South Korea’s leaders are eager to assume “operational control,” or OPCON, over joint US-ROK forces in Korea as quickly as possible—but doing so would be a strategic mistake.

Despite long-standing bilateral agreements on the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces to a Seoul-led bilateral command, the United States and South Korea remain at odds over the timing and procedures for doing so. While Washington remains committed to the OPCON transition, it is concerned that the administration of South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is overly eager to do so without first fulfilling agreed-upon requirements.

Lee perceives having his nation’s military forces under the control of a foreign general as an affront, and he (incorrectly) depicts reclaiming OPCON as a matter of South Korean national sovereignty. He has expressed a desire to attain OPCON transition before the end of his term in 2030. Such a move would run counter to the 2015 bilateral agreement that puts three preconditions in place before such a transition can occur: Seoul’s development of the capability to lead the combined US-South Korean forces Combined Forces Command (CFC); its acquisition of sufficient indigenous offensive and defensive capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats; and a broader improvement in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula due to complete or significant North Korean denuclearization.  

Lee’s mischaracterization reflects a flawed understanding of the current and future status of wartime OPCON. After the transition is completed as intended, the CFC commander would be a South Korean general, with a US general as deputy commander—the inverse of its current structure. However, the CFC Commander, regardless of nationality, is subordinate to the military leadership and presidents of both countries and does not answer to one over the other. As such, Seoul would not have “regained” command of its forces, nor its national sovereignty, since it had not previously ceded either.

The Problem: South Korea Is Not Yet Ready to Assume OPCON

The United States has insisted that South Korea must first fulfill the three agreed-upon conditions before Seoul could lead CFC, which has triggered strong South Korean criticism. Current and former US generals commanding forces in South Korea have also warned that shifting command prior to Seoul developing necessary capabilities could weaken the alliance, degrade combined US-ROK deterrence against North Korea, and cause higher casualties and rate of failure during war.

The Lee administration has declared that Seoul is prepared to immediately assume OPCON with “no difficulty at all.” Indeed, the South Korean military is a highly capable force and has devoted considerable resources and effort to improve its capabilities. However, significant deficiencies remain in the country’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), its ability to conduct joint and combined operations, and its capacity to push tasking to US or multinational forces.  

These shortfalls raise serious doubts about the viability of South Korea receiving wartime OPCON as quickly as Lee is pressing for. The United States maintains that requisite conditions have not yet been met, and that some capabilities that it had previously deemed satisfactory last year should now be reassessed amid North Korea’s improving military capabilities.  

How the Trump Administration Is Driving South Korea Toward OPCON

South Korea’s drive for OPCON is partly driven by its growing doubts of US credibility as an ally—exacerbated by President Donald Trump’s transactional and disdainful view of allies, his repeated threats to reduce or remove US forces from the Korean Peninsula, and his push to reduce US security commitments overseas. Compared to all other recent presidents, Trump has shown a greater willingness to transfer alliance security responsibilities with less regard for the potential consequences. This is coupled with an eagerness to use economic coercion to browbeat America’s international partners into greater security responsibilities—while promising less US commitment to its allies in return.

Seoul now perceives a price tag for America’s adherence to alliance treaty commitments and severe punishment for any aversion to pay it. South Korean defense minister Kang Shin-chul recently questioned US reliability: “Can the US military be trusted if a war breaks out with North Korea?” A 2026 public opinion poll in South Korea showed that, for the first time, more respondents distrusted the United States than trusted it.  

Disagreements over OPCON conditions is but one of many trade, diplomatic, and security disputes now vexing the bilateral relationship. US Ambassador to South Korea Michelle Steel recently described relations between Seoul and Washington as being in a state of “turbulence.” That may have been an optimistic spin; other Trump administration officials told their South Korean counterparts that “South Korea-US relations are worse than ever.”

How Can America and South Korea Recover Trust?

To restore the strength of the US-South Korea relationship, both nations should expeditiously implement measures to identify and resolve outstanding deficiencies in South Korean military capability necessary to enable OPCON transition. The most immediate necessity is for both governments to soften their rhetoric and keep any disagreements behind closed doors. When in a hole, the first priority is to stop digging. Both countries should better explain to their legislatures and populaces a bilateral consensus of the parameters, requirements, and responsibilities of OPCON transition.

The Lee administration should publicly affirm its pledge to fulfill all necessary conditions for OPCON transition, as well as commitments to the alliance, strengthening trilateral security cooperation with Japan, and assuming a larger regional security role. For its part, the United States should publicly uphold fidelity to its pledge to defend South Korea against security threats. Any perception of a wavering of the US pledge can degrade deterrence and lead North Korea to increase coercive actions against Seoul.  

US messaging should emphasize that OPCON transition does not by itself lead to an “unzipping of the alliance.” Even after the transition, the United States remains inexorably connected to the defense of South Korea by the 1953 mutual defense treaty and America’s continuing responsibilities as Commander of United Nations Command on the Korean Peninsula. 

While North Korea must remain the predominant threat priority of the alliance, the allies should also focus on security challenges over the horizon. In conjunction with OPCON, the United States and South Korea should address broader military issues such as modernization of the alliance, strategic flexibility of US forces on the peninsula, and the future US Forces Korea and South Korean security roles in the Indo-Pacific. 

The OPCON issue has roiled the alliance and exposed differences between Washington and Seoul. If done properly, more capable South Korean military capabilities embedded in the alliance can lead to a continued and strengthened deterrent and defense against North Korea’s growing security threat. Doing so would serve longstanding US objectives to have allies assume a larger role for their defense, while still maintaining American commitment to providing sufficient military resources to defeat a common enemy.  

On the other hand, if current trends continue, the issue could cause irreparable damage to the alliance. It could even encourage isolationists in the Trump administration who advocate reducing American commitments overseas to push for reduction or withdrawal of US forces in Korea. 

For more than 70 years, our two countries have remained shoulder to shoulder—not only out of tradition and honor, but out of necessity. The United States has placed its sons and daughters in uniform in harm’s way as a tangible symbol of its commitment. Service members from both countries have stood tirelessly on the ramparts of freedom.  

Neither country’s commitment or dedication can falter. Seoul’s challenge is to build the capacity to lead while securing confidence that Washington will remain committed to the common defense.

About the Author: Bruce Klingner

Bruce Klingner is a senior fellow at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation. A former senior research fellow in the Asia Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, he previously served 20 years with the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, including as CIA’s deputy division chief for Korean analysis.

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