The new network of infrastructure is not replacing, but adding to the transport and trade connectivity options of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

One of the most consequential foreign policy initiatives of the second Trump administration has been commercial diplomacy in Central Asia and brokering peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia. These developments have renewed momentum for infrastructure connecting Central Asia with the South Caucasus, Black Sea, Mediterranean, and wider Europe. The flagship initiative is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which could create an additional route through Azerbaijan and Armenia to Turkey for energy, minerals, fertilizers, data, and other strategic flows.

For millennia, the South Caucasus served as a trade route between Asia and Europe. Modern regional connectivity began with the need to export oil discovered near Baku in the 19th century. The first modern infrastructure projects were the Baku-Tbilisi-Poti and Baku-Batumi railways, constructed between 1865 and 1883 while the Russian Empire ruled the region. The Poti-Tbilisi line opened in 1872, and the Baku-Batumi line was completed in 1883, creating a backbone for the South Caucasus transportation system. The network was later complemented by the first oil pipeline between Baku and Batumi, completed in 1907.

Infrastructure development accelerated after Azerbaijan and Georgia regained independence in the early 1990s, creating opportunities to work with multinational energy companies and international financial institutions. Heavily influenced by the conflicts in the region and closed borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Armenia and Turkey, the current transit infrastructure of the South Caucasus represents a complex spectrum of oil and gas pipelines, railroads, highways, ports, airways, and transmission lines. 

Billions of dollars in public and private investment have modernized existing infrastructure and built new capacity, while most transit flows over recent decades bypassed Armenia. The Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process now creates an opportunity to complement the existing transportation network with routes through Armenia, potentially reshaping regional connectivity and transit dynamics and serving growing trade flow in and out of Central Asia.

A recent World Bank study indicates that targeted investments to better integrate the Middle Corridor could more than triple trade volumes, halve travel times, raise GDP by 3.3 percent, and create 2 million additional jobs by 2040. With reforms, corridor volumes could quadruple and travel times could fall by two-thirds compared with 2023. This would require at least $25 billion through 2040 for physical bottlenecks, plus $30 billion for enabling investments, with a significant share coming from private capital.

The State of Existing Central Asia-Caucasus Infrastructure 

Transshipments between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe through existing infrastructure have grown significantly. 2026 is expected to be a record year for non-liquid cargo shipped through the region’s ports, railways, and highways.

Existing infrastructure connecting Central Asia to the South Caucasus and onward to the Black Sea and Mediterranean includes Turkmenbashi port in Turkmenistan and Aktau, Kuryk, Sarzha, and Ersoy ports in Kazakhstan. Kazakh ports are expanding capacity beyond 15 million tons annually. Mangistau region around Aktau is emerging as a key Middle Corridor hub linking Kazakhstan and Western China with the South Caucasus, Turkey, Europe, and the Mediterranean.

The Turkmen and Kazakh ports on the eastern Caspian are connected to Baku International Sea Trade Port at Alat. Alat currently has a capacity to handle 15 million tons of cargo and up to 100,000 TEUs; planned expansion would raise capacity to 25 million tons and 500,000 TEUs. It is integrated with major rail lines to Georgia and connects with the Russia-Iran railway system. In 2025, the port handled more than 8.2 million tons of cargo and 107,000 TEUs.

For East-West trade, Alat is connected by rail and highway to Georgia’s Poti and Batumi ports. Alat is also linked to Turkey through the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, with a capacity of 6.5 million tons, allowing Central Asian cargo to reach Eastern European and Mediterranean destinations.

Georgia’s Black Sea ports, Poti and Batumi, remain critical links between Central Asia, Europe, and the Mediterranean. Poti, managed by APM Terminals, will add to its capacity after the completion of its second, US DFC-funded terminal. Batumi has a capacity of up to 15 million tons of liquid cargo, mainly oil products, and is owned by Kazakhstan’s KazTransOil.

Georgia also has the Supsa oil terminal, with a capacity of 7 million tons and connected to the currently non-operational Baku-Supsa pipeline. It could serve exports from Kazakhstan’s Chevron-operated Tengiz fields, which face challenges using Russia’s Novorossiysk route. Kulevi port, owned by a SOCAR subsidiary, has a capacity of 10 million tons, primarily for oil products.

Existing infrastructure also includes oil and gas pipelines important to regional and European energy security. These include the 100,000-barrel-per-day Baku-Supsa pipeline; the approximately 1 million-barrel-per-day Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline to Ceyhan; and the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, which became part of the Southern Gas Corridor network with TANAP and TAP.

A missing element in energy connectivity between Central Asia and global markets is Trans-Caspian pipelines for oil and gas. Diversifying market access for Kazakhstan’s oil and Turkmenistan’s gas is important for export stability and global energy security. Oil links between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, particularly a gas link between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, could provide greater access and pricing flexibility in European markets.

The New Developments in Azerbaijan-Armenia-Turkey Connectivity

TRIPP is the central element of a planned rail system connecting Azerbaijan to Armenia, the Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan, and potentially Turkey. It would connect Baku and Alat through the reconstructed 104.7-kilometer (65-mile) Horadiz-Agbend railway, followed by a new 43-kilometer (27-mile) line through Armenia. The route has an option to continue to Dilucu on the Turkish border, where it may connect to a planned 224-kilometer (139-mile) railway to Kars. That link is designed for 5.5 million passengers and 15 million metric tons of cargo annually.

An alternative would connect Nakhchivan to Armenia’s Gyumri along the old Soviet rail route and then to Kars. The commercial and technical feasibility of the Nakhchivan Railway Project and its extension is currently being evaluated by the EBRD.

For implementation of the TRIPP project, Armenia and the United States have created the TRIPP Development Company (TDC), with US ownership of 74 percent and Armenia’s 26 percent. US participation and the project’s proximity to Iran add complexity, but Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s commitment to the project and the nature of their relationships with Iran allow greater optimism for implementation.

Beyond rail, Armenia’s prime minister announced in January 2026 plans to integrate the power systems of Armenia and Azerbaijan. On January 29, Azerbaijan began construction of a power line connecting mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan, potentially enabling an Azerbaijan-Turkey-Europe electricity corridor. Caspian wind resources could provide electricity for export to Turkey and beyond. If Armenia’s nuclear power development, discussed during US Vice President JD Vance’s visit in February, materializes, generation could provide another export source for Turkey and Georgia.

These developments strengthen Turkey’s position as a major transit country for land-based Asia-Europe energy and cargo flows. Turkey is developing the İyidere Logistics Port Complex near Rize. It is expected to handle about 13 million tons annually, with a 100,000-TEU container terminal and a Ro-Ro terminal for 100,000 vehicles. The port will integrate maritime transport with northeastern Turkey’s roads, tunnels, and Rize-Artvin Airport. The transport minister has described it as a potential strategic point for trade among the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Europe.

New Infrastructure Projects in Georgia

For Georgia to remain competitive in transit, deep-sea port capacity remains a priority. Growing container demand makes delays consequential. Shippers currently rely on feeder vessels from Poti or Batumi to Istanbul and Mediterranean ports, increasing costs and delivery time. To address the issue, Anaklia Deep Sea Port is being developed by the Georgian government under a landlord-port model, with plans to lease berths to private terminal operators once basic infrastructure is in place. APM Terminals is also considering developing a new container-focused port north of Poti.

Another strategically important project is the Georgia-Romania Black Sea Submarine Cable Interconnection Project, which could deliver electricity from Azerbaijani Caspian wind farms directly to the European power market. The project could strengthen energy and economic security for clean-energy producers in the Caucasus and Central Asia and attract investment in hydro, wind, and solar generation. It is supported by intergovernmental agreements between Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary, and could potentially include Armenia and Turkey.

Russia’s pressure on Georgia to reopen the railway through Abkhazia is another development of geopolitical significance, likely affecting the transit infrastructure architecture of the South Caucasus. The initiative would revitalize Russia’s north-south connectivity, improve access to Armenia, and strengthen links to Turkey and Iran. 

A Moscow-based institution has suggested the route be named “Putin’s Path.” Beyond Russia’s infrastructure needs, it can be viewed as an effort to counterbalance US engagement through TRIPP. Georgia’s precondition for the re-opening of the railway has been the restoration of territorial integrity and the return of displaced ethnic Georgians to Abkhazia. The issue could become an additional source of Georgian-Russian tension.

Russia has not openly opposed TRIPP, but expanded US engagement in the South Caucasus clearly runs counter to Russian strategic interests. Russia retains leverage in Armenia through its military base in Gyumri and control of major strategic assets, including Armenia’s railway and energy infrastructure. Reopening the Abkhazia railway would therefore carry logistical, political, and military-security implications for the wider South Caucasus.

Digital infrastructure is the final major element of the infrastructure: connections from the Black Sea to Georgia and Azerbaijan’s digital backbone, the Trans-Caspian fiber-optic cable to Kazakhstan, and Central Asian networks. An alternative could connect Turkey through Armenia and Azerbaijan and across the Caspian. Rising data traffic and security requirements may favor a Multiple Digital Line Strategy, analogous to the multiple-pipeline strategy used to diversify energy supply. Parallel digital networks through Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian, together with Black Sea routes through Georgia, could provide greater security and resilience.

Existing infrastructure connecting Central Asia to Europe and the Mediterranean through the South Caucasus is functioning and delivering results, handling growing cargo volumes. Three decades of public and private investment in ports, railways, highways, pipelines, and energy infrastructure have created a viable East-West system linking Central Asia with the South Caucasus, Turkey, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and European markets.

Emerging infrastructure does not replace this system; it adds routes, capacity, and strategic options. TRIPP and new routes through Armenia can complement the existing Middle Corridor, increase competition, and bring Armenia into regional trade and connectivity. Greater route diversification should strengthen resilience and economic security. Energy transmission, digital connectivity, and flows of critical minerals, fertilizers, and other strategic commodities are increasingly interconnected, creating an integrated network connecting Central Asian and European and Mediterranean markets.

This architecture creates a strategic opportunity for Georgia. Its position between the Caspian and Black Seas, combined with existing ports, railways, pipelines, energy infrastructure, and developing digital links, gives Georgia the potential to remain a gateway between Central Asia and Europe. Yet alternative routes through Armenia and Turkey mean this position cannot be taken for granted. Maintaining competitiveness will require continued investment in infrastructure, logistics, digital connectivity, and trade facilitation.

The transformation of regional connectivity creates an opportunity for the United States, European Union, Turkey, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia to develop a shared strategic framework. TRIPP, the Black Sea Submarine Cable, and new energy connections should be viewed as components of a broader Black Sea-Caspian connectivity system. Coordinated development could strengthen sovereignty, resilience, energy and digital security, and integration with global markets.

The United States has a unique opportunity to serve as a leading strategic coordinator of this emerging connectivity architecture. Through commercial diplomacy and mobilization of US government agencies, private capital, and international financial institutions, Washington can align separate initiatives into a coherent framework. A coordinated US approach can help keep the network open, commercially viable, secure, and resilient while giving South Caucasus and Central Asian states greater choice in their economic and strategic partnerships.

About the Author: Mamuka Tsereteli

Mamuka Tsereteli is a senior fellow for Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) and a senior fellow at AFPC’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. He has more than 30 years of experience in academia, diplomacy, and business development, with a focus on economic security, business, and energy development in the Black Sea-Caspian region. Previously, he served as a research director at CACI and as a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He also directed the Center for Black Sea-Caspian Studies at the School of International Service (SIS) at American University (2009–2013) and served as an assistant professor at SIS (2007–2011). Dr. Tsereteli is also a co-founder of the American University Kyiv, a newly established university in Ukraine, in partnership with Arizona State University.

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