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How Russia and China Support the Houthis

The National Interest
November 6, 2026 at 12:55 AM
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How Russia and China Support the Houthis

The United States and its allies need a more coordinated anti-Houthi strategy to counter a Russo-Chinese threat to the region. The post How Russia and China Support the Houthis appeared first on The National Interest.

The United States and its allies need a more coordinated anti-Houthi strategy to counter a Russo-Chinese threat to the region.

In Yemen, the Houthis are causing chaos and destruction in Saudi Arabia, and there’s little sign of the attacks stopping. Targets have included civilian and energy infrastructure, and the Saudis have been left scrambling for a response.

But the Houthis haven’t been acting alone. Iran, the Houthis’ main sponsor, values its ally for its ability to threaten Red Sea shipping, which multiplies the effects of the Islamic Republic’s efforts to block the Strait of Hormuz. This combined effort has sent oil prices soaring.

Russia has also provided the Houthis with support ranging from weapons and satellite intelligence to fuel. Chinese companies have become a major source of materials for Houthi weapons manufacturing, with no evidence of interference to stop this procurement by Beijing.

For Moscow and Beijing, the Houthis, a US-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), are a useful thorn in America’s side. The group’s persistent threat to American partners and global norms like freedom of navigation undermines Washington’s leadership in the Middle East, a goal which Russia and China share with malign regional actors like Iran.

Removing the thorn has been difficult for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that Washington and its partners don’t entirely agree on the nature of the threat. Many American partners don’t even list the Houthis as a terrorist organization. Universal Western designation of the Houthis would help align an international response to the group.

Iranian support has been instrumental in transforming the Houthis into the regional force that it is today through weapons, training, and financial support tracing back to the 2000s. Out of all the groups within Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance, Tehran has given only the Houthis some of its more advanced systems, such as medium-range ballistic missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles. Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, then deputy commander of US Central Command (CENTCOM), said in 2024, “The Houthis are the first entity in the history of the world to use anti-ship ballistic missiles ever, firing against shipping.”

The Houthis used these weapons in a campaign against commercial shipping from 2023 to 2025—carried out in professed solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. In addition to anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, Iran has provided the Houthis with drones, including the infamous one-way attack Shahed drones, close-, short-, and medium-range ballistic missiles, land attack cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, as well as small arms. This massive weapons infusion converted the Houthi arsenal from one reliant on systems seized from the Yemeni armed forces to a dynamic arsenal capable of supporting their ever-growing ambitions.

Iran has also helped the Houthis develop their own weapons in Yemen. To manufacture them, the Houthis have expanded their procurement of components and dual-use items from China. For years, the efforts have centered on drone manufacturing. However, an October 2026 report by Conflict Armament Research showed that the Houthis are seeking to manufacture the Iranian medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), Kheibar Shekan, domestically with components from China. The Kheibar Shekan is one of Iran’s most advanced MRBMs and would enable the Houthis to continue striking deep in Saudi Arabia.

Chinese officials claim to control dual-use exports and abide by UN Security Council Resolutions regarding Yemen—which include an arms embargo against the Houthis. But between 2021 and 2025, more interdicted weapons components traveling to the Houthis were manufactured by Chinese companies than any other single country, according to arms experts.

China has also helped the Houthis with intelligence. Chang Guang Satellite Technology, a Chinese company with ties to the military, provided the Houthis with satellite imagery “to target US military assets” during the US air campaign against the group in spring 2025, according to the State Department. A State Department official told The Financial Times that China “ignored” American concerns about the company.

But China isn’t the only one assisting the Houthis with satellite data. During the Houthi campaign against commercial shipping over the war in Gaza, Russia passed targeting data for maritime attacks to the group via Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Islamic Republic is also providing targeting assistance and intelligence to the Houthis as they continue their deadly attacks on Saudi Arabia, while Moscow is reportedly giving the group satellite intelligence for these attacks.

Amid the Houthis’ maritime terror campaign, Russia also reportedly considered sending anti-ship missiles to the group but didn’t go through with it after Washington and Riyadh objected.

Beijing and Moscow have benefited from being on the Houthis’ good side. In May 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, a senior leader in the group and cousin of its head, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, noting that Mohammad “communicated with officials from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to ensure that Houthi militants do not strike Russian or PRC vessels transiting the Red Sea.” In July, when the Houthis resumed attacks on commercial ships to enforce their maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia, Chinese ships once again sailed through the Red Sea untroubled—even those laden with Saudi oil.

Russia doesn’t stop at helping the Houthis with satellite intelligence. The US Treasury has identified multiple networks and Houthi leaders focused on deepening Houthi-Russia ties, including in weapons procurement. Russia has also transferred oil and stolen Ukrainian grain to Houthi-controlled Yemen. But it’s not a one-way relationship. By purchasing these items, the Houthis help Moscow circumvent international sanctions on Russian oil and prohibitions on the sale of stolen Ukrainian grain. A Houthi leader also sold Yemeni civilians to Russian military units in Ukraine in what the US Treasury described as a “lucrative human smuggling operation.”

Diplomatically, each country takes a different approach to Yemen. Russia and China acknowledge Yemen’s internationally recognized government, in contrast to Iran, which recognizes the Houthis as Yemen’s government. However, Russia has hosted high-level delegations of Houthi leaders, and China maintains some communication with the group at least for the purposes of ensuring safe transit of its ships through the Red Sea.

Sources told Reuters in September that China appealed to Iran to curtail Houthi attacks on Saudi shipping at the request of Riyadh. While the Yemeni terror group stopped attacking Saudi oil tankers, it increased deadly attacks on the kingdom’s civilian infrastructure. Moscow and Beijing also frequently abstain from UN Security Council votes that censure the Houthis. 

The Russian and Chinese connections with the Houthis—and other elements of Iran’s Axis of Resistance—began with Iran operating as the connective tissue. Now, these states and terror groups are forging their own ties. Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing each approach the Houthis differently, but they all see the value of the Yemeni terror group as a disruptor to regional stability and American interests in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, the United States and its partners can’t seem to get on the same page about the group. Washington listed, delisted, and then relisted the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization over the Trump, Biden, and second Trump administrations. Europe hasn’t followed suit in recognizing that the Houthis are a terrorist organization. Transatlantic alignment on designation and sanctions against the group is important to ensure that the Houthis have no financial access in the West.

Now, Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s internationally recognized government are fighting the group mostly alone, with promises of personnel and defensive support from some European and Mecca Pact partners, Turkey and Pakistan. Washington is providing intelligence and targeting support to Riyadh, but President Donald Trump has resisted joining airstrikes against the Houthis. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom is offering defensive support and aerial refueling, including for Saudi operations in Yemen. France has limited its assistance to the defense of critical oil infrastructure on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast.

Washington should support Riyadh in organizing a comprehensive anti-Houthi effort and contribute financially. This should expand support to Yemeni forces on the ground, paired with an international effort to isolate the Houthis. Washington should also encourage the involvement of the United Arab Emirates, which had a falling out with Riyadh in late 2025 over their divergent interests in Yemen, in cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

International maritime coalitions can interdict weapons flows. There are multiple regional and international maritime missions tasked with defending shipping in the Red Sea. Washington should lead a mission to harmonize and potentially consolidate parallel maritime security efforts and focus on countering weapons smuggling.

The US Treasury should also expand its targeting of Houthi financial lifelines by sanctioning the front companies and institutions that enable and fund its weapons procurement. Even if the Trump administration wants to avoid direct, kinetic action against the Houthis, an internationally supported campaign to isolate the group would deliver a meaningful blow—not just in Yemen, but to efforts by Russia and China to challenge America’s role in the Middle East.

About the Author: Bridget Toomey

Bridget Toomey is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), focusing on Iranian proxies, specifically Iraqi militias and the Houthis. Before joining FDD, she was a Fulbright fellow in Israel, where she completed an MA in security and diplomacy at Tel Aviv University. During her undergraduate studies, she interned for the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, focusing on jihadi terror groups, and for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She holds a BA in government with a minor in modern Middle Eastern studies from Harvard University.

The post How Russia and China Support the Houthis appeared first on The National Interest.