Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s diplomatic push promises investment and strategic partnerships. Yet Washington’s ambitions face a familiar obstacle: Afghanistan’s unresolved political and security crisis.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Uzbekistan has firmly repositioned Central Asia on Washington’s strategic agenda. When he arrived in Samarkand on October 18, Rubio met representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan within the C5+1 framework. Accompanied by a substantial American business delegation, he sought to strengthen trade, investment, connectivity, and security cooperation. For a region historically caught between Russian influence and Chinese economic expansion, renewed American attention offers opportunities to diversify international partnerships through a multi-vector foreign policy.

Beneath the commercial enthusiasm lies a complex strategic question: Can the United States become a serious economic and security partner for Central Asia without addressing the deteriorating situation in neighboring Afghanistan? And could Washington’s expanding regional ambitions eventually extend to defense cooperation, creating another layer of competition with Russia and China?

The Trump administration appears increasingly interested in Central Asia as an economic partner. Washington’s calculations center on critical minerals, energy resources, transport corridors, and industrial development. American companies seek access to emerging markets to reduce dependence on China, while Central Asian governments welcome opportunities to diversify beyond traditional partners.

Secretary Rubio acknowledged that the United States had paid insufficient attention to the region, telling reporters in Samarkand that this was beginning to change. Speaking on October 19, 2026, Rubio put it succinctly: “This is not the end. This is the beginning.” 

For Central Asia, the attraction is clear: a multi-vector foreign policy is meant to strengthen regional agency and sovereignty. Indeed, US policy towards post-Soviet Central Asia has long sought to increase resilience and independence.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have pursued ambitious economic reforms, while the wider region views connectivity as a means to enhance its autonomy. American investment could support infrastructure, technology, energy diversification, and industrial modernization. The EU is pursuing comparable opportunities through its Global Gateway program, while China remains deeply embedded through the Belt and Road Initiative.

However, in this geography, economic development and national security cannot be easily separated. Central Asia borders Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, and China. Its governments must balance commercial ambition against concerns about terrorism, narcotics trafficking, border security, and regional unrest.

This raises the possibility that American economic engagement could gradually evolve into closer defense relationships. Washington already has experience in cooperating on counterterrorism, border security, and military training. Uzbekistan previously hosted American forces at Karshi-Khanabad during the Afghanistan campaign, while Kyrgyzstan hosted the US-led coalition at Manas.

A return to permanent American bases appears considerably less straightforward than expanded intelligence sharing, specialist training, border surveillance, cybersecurity, and defensive technology cooperation. Such partnerships could strengthen local security institutions without requiring Central Asian governments to abandon their relationships with Moscow or Beijing.

Russia, meanwhile, is following its own calculations in Afghanistan. In July 2025, Russia became the first country to recognize the Taliban, opening the way for a military-technical cooperation agreement in May 2026, the precise terms of which have not been publicly disclosed. Russian officials have discussed repairing and maintaining existing Soviet and Russian equipment. Still, the possibility of wider military cooperation raises difficult questions for Pakistan, which has spent much of the past year confronting the Taliban along its western frontier.

Islamabad once regarded the Taliban’s return to Kabul as a strategic success, believing a sympathetic government would provide security along its western border. Instead, relations deteriorated amid attacks attributed to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), accusations of cross-border militant sanctuary, and increasingly direct military confrontations.

In our March 2026 article for The National Interest, “What Does Pakistan Want in Afghanistan?” we examined the collapse of Pakistan’s longstanding strategic assumptions. We argued that Islamabad needed to move beyond attempts to manage Afghanistan through favored factions and instead consider a broader regional settlement based on political legitimacy, representative government, and economic integration.

Russia’s increasingly close relationship with the Taliban presents Islamabad with another complication. After Moscow formally recognized the Taliban, it developed channels for political, intelligence, and security cooperation. At the Moscow consultations on October 5, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that the Taliban’s successes against narcotics and terrorism were “linked to the ongoing military-technical cooperation between our countries,” according to The Associated Press. That assertion signals Moscow’s public commitment to the relationship, without establishing the scale or effectiveness of its assistance.

For Washington, these developments expose a wider challenge. American policymakers cannot treat Central Asian prosperity and Afghanistan’s political future as separate questions. Major infrastructure ambitions, particularly those connecting Central and South Asia, depend on reliable borders, functioning institutions, and predictable security arrangements. The World Bank made this dependence explicit in its January 2026 update on the CASA-1000 electricity project: “The CASA-1000 project cannot operate unless the Afghanistan section of the transmission line is completed.” 

Afghanistan should bridge regions, not become a permanent barrier. Its location offers possibilities for trade, energy transmission, transport networks, and economic integration extending from Central Asia into Pakistan, India, and the wider Indian Ocean economy. But these ambitions remain constrained by the Taliban’s exclusionary political system, restrictions on women and girls, and the absence of a broadly legitimate national settlement. As Roza Otunbayeva, then head of UNAMA, said of women and girls of Afghanistan in March 2025: “Restoring their rights to learn and work would transform their lives, communities, and Afghanistan’s future for the benefit of all.” 

Commercial engagement with Central Asia must therefore be accompanied by serious diplomatic attention to Afghanistan. This requires recognizing that Afghanistan’s long-term stability depends on a broad political process supported by regional consensus.

A regional dialogue involving Afghanistan’s neighbors, the Central Asian republics, India, Pakistan, Russia, China, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia could help establish common principles for regional security and economic integration. Such a process should complement an Afghanistan-led national dialogue rather than substitute external geopolitical bargaining for the political rights of its people.

Rubio’s Samarkand visit demonstrates that Central Asia is attracting serious American commercial and strategic attention. Whether that engagement deepens into defense relationships will depend on regional preferences and the broader security environment.

Yet one central reality remains: economic corridors cannot deliver their full promise if the political landscape through which they pass remains fractured. Central Asian prosperity is inseparable from Afghanistan’s stability, and any enduring regional strategy must eventually address both.

About the Authors: Zalmai Nishat and Chris Blackburn

Zalmai Nishat is the founder and executive chair of Mosaic Global Foundation, a UK-registered charity focused on Afghanistan and Central Asia. Previously, he was the program lead for Central and South Asia at the Tony Blair Institute. He is a graduate of SOAS University of London. Follow him on X: @ZalNishat.

Chris Blackburn is a strategist in international relations and economic development. He serves as a strategic advisor to Mosaic Foundation. He is also the director of communications for the Europe-Bangladesh Forum and an advisor to global leaders and professionals on South Asian issues. Follow him on X: @CJBdingo25.

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