Once again, strategic differences between the United States and Israel over the denouement of the Iran War are emerging.

The drums of war are beating again. Reports that the United States and Israel are considering another, more forceful assault on Iran after the American midterm elections deserve serious attention. However, preparations for war do not prove a decision has been made. The more important question is whether another bombing campaign could produce the political results that earlier attacks failed to achieve.

The evidence of planning is credible. The Financial Times cited three people familiar with preparations for Israeli strikes earlier in October against Iranian nuclear facilities, regime targets, and energy infrastructure. President Donald Trump opposed restarting major hostilities before November 3. The report nevertheless left American participation uncertain and acknowledged that reports of preparations might also serve as negotiating pressure on Iran. This supports the view that renewed war is a real possibility, not an established post-election commitment.

The New York Times has separately reported consideration of a brief, intensive campaign against Iranian nuclear facilities, missile and drone capabilities, and energy infrastructure. Crucially, its account says American officials have made no decision. The danger lies in the accompanying expectation that additional military punishment, combined with economic strangulation, could finally destabilize the Iranian regime and make Tehran surrender to American-Israeli demands.

Removing the immediate electoral constraint would not remove the United States’ strategic constraints. Higher energy prices, American casualties, and another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict would remain politically costly even after polling day. Washington also cannot determine a campaign’s duration simply by announcing it will be short. President Trump had done so earlier but failed to make the campaign conform to his timeline. Iran would also retain a vote on when the fighting ends, as it did during the last round.

American and Israeli objectives may overlap to a certain extent, but their priorities do not coincide. Washington has an interest in preventing the creation of an Iranian nuclear weapon, protecting its forces and partners, and securing maritime commerce. Israel seeks to eliminate Iran’s ability to balance it militarily and support armed adversaries like Hezbollah and Hamas. For Israeli leaders, repeatedly degrading Iranian capabilities could constitute an acceptable strategy even without a final settlement. For the United States, indefinitely underwriting such a campaign would impose unacceptable strategic and economic costs.

The distinction between weakening Iran and overthrowing its government matters. Destroying missile factories, damaging enrichment facilities, extracting diplomatic concessions, and producing regime change are separate objectives. Success in achieving one does not automatically translate into achieving the other goals. Indeed, a campaign that convinces Iranian leaders their very survival is at stake could make a negotiated agreement harder.

Washington’s immediate diplomatic demands remain centered on the nuclear program. Reuters reported on October 18 that negotiations were stalled partly because the United States insisted on addressing enrichment at the outset, while Tehran wanted priority given to reopening the Strait of Hormuz and lifting the American maritime blockade. This disagreement reveals competing conceptions of the war’s settlement: Washington seeks strategic concessions before normalization while Tehran seeks economic relief while preserving bargaining assets.

Another assault could undoubtedly inflict substantial damage on Iran. American and Israeli superiority in aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and precision strike gives them considerable capacity to destroy identifiable installations. Iran cannot prevent every penetration of its airspace or defend every important facility. Its ability to absorb punishment should not be confused with its ability to avoid it.

But targeting Iran’s nuclear program is especially difficult to translate into permanent nuclear denial. Facilities can be rebuilt; expertise cannot be bombed out of existence. Uncertainty over nuclear material further complicates confident claims of success. Additional bombing could worsen the verification problem even while physically damaging the nuclear program.

The political consequences could also undermine the stated nonproliferation objective. Iranian leaders might conclude that their decision not to go overtly nuclear the way North Korea has done failed to protect the country and, in fact, invited attacks. This would not make weaponization inevitable: technical obstacles, internal calculations, and the danger of further attack to stave off a nuclear breakout would remain. Nevertheless, the pressure to acquire nuclear weapons capability will increase, thus subverting the very goal the attacks are intended to serve.

Therefore, assess Iranian resilience against an attainable Iranian objective. Tehran does not need to defeat the American military. It needs to preserve a functioning state, retain some retaliatory capacity, and deny its opponents an affordable political victory. Consequently, its threshold for claiming success is much lower than that of adversaries promising decisive transformation, including total denuclearization and regime change.

Evidence suggests Iranian institutional adaptation. Deutsche Welle reports that Iranian preparations include rebuilding missile and drone capabilities, replacing officials killed in earlier attacks, and strengthening internal security. These measures do not establish that Iran has restored its former strength. They suggest that its leadership sees organizational survival, rather than conventional military parity, as the essential requirement.

Resilience nevertheless has limits. Economic distress can erode administrative capacity, weaken public services, and intensify political divisions. Repeated attacks could damage the infrastructure needed to sustain military production. Public exhaustion should not be dismissed. But dissatisfaction with the government should not be mistaken for a willingness to help overthrow it during foreign bombardment. In fact, it could have the opposite effect of consolidating popular support behind the embattled regime perceived as defending national dignity and state sovereignty. 

The maritime dimension gives Iran opportunities to impose costs disproportionate to its conventional strength. In the Strait of Hormuz, the decisive issue is commercial confidence. Tehran need not maintain an impermeable blockade. Intermittent attacks, mines, or credible threats could make insurers, shipowners, and crews reluctant to accept voyages. Naval escorts can reduce danger without eliminating uncertainty.

The situation is also more fluid than descriptions of a permanently closed strait imply. Deutsche Welle, citing Kpler data, says oil flows have approached prewar levels as escorts and commercial risk-taking increased. Renewed hostilities could jeopardize that recovery. The relevant forecast is therefore renewed, potentially severe disruption, rather than the assumption that every vessel would immediately cease transit.

Alternative export infrastructure offers only partial relief. Saudi and Emirati pipelines can bypass Hormuz. Still, their available capacity cannot replace the waterway’s normal flows, and they are also vulnerable to drone and missile attacks. These alternatives also do not solve the problem of Gulf liquefied natural gas exports. A sustained disruption would pass costs through global markets, including to American consumers, regardless of US production.

Bab el-Mandeb presents a related but distinct vulnerability. Houthi attacks could further disrupt the Red Sea-Suez route, forcing ships to sail around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing voyage times and freight costs. The Houthis have their own political interests, and their actions result from their own deliberations, not just orders from Tehran. Nonetheless, simultaneous insecurity at both chokepoints would amplify the economic consequences of another Iran campaign.

Geography makes the interaction especially consequential. Saudi crude shipped from Yanbu can move north toward Europe without passing Bab el-Mandeb, but shipments sailing south toward Asia must transit that passage. Diversifying away from Hormuz therefore does not necessarily remove exposure to regional conflict.

Most importantly, renewed attacks on Iran would lead to Iranian retaliation against soft targets of the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, allied with the United States. These would include not just American bases but also oil and gas facilities, airports, tourist destinations, and other high-value economic targets, disrupting and degrading the economies of countries heavily dependent on foreign investment and expatriate expertise. 

The Iranians have learned this lesson from the current Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia. If Tehran interprets the next round as an existential threat to the regime and the state, it is likely to engage in a no-holds-barred retaliation, especially against its Gulf neighbors, as it would feel it has nothing to lose. The most plausible result of renewed bombing is further Iranian degradation without assured capitulation: another militarily unequal contest producing an inconclusive political outcome.

About the Author: Mohammed Ayoob

​Mohammed Ayoob is a university distinguished professor emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University. His books include The Many Faces of Political Islam (Second Edition, 2020), Will the Middle East Implode? (2014), and, most recently, From Regional Security to Global IR: An Intellectual Journey (2024). He was also the editor of Assessing the War on Terror (2013).

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