic often comes up in discussion of certain classes of civilian goods—notably cars, electronics, and heavy machinery—which manufacturers attempt to make difficult to repair in an attempt to secure ongoing revenue from maintenance needs. For instance, farm equipment manufacturer John Deere fought for many years to ensure its tractors and other machinery could be repaired only at John Deere-owned facilities, effectively creating a services monopoly and increasing costs for farmers. Five US states and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ultimately filed an antitrust lawsuit against John Deere, which it settled in July 2026 and agreed to concessions on right to repair.

For the Department of Defense, the right-to-repair dispute largely centers on technical data rights: that is, the licenses governing the Pentagon’s access to and use of things like engineering drawings, software, technical specifications, and maintenance information. Existing law generally gives the government broad rights to certain operation and maintenance data, but more detailed manufacturing and process information can remain proprietary.

The problem becomes acute when the Pentagon hasn’t negotiated adequate rights before purchasing equipment. A September 2025 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, Weapons Sustainment: DOD Can Improve Planning and Management of Data Rights, examined data-rights planning for major weapons programs. A proposed reform would enable military maintenance facilities and qualified third parties to perform more repairs without relying exclusively on original manufacturers; but these reforms often have not been implemented in the past, with detrimental consequences.

One clear example of the impact of IP restrictions on military readiness has been the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35 Lightning II) program. Under the Pentagon’s contract with F-35 manufacturer Lockheed Martin, that company’s technicians are the only ones allowed to repair the aircraft. Repair backlogs for the F-35 have reportedly exceeded 10,000 components at various points, demonstrating the difficulties of sustaining a complex, contractor-dependent aircraft fleet. Not coincidentally, the F-35 has a catastrophically low readiness rate, with as little as 25 percent of the aircraft ready to fly at any time.

Other contractor engine-repair bottlenecks have reportedly delayed pilot training on the T-38 Talon, the US Air Force’s training jet, by six months or longer. In Japan, US Marine Corps units have reportedly shipped engines all the way back to the United States rather than repairing them locally because of data-rights limitations.

In other words, the financial stakes of contractor control over maintenance are exceptionally high. Bloomberg Government reportedly identified approximately $12 billion in FY2025 single-source Pentagon maintenance, repair, and rebuilding obligations. To make matters worse, sustainment can account for as much as 70 percent of a weapon’s lifecycle costs, making control of maintenance contracts commercially significant.

Congress Can Enact Military “Right to Repair” Through Legislation. Why Hasn’t It?

Given the obvious impacts of restrictive maintenance contracts on military readiness—not to mention the efficient use of taxpayer dollars—several politicians from both parties have attempted to put a provision ensuring right to repair into the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). These efforts have gained attention in recent months, as Congress still has not passed the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2027; it has funded the Pentagon through a continuing resolution (CR) since FY27 began on October 1. The upcoming shifts in the House of Representatives and the Senate, where Democrats gained a majority following a “blue wave” victory in the 2026 midterm elections, are also likely to play a role.

In the Senate, Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Tim Sheehy (R-MT) have backed the Warrior Right to Repair Act, which was included as Section 804 of the Senate’s version of the NDAA following a 27-0 Senate Armed Services Committee vote. In the House of Representatives, Reps. Maggie Goodlander (D-NH) and Pat Harrigan (R-NC) backed comparable provisions, incorporated as Section 861. Both approaches would expand default government purpose rights (but differ in scope and enforcement). An alternative has been proposed in House Section 842, which would establish an intellectual property ombudsman and voluntary mediation rather than broadly expanding default rights. 

All of these efforts have run up against vigorous opposition from the defense industry. Major trade organizations for defense contractors, including the Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), and the US Chamber of Commerce have all opposed broad default data-rights provisions. 

They have argued that the government could gain access to their proprietary technical information and share it with competing maintenance providers—in the process exposing trade secrets, undermining privately financed research, and discouraging commercial technology companies from working with the Pentagon. A proposed compromise could be the institution of “government purpose rights” (GPR) for maintenance—allowing the US government to use certain data and authorize others to use it for government purposes, without granting unrestricted commercial exploitation rights.

For the time being, the 2027 NDAA remains in limbo, and the FY2027 provisions are subject to final congressional negotiations. Ultimately, their inclusion in the enacted law is far from assured. If they are left out, the Pentagon will need to continue paying inflated repair costs—a development that would be unfortunate, but basically a continuation of the status quo.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a writer and attorney focused on national security, technology, and political culture. His work has appeared in Tablet, City Journal, The Hill, The Spectator, and The Cipher Brief. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global & Joint Program Studies from NYU. More at harrisonkass.com.

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