America should not abandon an emerging industry because yesterday’s technologies failed. It should demand better technology, better economics, and commercial accountability.

In his recent National Interest article, “Why Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Is Recycling in Name Only,” Ross Matzkin-Bridger raises legitimate concerns about economics, proliferation risks, and the historical failures of nuclear reprocessing. However, his argument assumes that because previous generations of reprocessing technology failed commercially, future generations will suffer the same fate. This overlooks emerging technologies, evolving economics, and the geopolitical consequences of surrendering a strategic industrial capability to foreign competitors.

Why Advanced Nuclear Recycling Is Not PUREX

Traditional nuclear reprocessing, particularly the plutonium uranium reduction extraction (PUREX) process, was developed in a different technological and economic environment. Its limitations are well documented, but judging emerging recycling technologies exclusively through PUREX is like comparing a Model T to a Tesla Roadster. Both are automobiles, yet their engineering and economics differ fundamentally. Advanced recycling technologies are exploring alternative chemical processes, selective separations, improved material recovery, and more efficient operations. These innovations require independent validation, but dismissing their potential based on generation-old technology is not sound industrial policy.

The United States has accumulated approximately 94,000 metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel containing recoverable uranium and other potentially valuable materials. We invest billions in mining, converting, enriching, and fabricating uranium, use only a fraction of its potential energy, and classify the remainder as waste. It is equivalent to purchasing a Ferrari, driving until the fuel tank is empty, and abandoning the vehicle rather than refueling it. Nuclear recycling is complex, but why discard potentially valuable resources without evaluating whether modern technology can recover them competitively?

How Nuclear Recycling Can Compete Without Subsidies

Critics correctly observe that conventional reprocessing has struggled to compete with newly mined uranium. But that comparison addresses only part of the economic equation. Advanced recycling economics must account for spent-fuel management services, recovered materials, marketable isotopes, and long-term waste-management costs. Improvements in engineering, modular construction, automation, and chemical separations may also transform capital and operating costs. These advantages must be demonstrated, not assumed, but they cannot be dismissed because earlier technologies failed.

Nor must a successful recycling industry depend on perpetual government subsidies. A sustainable industry should generate revenue from recovered materials, valuable isotopes, and waste-management services. If advanced recycling demonstrably reduces the volume or burden of nuclear waste requiring permanent disposal, the Nuclear Waste Fund should be authorized to compensate operators for measurable waste-management benefits. Such payments would purchase services the federal government would otherwise need to provide, rather than subsidize commercially uncompetitive operations. Private industry must develop technologies, attract investment, and deliver results. The objective is to pay for demonstrated value, not subsidize failure.

Why Nuclear Recycling Matters for US Reactor Exports

Perhaps the most consequential issue is America’s competitiveness in international nuclear markets. We cannot expect to export American reactors at scale without offering customers comprehensive fuel-cycle solutions, particularly spent-fuel management. Russia understands this. Through Rosatom, Moscow combinesreactor construction, financing, fuel supply, technical services, and spent-fuel arrangements into long-term strategic partnerships. Its projects in Turkey, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Hungary demonstrate relationships extending decades beyond construction. Nations are purchasing more than reactors; they are establishing enduring energy partnerships. Without competitive American recycling and back-end fuel-cycle capabilities, US reactor developers face a significant strategic disadvantage.

This challenge is especially consequential in the Middle East, where civilian nuclear development intersects with American nonproliferation objectives. Discouraging independent enrichment and reprocessing requires more than diplomatic pressure; it requires offering credible commercial alternatives. American private industry, working with the US government through Section 123 agreements under the Atomic Energy Act, can provide those alternatives. Combining American reactor technology, assured fuel supplies, and comprehensive spent-fuel management and recycling services would allow the United States to compete commercially while reducing incentives for nations to develop sensitive nuclear capabilities.

Such partnerships need not export sensitive reprocessing technologies or separated weapons-usable materials. They require enforceable safeguards, material accountability, and government-to-government agreements defining responsibilities. Foreign customers must pay the full commercial costs of services, American taxpayers must not inherit foreign waste liabilities, and host communities must consent to facilities. Responsibility for residual materials and final disposition must be established. Section 123 agreements provide a foundation for peaceful nuclear cooperation, while American private enterprise delivers the technology and commercial capabilities that make those partnerships meaningful.

What Advanced Nuclear Recycling Must Prove

Advanced recycling could fundamentally transform spent-fuel management by recovering valuable resources and dramatically reducing the volume of material requiring long-term disposal. Residual waste will still require responsible management, but it should not be equated with wholesale disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Emerging technologies must demonstrate economic viability, environmental performance, and effective safeguards. These are standards for innovation, not reasons to abandon it. Matzkin-Bridger is correct that recycling must be judged by evidence rather than promises; the same standard must apply to claims that advanced recycling cannot succeed. America is investing in advanced reactors, domestic enrichment, and nuclear manufacturing, yet treats the back end of the fuel cycle as an afterthought. We cannot lead the global nuclear renaissance while surrendering a critical component to our competitors. The technologies must prove themselves, the economics must stand on their own, and American industry must have the opportunity to compete. Our energy security, industrial competitiveness, and international nonproliferation objectives depend on getting all three right.

About the Authors: Yechezkel Moskowitz and Ed McGinnis

Rabbi Yechezkel Moskowitz is a Long Island entrepreneur and investor who leads Curio and Synergos Fund. He manages the family’s political investment portfolio, advises elected officials on international policy, and serves on nonprofit boards. He holds three rabbinic ordinations and a master’s degree in administration from the University of Scranton.

Edward (Ed) McGinnis is Curio’s President and CEO and a senior nuclear energy executive with more than 30 years of government and industry experience. He served as Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy at DOE, led international nuclear cooperation, directed the White House President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), and chaired initiatives advancing nuclear energy, security, and nonproliferation.

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