Whoever pulls together a Knesset majority, the Israeli mainstream remains committed to denying Palestinian sovereignty.

The Israeli elections of October 27, which have once again produced a hung Knesset, were treated as a referendum on Benjamin Netanyahu: his responsibility for the security failure of October 7, 2023, his conduct of the war in Gaza, his alliance with the religious far right, and his increasingly divisive leadership at home. These were consequential questions. However, for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, the contest offered hardly any choice.

If the opposition can form a government, which seems unlikely without Arab parties’ support (the Yashar Party has ruled out a coalition including them), it could change the style and some methods of Israeli rule. It could restrain the most openly expansionist members of his coalition, reduce tolerance for settler violence, and possibly alter the management of Gaza. But it is unlikely to change the fundamental direction of Israeli policy: the denial of Palestinian statehood, the preservation and expansion of Israeli control over the West Bank, and the treatment of Gaza primarily as a security problem to be denuded of its population rather than as an integral part of a future Palestinian state.

The election’s central irony is that Netanyahu’s opponents accuse him, with considerable justification, of endangering Israel’s democratic institutions while offering little hope of democratic rights or national self-determination to the millions of Palestinians over whom Israel exercises power. 

The divide between Netanyahu and his principal challenger, former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, illustrates the limits of the electoral choice. Both reject an independent Palestinian state and insist on Israeli control over the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Both demand that Hamas be disarmed before Israeli forces withdraw from Gaza and both leave open the possibility of renewed military operations.  

There are some differences. Eisenkot has opposed unauthorized settlement outposts, condemned settler violence, and opposed settlement construction in the strategically consequential E1 area east of Jerusalem. By contrast, Netanyahu’s government has promoted unchecked settlement expansion and relied on coalition partners committed to formal annexation. But Eisenkot’s support for settlements that comply with Israeli law and his rejection of Palestinian sovereignty suggest that a change of government would leave the architecture of control intact and permit settlement activity considered “legal” under Israeli law but not international law. 

The breadth of the political consensus in Israel was demonstrated well before this election. In July 2024, the Knesset passed a resolution opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River by a vote of 68 to nine. The measure drew support from lawmakers in both the government and the opposition. Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, who had previously endorsed a two-state solution, avoided the vote rather than endorse the declaration.

A year later, the Knesset voted 71 to 13 for a non-binding declaration calling for Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and the Jordan Valley. The largest opposition parties abstained from the vote. Even with those qualifications, the result showed how far the political center of gravity had shifted toward absorbing territory that was supposed to form the core of the Palestinian state.

There are exceptions to the prevailing consensus. The Arab-led parties support Palestinian statehood and an end to occupation, as does the Jewish-led Democrats Party. But the principal contenders for power have rejected a governing partnership with the Arab-led parties. This leaves the strongest advocates of Palestinian sovereignty with little or no influence over forming the next government.

The marginalization of Arab parties is especially revealing. Palestinian citizens of Israel can vote in the election, and their representatives may hold seats that influence the parliamentary arithmetic. But parties representing a large part of that constituency remain politically inconsequential since they are considered “untouchable” by leaders who define an acceptable governing majority in explicitly Jewish terms. The Palestinians most directly affected by Israeli policies in the occupied territories, meanwhile, have no vote in the election that some had imagined would help determine their future.

The political effect is to narrow the debate. The question is rarely whether Palestinians are entitled to freedom and sovereignty, but how Israel can best manage a population whose national aspirations are treated as a threat.

Formal annexation of the West Bank remains a central objective of Netanyahu’s far-right allies. But its absence would not necessarily prevent Israel from continuing to consolidate control. Annexation can proceed incrementally, through settlement construction, roads, land designations, administrative changes, military restrictions, and the displacement of Palestinian communities.

Each step may be presented as a discrete response to security needs, housing demand, or administrative necessity. Together, they fragment Palestinian territory and make the creation of a viable state increasingly difficult. A future Israeli government led by Eisenkot could avoid the international repercussions of a formal annexation declaration while allowing the territorial transformation to continue.

The consequences are visible in the daily lives of Palestinians. According to the UN humanitarian office, demolitions displaced approximately 1,790 Palestinians across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in 2026 through its October reporting period. Settler violence and restrictions on access to land add to the pressures on communities already living under occupation.

An Eisenkot-led government might enforce Israeli law more consistently against violent settlers and curb some of the most provocative projects. But support for selected settlements, combined with indefinite security control and rejection of sovereignty, would still leave Palestinians without a credible route to independence.

The distinction between formal and creeping annexation also matters for Israel’s Western partners. Governments that condemn an explicit declaration of sovereignty may end up turning a blind eye to a process that produces a similar territorial result through a succession of administrative acts.

Gaza exposes another area of broad agreement. Netanyahu and his far-right partners have pursued a devastating military campaign and insisted that Hamas cannot remain a player in Palestinian politics. Eisenkot has likewise pledged to end Hamas’s rule within 18 months, through an agreement or military action.

Israel’s security concerns are real. But Israel’s security cannot be separated indefinitely from the rights and conditions of Gaza’s population. The destruction already inflicted will shape Palestinian life for years. A US-backed reconstruction proposal announced in September estimated that rebuilding Gaza’s physical infrastructure would cost tens of billions of dollars. It envisioned an initial program of shelters, repairs, health care, education, and food security, but reconstruction depended on funding and access; major questions about governance and security remained unresolved.

The danger is that Gaza’s destruction becomes effectively permanent largely because reconstruction remains subject to restrictions and political conditions that successive Israeli governments are unwilling or unable to change. A ceasefire alone cannot restore homes, hospitals, schools, water systems, or an economy. Nor can an externally designed administration provide lasting legitimacy if Palestinians have no meaningful authority over their own future. Moreover, Israeli attacks on the pretext of targeting terrorists continue to kill and maim hundreds of Palestinian civilians, including children.

According to the UN-appointed Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory’s latest report, between the ceasefire that came into effect on October 10, 2025, and the end of September 2026, Israeli air strikes, artillery, and gunfire killed 1431 Palestinians in Gaza, including 300 children.

There are differences among Israeli politicians over Gaza’s administration, reconstruction, and military occupation. But neither of the principal alternatives to Netanyahu has placed Palestinian self-determination at the center of a postwar settlement, quite the opposite. Gaza risks being left in a condition of prolonged dependency, fragmented governance, and recurring military intervention.

Many Israelis view the promise of Palestinian statehood in light of the October 7, 2023, attacks, the collapse of earlier peace efforts, entrenched Palestinian political divisions, and Hamas’s armed challenge. This has naturally shaped Israeli distrust of the two-state solution. But distrust cannot explain away the consequences of a policy that offers Palestinians neither a state nor equal political rights. Nor can permanent military superiority settle a conflict rooted in competing national claims.

For decades, Israeli leaders have sought to manage the Palestinian question while postponing a political reckoning. Netanyahu refined this approach, using Palestinian division and regional normalization to argue that Israel could prosper without dissolving the occupation. The October 7 catastrophe demonstrated the limits of that assumption. The devastation of Gaza that followed has made any future settlement harder, but not less necessary.

A government without Netanyahu might improve Israel’s relations with Western allies and restrain the most extreme advocates of annexation. But a more acceptable face for indefinite control would not resolve the underlying conflict. The United States and its European allies should therefore judge the next Israeli government by more than its composition or rhetoric. The relevant questions are whether settlement expansion stops, Palestinian communities are protected, Gaza can be rebuilt, and Palestinians are offered a credible path to political freedom.

Israel’s election may determine who governs in Jerusalem. It is unlikely, by itself, to determine whether Palestinians will be allowed to govern themselves. That decision remained the missing issue at the heart of the campaign, and the one on which a durable peace depends. On Palestinian self-determination, Netanyahu and Eisenkot differ as much as Tweedledum and Twiddledee.

About the Author: Mohammed Ayoob

​Mohammed Ayoob is a university distinguished professor emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University. His books include The Many Faces of Political Islam (Second Edition, 2020), Will the Middle East Implode? (2014), and, most recently, From Regional Security to Global IR: An Intellectual Journey (2024). He was also the editor of Assessing the War on Terror (2013).

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