For Riyadh, further escalation against a determined foe may create an open-ended conflict; withdrawal may reward Houthi aggression.

The Houthi missile strike on Riyadh’s King Khalid Airport on October 10 that killed 13 people has brought Saudi Arabia’s Yemen predicament home with devastating force. Tit-for-tat attacks on each other’s airports continued on October 11, causing more casualties. Reported deaths and injuries underline the vulnerability of a kingdom whose military expenditure and sophisticated arsenal vastly exceed that of its adversary. 

Following Saudi support for renewed operations by its Yemeni allies, attacks on Saudi civilian infrastructure and military targets have confronted Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman with three choices: escalate toward full-scale war, exercise restraint, or withdraw from Yemen’s conflict. None of these is without substantial risks.  

The immediate temptation is to retaliate with excessive force to demonstrate national resolve. But the strategic question is whether Saudi military action can produce a political outcome that makes the kingdom safer. Punishing the Houthis, protecting Saudi citizens, and restoring friendly rule in Yemen are very different objectives. Confusing them could turn a deterrence strategy into another open-ended intervention. 

The current escalation follows Saudi-backed efforts to reverse Houthi gains and protect access to the Red Sea. The Houthis have framed their attacks as retaliation for Saudi strikes on Sanaa and other territories under their control. On October 5, they claimed operations against Saudi airports, a refinery, and military sites. The Saudi-led coalition subsequently announced strikes on dozens of Houthi military and civilian targets. These competing accounts require scrutiny, but the pattern is unmistakable: Riyadh’s support for its Yemeni clients now carries direct costs for it inside Saudi Arabia.

The Houthis have demonstrated again and again that the Saudis cannot defeat them by simply buying and deploying more sophisticated weapons. Saudi Arabia must protect airports, refineries, ports, population centers, and military installations. The Houthis need only penetrate those defenses occasionally to inflict casualties, disrupt oil exports, and increase nervousness among foreign investors. The vulnerability of war-hardened Houthis to airstrikes does not eliminate their capacity to impose disproportionate economic and psychological damage on Saudi Arabia.

First, escalation offers the most immediate political satisfaction. A sustained campaign against missile launchers, weapons stores, command networks, and supply routes could degrade Houthi capabilities. Supporting advances by anti-Houthi forces could also deny the movement territory from which it threatens shipping. A forceful response would reassure Saudi citizens and signal to Yemeni partners that Riyadh will not abandon them under pressure. 

However, continued retaliation can be a slippery slope toward a full-scale war. The Saudi intervention launched in 2015 did not remove the Houthis from Sanaa. Repeating that effort would require explaining why the outcome would be different this time around. Air superiority alone cannot establish a pro-Saudi Yemeni government, secure mountainous territory, or settle the disputes dividing the kingdom’s local partners. Battlefield advances would still require a sustainable political settlement. 

Escalation could also strengthen the adversary it seeks to weaken. Civilian casualties and damage to essential services would help the Houthis present themselves as defenders of Yemeni sovereignty against foreign aggression. Renewed war could deepen their dependence on Iran while increasing Tehran’s incentive to sustain their military capacity. 

For Mohammed bin Salman, the domestic opportunity cost is especially severe. His pet modernization project, Vision 2030, depends on confidence in Saudi stability and on resources available for economic transformation. Recurrent airport closures and threats to energy infrastructure undermine both. Even a militarily successful campaign could become strategically self-defeating if it prolongs insecurity, drains revenue, and discourages investment. A war undertaken to restore prestige could weaken the foundations of Saudi influence. 

Restraint offers a second course. This need not mean passively accepting attacks. Riyadh could prioritize air defense, infrastructure protection, intelligence cooperation, and narrowly bounded strikes against imminent threats while suspending offensive support intended to reshape Yemen’s territorial balance. The purpose would be to interrupt the cycle of escalation and reopen negotiations, including through Oman and the United Nations. 

The advantage is that Saudi objectives would become clearer and more defensible. Protecting the kingdom is a feasible mission around which external partners can cooperate. Defeating the Houthis and rebuilding Yemen’s political order are far more demanding. Defensive strategies would also let Riyadh seek assistance without assuming that its partners such as Turkey, Pakistan and the United States are prepared to join it in another Yemeni war. 

Restraint nevertheless carries real dangers. The Houthis could interpret a pause as evidence that their attacks have broken Saudi resolve. A policy that merely absorbs attacks while waiting for moderation would lack both credibility and an enforceable endpoint. 

To succeed, restraint therefore needs reciprocal terms and serious negotiations with the Houthis and possibly Iran. Saudi suspension of offensive operations and imposition of restraints on its Yemeni clients should be matched by a halt to attacks on Saudi territory and shipping, with arrangements for monitoring and investigating violations. Airport access, port restrictions, economic measures, and prisoner exchanges could serve as bargaining chips. Humanitarian relief for Houthi-controlled territories should accompany negotiations rather than become a discretionary reward. Riyadh would also need to discipline its own partners sufficiently to prevent them from destroying an emerging ceasefire. 

Withdrawal is the third option and the most consequential. Ending Saudi participation in Yemen’s internal war would reduce the kingdom’s responsibility for its clients’ military fortunes and remove a central Houthi justification for attacking it. In fact, the UAE did this quite some time ago. It would acknowledge that Saudi security does not require determining who governs every part of Yemen. Resources could shift toward border protection, maritime security, and domestic priorities. 

But withdrawal would not automatically purchase peace. Houthi leaders might claim victory and keep their missiles and drones as tools for future defense and coercion. Saudi-backed forces could fragment or lose territory, creating further instability along the kingdom’s southern frontier. Abandoned partners would remember the decision, potentially weakening Saudi credibility elsewhere. A hurried departure could leave Riyadh confronting a stronger adversary with fewer bargaining chips of its own. 

The distinction between unilateral withdrawal and negotiated disengagement is therefore crucial. Saudi Arabia should seek an arrangement that ends its offensive role while preserving defensive capabilities and non-military support for an inclusive Yemeni political process. Disengagement should be accompanied by nonaggression commitments, border arrangements, and protections for maritime traffic. Economic assistance for Houthi-controlled Yemen could help sustain an agreement by making it more palatable to the Houthis.  

Riyadh must resist making peace conditional on first severing every Houthi connection with Iran. That demand would make an agreement unattainable. The more practical test is behavior: whether the movement stops attacking Saudi territory, threatening shipping, and using negotiations to prepare another offensive. Tehran can be pressed to support de-escalation, but it cannot substitute for bargaining with the Houthis themselves, whose objectives are independent of Iranian concerns. 

Riyadh must also learn a final lesson. The last ceasefire, which had held for four years, was broken by the Saudi-led coalition forces that attacked Sanaa airport on July 13 ostensibly to prevent an Iranian flight from landing there. The Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia for this act and began a retaliatory campaign that has escalated into a major confrontation. Riyadh must not allow this to happen again and provide the Houthis an excuse for restarting their attacks on vital installations in the kingdom.

The strongest course combines immediate armed restraint with negotiated disengagement. Saudi Arabia should retain the capacity to defeat attacks and impose proportionate costs while abandoning the expectation that another expansive campaign will deliver a compliant Yemen. A full-scale war risks repeating an expensive failure, while an unconditional withdrawal could reward coercion. 

The kingdom’s predicament will ease when its commitments match what it can realistically achieve. Defending Saudi Arabia is essential. Making Yemen’s political future depend on Saudi military power has proved a far less sustainable undertaking because of the domestic dynamics that drive what is essentially a local conflict. Riyadh should abandon this mirage for good.

It is also in the interest of the United States to encourage the Saudi regime to do so. An escalating Saudi-Houthi war could have unintended consequences, including involving Washington in another “forever war” in the Middle East that would further strain US military and financial resources as well as indefinitely jeopardize the flow of oil and other essential commodities through the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb.

About the Author: Mohammed Ayoob

​Mohammed Ayoob is a university distinguished professor emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University. His books include The Many Faces of Political Islam (Second Edition, 2020), Will the Middle East Implode? (2014), and, most recently, From Regional Security to Global IR: An Intellectual Journey (2024). He was also the editor of Assessing the War on Terror (2013).

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