Pakistan is one of China’s closest partners. But it can still help the United States diversify its critical minerals supply chains.

China has spent decades building a near-stranglehold on critical mineral supply chains, leaving the United States dangerously dependent on its chief strategic rival. Even President Donald Trump’s recent trade truce with Chinese leader Xi Jinping has done little to resolve the underlying problem: America’s continued dependence on Chinese processing of minerals essential to its economy and national security. But the Trump administration is aggressively challenging Beijing’s dominance across the globe, and over the past year, it has engaged an unlikely partner: Pakistan.

To be sure, Pakistan has been an important, if at times complicated, American strategic partner since the Cold War, helping Washington counter Soviet expansionism and, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, supporting US military operations in Afghanistan. Bilateral ties have seen periods of strain, but Trump’s return to the White House has brought a major reboot. Since then, Trump has met multiple times with senior Pakistani leaders, including Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Most recently, Islamabad has served as a key mediator between the United States and Iran in efforts to end their war, ushering in a remarkable revival in bilateral relations.

And now, there’s apparently a new area to explore: critical minerals. Over the past year, the Trump administration has stepped up discussions with Islamabad on developing Pakistan’s largely untapped mineral wealth, including a $500 million agreement between an American company and Pakistan’s Frontier Works Organization to cooperate on mining and processing critical minerals, including rare earths. 

Washington has also backed the massive Reko Diq copper and gold project through $1.25 billion in Export-Import Bank financing, underscoring its growing interest in Pakistan as an alternative source of strategic minerals. Pakistan, meanwhile, stands to benefit economically from greater American investment in a mining sector that currently accounts for only about 3 percent of its GDP.

Last April, a US delegation led by Eric Meyer of the State Department attended the Pakistan Minerals Investment Forum in Islamabad and conveyed the interest of American companies in the sector. With the forum returning November 12–13, renewed American participation—particularly if accompanied by fresh investment commitments—would demonstrate that Washington is serious about turning its growing interest in Pakistan’s mineral wealth into a lasting strategic partnership.

Deeper US-Pakistan cooperation on critical minerals could help Washington chip away at Beijing’s dominance over global supply chains. Early American investment could also help determine where Pakistan’s minerals are processed and who ultimately purchases them, rather than allowing Beijing to lock in these arrangements before Washington has a chance to compete. 

Indeed, Pakistan is just one piece of the Trump administration’s broader strategy to reduce dependence on China, with Washington pursuing critical minerals agreements and partnerships across Asia, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia, as well as resource-rich countries such as Argentina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ukraine. 

Washington’s experience in Africa suggests the bet can pay off. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a country where conflict in the east has complicated the operating environment and where Chinese firms have long held the advantage, yet the United States has leaned in anyway, building on a Lobito Corridor initiative that began under the Biden administration and that Trump has carried forward. In December 2025, Washington and Kinshasa signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement reportedly giving American companies a right of first offer on designated mineral deposits. 

This July, the Development Finance Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa closed a $753 million package to upgrade the Lobito Atlantic Railway, which carries Congolese and Zambian copper and cobalt to Angola’s Atlantic coast, and the operator now expects to double its international cargo to 800,000 tons next year. 

In May, the DRC’s state cobalt entity also agreed to supply cobalt hydroxide to a US-based firm. Progress has not been linear, and the DRC’s task force for the minerals pact was set up months behind schedule, but the lesson is clear: sustained commitment in a difficult jurisdiction can reshape supply chains in ways that waiting for ideal conditions never will. Pakistan has its own challenges, but trust built through early investment is what gives American companies a seat at the table.

But challenges remain. For starters, Pakistan’s evolving domestic security situation, particularly in mineral-rich Balochistan, will shape how quickly American companies can establish an on-the-ground presence. The Barrick Mining Corporation has slowed development of the massive Reko Diq copper and gold project while it reviews the security environment in Pakistan and the wider region, though it has said it continues to believe in the project’s long-term value and has kept Phase 1 approved, a reminder that investors will need to price in risk and that Islamabad has a strong interest in improving the conditions for them. 

Another constraint is that Beijing, having entered Pakistan’s mining sector much earlier, already enjoys significant advantages in infrastructure, expertise, and established commercial relationships, forcing Washington to play catch-up. According to a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, China already purchases approximately 95 percent of Pakistan’s exported copper ores and concentrates, illustrating just how deeply Beijing is embedded in Pakistan’s existing minerals trade. 

Nevertheless, the upcoming critical minerals conference, along with potential new Trump administration agreements with Islamabad, could help narrow this gap—provided they translate into concrete investments and sustained cooperation. Moreover, much of Pakistan’s critical mineral wealth remains underexplored, giving American companies a chance to help identify and develop commercially viable deposits, particularly antimony—a strategically important critical mineral used in ammunition, explosives, flame retardants, and advanced military technologies, making it essential to US defense manufacturing and national security—while potentially establishing new processing facilities outside China’s control. Islamabad also has an incentive to welcome American investment as a way to diversify its economic relationships without abandoning its longstanding strategic partnership with Beijing.

Though making that case a reality will take more than just this. Washington could start by pairing its financing with tools that help American firms manage the risks of a frontier jurisdiction, such as political risk insurance and co-financing alongside development banks and Gulf investors, so that capital can move before conditions are perfect. It should prioritize processing as much as extraction, because the real leverage lies in refining, and the opportunity to build facilities outside China’s control is greatest while Pakistan’s sector is still taking shape. 

And it should treat the relationship as a durable economic partnership rather than an extension of its diplomacy around Iran, with offtake agreements and technical cooperation that give both sides a stake in the outcome. Like many countries with a resource at an early stage of development, Pakistan will need time and sustained engagement to realize its potential, and the partners that commit early will be best placed to shape what comes next. 

Washington should not expect Pakistan to abandon its longstanding strategic partnership with China, nor does it need to. If the Trump administration can turn Pakistan’s mineral wealth into a reliable source of critical minerals for American industries, then it could strengthen US-Pakistan relations while reducing Beijing’s leverage over Washington. Ironically, one of China’s closest strategic partners could help America become less dependent on China.

About the Author: Derek Grossman

Derek Grossman is a professor of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC). Professor Grossman is also an adjunct senior fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He previously served as a senior defense analyst at RAND and as a professor of Policy Analysis at the RAND School of Public Policy. Before RAND, he served for over a decade in the US intelligence community, where he was the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

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