An overhead view of the Port of Hong Kong in February 2020. A shipment of damaged F-35 parts was accidentally rerouted to Hong Kong to save time, and has disappeared; it is presumed to be in the hands of the Chinese government, though Beijing has denied this. (Shutterstock/Zotov Dmitrii)
We Now Know How China Got Sensitive F-35 Parts
Existing US export controls forbid the delivery of sensitive military equipment to non-approved countries, but a UPS employee appears to have ignored an email containing this information.
The old proverb “For want of a nail, the war was lost”—an adage meaning that small mistakes can have far-reaching consequences—may need a 21st century update. Last month, it was revealed that China had likely obtained parts for the F-35 stealth fighter after a repair shipment from Australia to the United States was mistakenly redirected to Hong Kong. More recent reporting indicates that the mistake took place because a United Parcel Service (UPS) employee missed an email that warned against routing the shipment through the Chinese special administrative region.
The F-35 parts—including a cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door—were on their way back to the United States for repair or possible disposal. The shipment arrived in South Korea as planned, but was then routed to Hong Kong. After the shipment arrived, the Chinese government subsequently took possession of the parts, which have not been returned to the United States. The concern is that the components could reveal details about the fifth-generation fighter’s radar-absorbing stealth coating.
Why It’s Important to Check Your Email
An email was sent from freight forwarder DSV specifying that the components must not transit through certain countries, per the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)—a rule that is in place to prevent sensitive US weapons technology from falling into the hands of US adversaries.
The shipment of F-35 parts was originally slated to travel to San Francisco via South Korea and Taiwan, both approved countries on the ITAR list, Bloomberg first reported.
However, the parts were late in departing from Australia, and in an effort to speed up its delivery, the shipment was then routed via Hong Kong, on the ITAR blacklist. Had the email been seen, the shipment almost certainly wouldn’t have been routed to China.
“The DSV email may have been sent through a different IT system than the one used by the UPS agent,” an unnamed source told Bloomberg.
Prior to this week’s disclosure, there had already been no shortage of finger-pointing, as components related to one of the US military’s most advanced combat aircraft were essentially delivered to the Chinese government.
Lockheed Martin and the US military have attempted to downplay the damage, noting that the parts had been damaged and questioning their intelligence value. Still, the greater concern is the actual stealth coatings on the metal, which the Chinese military will no doubt attempt to reverse-engineer or study to determine how it can be countered.
The incident has prompted investigations into the mishandling of such sensitive components, and US lawmakers have rightfully demanded a review of the global supply chain.
“Bloomberg’s new information shifts the blame somewhat to a shipping firm’s miscommunication. Even though it has now been explained, the error seems pretty amateurish,” Tom’s Hardware reported.
Beijing has yet to return or release the parts, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry has even suggested it is unaware of their existence. Still, it is hard to take this declaration at face value; one must expect that the State Department would give a similar stonewalling response if China had accidentally dropped off components related to J-20 Mighty Dragon!
Mistakes Happen, Even with Sensitive Military Equipment
The F-35 parts shipment that was misrouted to Hong Kong is a rare incident, but similar mishaps are not unheard of. Transportation is a complicated business, and the same basic logistics errors can equally affect an Amazon package and a nuclear missile.
In 2008, the Pentagon acknowledged that “four non-nuclear ballistic missile nose-cone assembly components were mistakenly shipped to Taiwan in August 2006.” The self-governing island nation had expected to receive four helicopter batteries initially ordered through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.
In 2024, a batch of anti-tank mines that was being transported by train was mistakenly delivered to an IKEA warehouse in Poland. The loss wasn’t discovered until an IKEA worker called the Ministry of Defense and asked when they’d come to collect the mines.
About the Author: Peter Suciu
Peter Suciu has contributed to dozens of newspapers, magazines, and websites over a 30-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a contributing writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. He is based in Michigan. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author at Editor@nationalinterest.org.
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