The United States and South Korea should focus on halting the growth of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal before denuclearization.

Editor’s Note: Center for the National Interest President Paul Saunders interviewed Sejong Institute Chairman Robyug Park. The two discussed the upcoming APEC Summit, whether Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un will make any progress on nuclear arms talks, and how the United States and South Korea should approach nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula. The following conversation has been edited for style and clarity.

Paul Saunders (PS): There has been considerable speculation that President Donald Trump might meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on the margins of the APEC Summit later this week. Do you think a Trump-Kim meeting is likely? What could it accomplish?

Robyug Park (RP): More likely than many in Washington assume. I’d put it at roughly even odds over the next year. And if it’s well prepared, a meeting could do more than what sanctions and pressure have done. It could, first, stop North Korea’s arsenal from growing.

The American door is open. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has made clear that President Trump is willing to talk if Kim Jong-un is ready to address the concerns of the United States and its allies, including South Korea. Nothing is scheduled yet. The ball is in Pyongyang’s court.

PS: Do you think Kim would be interested in a meeting? He has taken some dramatic steps in the North-South relationship.

RP: Yes. Kim may be picking up the ball. On October 24, he made a surprise trip to Dandong, just across the border in China. Officially, he went to mark China’s entry into the Korean War. But look at who he brought: diplomats, not generals. Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui was seen in close conversation with China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, and Beijing sent Wang Huning, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s long-time channel to Kim. 

We can make a reasonable assumption that Kim might use Beijing to pass along his thinking on talks with Washington. South Korean intelligence also believes both sides are keeping the door open around the APEC summit in Shenzhen.

Why would Kim come back? I see three reasons. 

First, sanctions set a hard ceiling. Trade with Russia and China keeps the economy afloat, but it can’t rebuild North Korea’s industry, its power grid, or its infrastructure. That takes finance, technology, and investment, and only Washington and Seoul can unlock them.

Second, patrons don’t last forever. Russia’s support is tied to a war that will eventually end, and China’s help comes with limits and strings attached. A working channel to Washington would give Kim more room to maneuver, not less.

Third, the rules of survival are changing. National strength today is measured in technology, data, and access to the global economy, not just in warheads and artillery.

President Trump has his own reasons: his own legacy. He wants to be remembered as the leader who ends extremely difficult conflicts, and he might ask Beijing to help bring Kim back to the table rather than stand in the way. President Trump and President Lee Jae-myung have already agreed on a clear division of labor: America as the peacemaker, Korea as the pacemaker. Since the 2019 Hanoi summit, only Kim can decide to come back, so a top-down approach is unavoidable. That makes preparation essential, starting with closer coordination with the allies and a professional US special envoy.

I don’t expect President Trump to be shaken by the midterm results. If anything, losing control of Congress is likely to push him toward foreign policy. That is where an American president faces the fewest domestic constraints. The real question is whether Pyongyang will respond. I would put it at roughly even odds.

On the one hand, Kim Jong Un may conclude that with only two years left in Trump’s term, a summit would neither produce tangible results nor last beyond this administration. If that is his calculation, a summit will be difficult.

On the other hand, simply sitting across the table from an American president is enormously attractive to the North Korean leader in its own right. If Kim decides to use the political symbolism of a summit, there is a real chance he will accept.

PS: What could a summit actually deliver?

RP: There are a wide range of areas to agree on if the summit could be held. As far as the nuclear issue is concerned, first, it could stop the threat from growing. North Korea has around 60 nuclear weapons today and adds roughly seven to ten a year. Second, a summit could launch a phased, verifiable bargain, with each step matched to North Korean action. Third, it could give the two Koreas room to talk again. 

For Washington, the payoff is concrete: one less flashpoint, and more global attention and the US resources to be used for other priorities. Done right, a summit delivers a halt and real risk reduction, not just a photo. China and Russia matter a great deal here too.

PS: Given North Korea’s stance, is denuclearization, at any pace, still a feasible goal?

RP: It’s harder, yes, but not impossible, as long as it’s the destination rather than a precondition for talks.

Kim believes nuclear weapons are the best guarantee of his regime’s survival. Our policy has to change that calculation, step by step. Demanding denuclearization up-front was tested, but it was not successful, while the arsenal grew from about 20 weapons at the time of the Hanoi summit to roughly 60 today. Trust built along the way is what can lead, in the end, to dismantlement.

Over time, we should not dismiss the possibility that both the situation the North Korean leader faces and the way he thinks could change for three reasons. 

The first reason is diminishing returns for North Korea: more warheads add little to the regime’s security and nothing to its people’s lives. 

The second is shifting partnerships: North Korea’s ties with Russia and China won’t stay fixed. 

The third is that North Korea’s leadership will come to recognize the high cost of a prolonged rivalry, so long as South Korea and the United States continue to reinforce extended deterrence and South Korea continues to advance economically and technologically, further widening the gap between the two Koreas.

PS: Why put the emphasis on stopping the growth of North Korea’s arsenal first?

RP: We will inevitably face an arms race and the risk of a clash if we stand still doing nothing. Every month without a halt, North Korea accumulates more fissile material and refines more delivery systems. Each new weapon makes the eventual job of reduction harder and more expensive.

So the order of the approach matters. First, stop the growth. Second, reduce the stockpile. Third, dismantle the program. That sequence is consistent with the United States and the Republic of Korea’s approach. Peace-building and denuclearization may move in parallel and pull each other forward, rather than one waiting for the other.

PS: How would this start? What is the concrete first step?

RP: Stop for relief, step for step. Pyongyang doesn’t need to announce up front that it will give up its weapons. We can frame the talks around threat reduction and stability.

North Korea stops nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and fissile-material production at known sites. The allies respond with partial, reversible sanctions relief and steps to lower military tension. And snapback is built in: if Pyongyang breaks its word, the relief is reversed automatically. This is a bargain designed to build trust.

Alongside the halt of North Korea’s nuclear and missile progress, both sides can take simple risk-reduction steps: a military hotline, advance notice of missile launches and exercises, and rules to prevent incidents at sea and in the air. These would cost little and save a great deal if something goes wrong.

PS: What can the allies realistically offer?

RP: Things that are valuable to Pyongyang but reversible for us. That could mean civilian exemptions to sanctions, limited relief in specific sectors, steps toward liaison offices and normalization, and adjustments in military activity that the allies decide on together, without giving up readiness. Nothing is irreversible until North Korea’s actions are irreversible too.

PS: Doesn’t a freeze reward Pyongyang, or accept its de facto status as a nuclear weapons state?

RP: I understand the concern, but the stopping or suspension is not recognition. It’s the first of three stages, and it has to cover the whole program: Yongbyon, the enrichment site at Kangson, and the newly disclosed facility. No meaningful relief comes before reliable steps. And remember what the alternative to stopping really is. It’s a bigger arsenal every month we wait.

PS: How would it be verified? Would North Korea accept intrusive inspections?

RP: Verification should advance together with trust, with each step earning the next. We can start with what we can see from outside. A halt to tests and fissile-material production can be monitored by satellites, seismic sensors, and other national technical means, without a single inspector on the ground. 

Then add declarations and limited inspections: North Korea declares part of its fissile material and facilities, accepts limited on-site checks, and agrees to caps on new production. Finally, widen the scope. As compliance builds, further limits lead to a fully verified freeze and then to real reductions.

And if there’s cheating? That’s why snapback matters. Because every step of relief is reversible, a violation costs Pyongyang immediately, and it costs the allies very little.

PS: How does this fit with the Lee government’s North Korea policy?

RP: It may fit well. Seoul’s approach starts from a simple idea: the most reliable security is a peace we never have to fight for. The ROK president has said the country respects the North’s system, will not engage in hostile acts, and does not seek its absorption. It keeps taking steps to lower military tension and to reopen dialogue. At the same time, it keeps complete denuclearization as a long-term goal, responds firmly to provocations, and maintains UN Security Council sanctions. A phased halt, then reductions, then dismantlement, can serve as a practical bridge between those principles and real results.

PS: What role can South Korea play in future US-DPRK negotiations?

RP: President Trump can be the peacemaker, and Korea will be the pacemaker. A pacemaker doesn’t run the race for someone else. It sets the rhythm, so the runner can finish.

In practice, Seoul and Washington need to jointly set the goals, the agenda, and the sequence of talks, and we coordinate the pace so the nuclear track and the inter-Korean track move together. Whatever is agreed, much of the work of carrying it out, and much of the cost, will fall to South Korea, as we witnessed in the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework between the United States and DPRK. A deal Seoul hasn’t helped shape won’t last.

PS: How do you see conditions evolving without a restart to diplomacy? How might continuing stalemate affect inter-Korean relations?

RP: Stalemate isn’t stability. It’s continued deterioration. The landmine incident in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) last September is the exact reason for the two Koreas to restore hotlines to avoid potential clashes.

But doing nothing will also lock in bloc confrontation, with the ROK, the United States and Japan on one side and DPRK, China and Russia on the other. It ties the Korean Peninsula to wider conflicts: with North Korean troops and missiles in Russia’s war, America could face pressure in Europe, the Middle East and Korea at once. And it raises the risk of accidents. 

PS: How could an agreement limiting North Korea’s nuclear expansion change inter-Korean dynamics?

RP: A cap on the arsenal would make stable coexistence possible. Once the buildup is capped and tension eases, cooperation and even inter-Korean summits become possible again, as we saw, briefly, in 2018.

And if Pyongyang refuses to talk to Seoul? Patience and consistency. We keep the door open, from hotlines to humanitarian cooperation to dialogue at any level, while keeping deterrence strong. Pyongyang can’t get the peace and prosperity it wants through Washington alone. That road also must run through Seoul.

PS: What is the path to peace on the Korean Peninsula? Is it attainable?

RP: Don’t wait for denuclearization to start building peace. We need to think about the possibility of talks on a peace regime, to begin with confidence-building. It may grow into formal peace talks as a nuclear agreement is carried out. Concrete steps may cover diplomatic, military, and economic/humanitarian areas—North Korea liaison offices as a first step toward normalization; and reviving the September 2018 inter-Korean military agreement to prevent border clashes. 

PS: What should be the role of the United States in inter-Korean relations? Can Washington help?

RP: First, Korean officials hope that their American counterparts will coordinate steps with Seoul to decide on a plan for dialogue with North Korea. Start a chain of reciprocal steps: a halt in testing matched by reversible steps to ease tension, and limits on fissile material matched by partial sanctions relief and steps toward normalization. Concrete, reciprocal, and reversible is an approach both political parties in Washington can support. And bring China and Russia on board, because no lasting solution is possible if Beijing and Moscow work against it.

The window for diplomacy is open, though not wide. Kim has reasons to talk, and President Trump has reasons to move. Our task is to turn a possible summit into a practical result: stop the arsenal from growing, reduce the risk of war, and manage the potential risk of confrontation. Stop, reduce, dismantle. That’s the road, and South Korea hopes to help set the pace.

About the Participants: Robyug Park and Paul Saunders

Amb. Robyug Park is a distinguished career diplomat and scholar with over three decades of experience in diplomacy and academia. He currently serves as chairman of the Sejong Institute, a leading South Korean policy research organization. After joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1980, he held key positions including director-general for European Affairs and postings at the Korean embassies in Russia and the United States. He served as ambassador to Ukraine and Moldova (2008–2011) and ambassador to Russia (2015–2017), as well as the chief negotiator for the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the United States (2011–2015) and ambassador for energy and resources. Following his diplomatic service, Amb. Park continued to contribute to academia as an adjunct professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy and a visiting professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (2018–2022). Since November 2024, he has been a Visiting Professor at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. The views expressed here are his own.

Paul J. Saunders is president of the Center for the National Interest and publisher of The National Interest. His expertise spans US foreign and security policy, energy security and climate change, US-Russia relations and Russian foreign policy, and US relations with Japan and South Korea. Saunders is a senior advisor at the Energy Innovation Reform Project, where he served as president from 2019 to 2024. He has been a member of EIRP’s board of directors since 2013 and served as chairman from 2014 to 2019. At EIRP, Saunders has focused on the collision between great-power competition and the energy transition, including issues such as energy security, energy technology competition, and climate policy in a divided world. His recent projects at EIRP have included an assessment of Russia’s evolving role in the global energy system and a study of the linkages between China’s energy, climate, and national security policies.

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