Both the Saudis and the Houthis will eventually come to recognize that they cannot achieve their military and political objectives.

Saudi Arabia and the Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, continue to escalate their attacks against each other as major humanitarian warning signs flash inside Yemen. With all sides resorting to increasingly hyperbolic rhetoric, viewing war as the primary avenue to pursue their interests, a clear reality in the Yemen conflict remains: there is no military solution. Rather, a brutal, zero-sum war of attrition in which the warring parties wait for their foe to blink first is the most likely outcome of the current fighting, leaving Yemeni civilians with the consequences as diplomacy falters.

The last few weeks have witnessed the worst hostilities in Yemen’s 12-year civil war since a United Nations-backed truce largely halted the fighting in 2022. The broader regional war involving the United States is directly connected to this development, with Saudi Arabia backing forces with the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG) and Iran supporting the Houthis. Hundreds of thousands have died since 2014 directly and indirectly, with thousands more reportedly killed and injured in recent months.

Recent fighting has spanned the frontlines largely separating north and south Yemen, although the most significant combat has occurred along the Western coast and in the mountains surrounding Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city and former industrial hub. The Houthis made significant advances in September as the war heated back up, taking much of the western coast and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Just recently, they surrounded Taiz. The group has not held the city since the early days of the war and lost it in the IRG counteroffensive in early 2015, making it a frontline for much of the war.

A pro-government counterattack kicked off in October to retake the Red Sea coast in southwest Yemen. Thus far, both sides in the war dispute that campaign’s success, which aims to take back Houthi leverage on the sea and, in turn, loosen the siege on Taiz. While some factions within the IRG camp, such as the formerly UAE-backed Giants Brigades, have experienced relative success fighting the Houthis over the years, the effort remains inconclusive at this stage as Ansar Allah continues advancing toward Taiz and into neighboring Lahj Governorate to the east and Aden—the seat of the IRG—to the south. Notably, the flatlands along the western coast are much harder to hold than to capture, especially compared with the mountainous regions farther inland.

Fighting in Taiz city deserves particular attention, as it would be a disaster for the hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped there as the Houthis commit to a brutal siege of the city. The UN’s International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that over 300,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) are in Taiz Governorate, with many in the city itself. The agency estimates that the IDP population is in addition to an estimated 600,000 people living in the city, with some estimates as high as 1 million residents living amid the newly displaced. 

As fighting continues around the city, that number will only continue growing as people move in the only direction they can—toward the city. Aid agencies say they cannot reach most displacement camps and that Taiz, already difficult to reach because most main routes are cut off by the frontlines, increasingly lacks the basic resources it needs. 

In that context, the Houthi siege of Taiz could constitute a war crime by blocking the flow of goods the civilian population requires to survive. It is indiscriminate, using the humanitarian crisis as a method of war. That conscious decision is indicative of the war’s longer trends, in which the warring parties aim to starve each other of resources and, in turn, leverage over any post-war settlement. Saudi Arabia’s land, sea, and air blockade of Houthi territory could similarly constitute such war crimes.

The warring parties are repeating this strategy today, appearing less interested in how their actions directly cause suffering than how they can use it to their advantage. This style of combat has returned far and wide across the region, from Gaza and Lebanon to Iran. Yet for Yemenis in particular, 83 percent of whom live in multidimensional poverty amid a widely destroyed society, there are few coping mechanisms left to survive that kind of war.

All sides talk of wanting a diplomatic solution but choose violence as another form of political gamesmanship. Ansar Allah, in particular, thrives in this environment, especially as it has significantly improved its indigenous weapons-development capacity. Yet the IRG has regularly called for a new offensive against the group for the better part of a year, likely viewing the broader regional dynamics as an opportunity to attract international involvement that could help them defeat the militia. Instead, they now find themselves in a losing battle as the Houthis once again highlight their military prowess—especially that of drones—and the general fractious nature of the pro-IRG bloc, which has for years struggled to unite against its militarily superior foe.

Saudi Arabia, not necessarily having wanted the war to reignite in the first place given regional turmoil that has significantly harmed it and the other Gulf states’ economies, now faces a Houthi movement looking to increase its leverage in any post-war settlement. It, in turn, is upping the ante itself, matching Ansar Allah attacks on its soil with its own. The results are horrific: both sides openly threaten each other’s civilian infrastructure—in particular, airports—with the expressed interest in causing widespread suffering that ends open conflict. 

Houthi strikes on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and oil infrastructure, including Saudi state oil giant Aramco’s headquarters, should not be downplayed. Nor should Saudi strikes on Yemeni oil infrastructure in Houthi territory and Sana’a International Airport in the same time span. These incidents, occurring within hours of each other and including threats to escalate on both sides, killed and injured hundreds, highlighting the concerning nature of the escalatory spiral underway in Yemen. Houthi strikes on the Saudi-led coalition’s headquarters at the presidential palace in Aden indicate just how far this can go.

This international component to the war, including the Saudi blockade and the Houthi “blockade of blockades” on Saudi Arabia in response, is both separate from and intertwined with the intra-Yemeni conflict at hand. Yet for the war to end, both must be resolved sustainably, likely leaving no party fully satisfied. That dynamic is what makes wars like the one in Yemen so difficult to resolve, especially considering the regional dynamics at play in what is a Middle East in total generational upheaval.

Still, much of the previous diplomatic framework remains. Oman, in its traditional role as a mediator in this war and other regional conflicts, is reportedly facilitating messages between the Saudis and Houthis. The UN’s diplomatic track, while flawed, remains another path for talks to lower the temperature. The question is time-bound: As all parties play their game of chicken, at what point will they view diplomacy as the best path to achieve their interests?

That stalemate of mutual bloodletting does not feel close. The Saudis have more to lose with respect to their energy infrastructure, investment climate amid an ongoing economic diversification program, and overall prestige. The Houthis can almost certainly outlast them, as they did previously. That would explain why Riyadh has asked for international support to fight the Houthis, just as the IRG has done. Yet it would be a mistake for other states to join the fray rather than encourage both parties to reach an agreement.

Each party’s interests are relatively clear, so political decisions will be needed to end the fighting. The Houthis hope to pressure Saudi Arabia’s oil exports and economic diversification through direct strikes to force Riyadh to ease the blockade of its territory, alongside an interest in public sector salary payments in its territory and a leading role in any future governance of Yemen. 

The IRG rejects all Houthi demands, viewing itself as the country’s only legitimate governing power. The Saudis, meanwhile, desire a sustainable end to the war that ensures their security and that avoids a repeat of Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon —which critics claim is the group’s goal in Yemen, as opposed to real interest in any power-sharing agreement.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia will have to make the first move. Concessions in this regard do not equate to capitulation so much as facing reality. The Houthis are not going away. They will be part of any future Yemeni state. Dealing with them in that manner may be the only path, and it starts with ending the Saudi blockade of Houthi territory and the IRG’s withholding—which means Saudi withholding—of public sector payroll for Yemeni government employees in Houthi territory. These longstanding, sticky issues have always needed to be resolved for the war to end. It is long past time to resolve them.

The Houthis will have to give as well. They must accept a ceasefire and must commit, in good faith, to simultaneous intra-Yemeni and Houthi-Saudi negotiations on a post-war settlement. They must commit to non-violence and should be presented with the blockade and payroll decisions in exchange. Military assets must be removed from the frontlines, and the agreement must include a verifiable commitment to demilitarization. Such decisions can be rolled out in phases to ensure compliance.

Riyadh will have to talk with Iran behind the scenes, as it already is, even though Tehran does not fully control the group, to help ensure the deal goes further, since it still has some leverage. Even a lull in the fighting for now, giving time for the regional war that clearly allowed fighting in Yemen to restart to hopefully be resolved, can foster opportunities down the line.

This approach is certainly not ideal and could fail. Too many factors are at play in Yemen and across the region, leaving actors who see opportunity in conflict to take that path as easily as a diplomatic one. For now, the consideration must be Yemen’s civilians first and foremost—not geopolitics—which means possibly accepting a deeply flawed ceasefire that at least stops the fighting for now.

About the Author: Alexander Langlois

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst and the senior editor at DAWN. He is focused on the geopolitics of the Levant and the broader dynamics of West Asia. Langlois holds a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from American University. He has written for various outlets, including The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Sada, the Atlantic Council’s MENASource, the Lowy Institute, the Gulf International Forum, The New Arab, The Nation, and Inkstick. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.

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