Since 2014, Yemen’s civil war has grown from a marginal conflict in a corner of the Arabian Peninsula to a force of global disruption.

In 12 years, the Houthis (also known as Ansar Allah, “the Supporters of God”) have grown from provincial rebels into a force capable of disrupting global trade. Each new round of Yemen’s civil war seemed to temper and strengthen them. In September, Ansar Allah broke through its opponents’ defenses, reached the Bab el-Mandeb and reaffirmed its blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea. At the other end of the Arabian Peninsula, the crisis is already restricting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Simultaneous instability on two key maritime arteries turns the new war in Yemen from a regional conflict into a problem for global trade. How far can the Houthis go, and what will it cost the world economy?

A Yemen Divided by Civil War

The Houthi seizure of Sanaa in September 2014 was one of the turning points of the Yemeni Civil War. Today, the country is split between several centers of power, and the strongest of them is in the north. Ansar Allah controls the capital and most of the densely populated northwest, where about 70 percent of the population lives. The movement holds key ports and a large share of northern Yemen’s trade flows.

The anti-Houthi camp is far more complex. The internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, operates from Aden with Saudi support. Yet the PLC brings together forces with differing visions for the country’s future, including General Tareq Saleh, nephew of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, who holds an independent power base on the west coast. The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) goes further, seeking to restore an independent South Yemen. In December 2025, its leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, tried to take control of Hadramawt and al-Mahra in the east, opening a new rift inside the coalition. In January 2026, the PLC expelled al-Zubaidi, and the UAE began withdrawing from Yemen. 

The September offensive showed the price of this fragmentation. A spokesman for Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces said that between August 9 and September 9, Ansar Allah mobilized more than 76,000 fighters on the west coast. On September 10, the Houthis drove government-aligned forces out of the strategic port city of Mokha. On September 11, they took Perim Island, which sits within the Bab el-Mandeb. Perim does not give the Houthis full control of the Bab el-Mandeb, but it sharply improves their position. With 12 percent to 15 percent of global trade passing through the Red Sea before the crisis, the escalation reaches far beyond the Middle East. 

The Houthis’ Baptism by Fire 

The world knows the movement as the Houthis, though its members call themselves Ansar Allah. The name “Houthis” comes from the al-Houthi family, whose members founded the movement and still form the core of its leadership. 

Ansar Allah took shape in the 1990s in Saada province. Its religious foundation is Zaydism, a local branch of Shia Islam. The current leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, took over after his brother Hussein was killed in 2004. Between 2004 and 2010, he led the movement through six military campaigns against the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, and each campaign hardened the Houthis’ military capabilities. His ability to prevail against a stronger opponent made al-Houthi a symbol of resistance. During the Arab Spring, the Houthis exploited the weakness of the transitional government and captured Sanaa in 2014. 

The Saudi intervention of 2015 played into al-Houthi’s hands. Foreign interference allowed him to move beyond the image of a northern leader and present himself as Yemen’s defender against external aggression. 

Iran played an important role in strengthening the movement. Tehran helped the Houthis rapidly build up their military and technical capabilities. Both Sanaa and Tehran regard Saudi Arabia as an adversary. For Iran, Saudi Arabia remains one of its main regional rivals. For the Houthis, it is the state that has led a military campaign against them for more than a decade. Still, treating Ansar Allah as an Iranian proxy is an oversimplification. Unlike Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Houthis retain considerable autonomy and are not controlled by Iran’s security services. 

The Houthis’ Trap for Saudi Arabia

The timing could hardly be worse for Saudi Arabia. After the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the kingdom redirected large volumes of crude west to its Red Sea terminals. For a time, this route served as a lifeline for Saudi exports. Now the western side of the Arabian Peninsula is unsafe, too. In early September, the Houthis struck a series of Saudi Aramco facilities. Around September 10 and 11, unidentified drones launched from Iraqi territory disabled the East-West pipeline, which had been carrying 4 to 5 million barrels per day. By September 22, pumping was partly restored, but a return to full capacity could take six to eight weeks. 

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was the main advocate of the 2015 intervention in Yemen. Riyadh regarded the Houthis as an Iranian proxy and assembled a coalition expecting to push the Houthis out of the capital and restore the allied Hadi government. Eleven years later, Ansar Allah has kept its hold on the north and is inflicting serious economic and political damage on the kingdom. 

After the offensive began, Crown Prince bin Salman twice in one day called President Trump to urge US airstrikes on Yemen. The White House declined to enter the war and instead offered intelligence support. This reflects Washington’s reluctance to open a second front in the Middle East. During recent talks in Oman, the Houthis also stated that they had no intention of attacking American vessels. In parallel, Riyadh turned to France, the UK, Pakistan, and Egypt for air defense support. 

The Mecca Pact, which Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed on August 7, is facing a serious stress test. The pact declared the principle of collective defense. After the Houthi strikes, however, the agreement quickly ran into political reality. Pakistan’s defense minister suggested the pact could be activated, yet a day later the Foreign Office said that no military action was yet under discussion. Ankara confined itself to condemning the attacks and backing the kingdom’s sovereignty. On October 5, the three powers agreed to activate “collective deterrence measures” to help defend Saudi Arabia, but it remains unclear what form this will take. 

Riyadh’s position increasingly resembles a geopolitical zugzwang, a chess situation in which a player has no good options. In the east, Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz. In the west, the Houthis regularly attack Saudi vessels in the Red Sea, while the kingdom’s allies are in no hurry to help. Whether Mohammed bin Salman will find a way out is hard to say. For now, each new move on the Middle Eastern chessboard costs Riyadh more and carries greater risk. 

The Houthis’ Global Reach 

September substantially shifted the region’s balance of power. By reaching the Bab el-Mandeb, Ansar Allah has positioned itself on a main trade artery between Asia and Europe. The movement does not need to close the strait completely. It is enough to make the route so risky that shipowners and insurers start looking for alternatives. After the Houthis declared their maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia, some carriers have avoided the strait and sent ships around Africa. 

South Korea offers a telling example. Rerouting Saudi crude around the Cape of Good Hope adds three to four weeks to the voyage to Korean refineries. On September 15, Seoul and Astana signed a framework agreement on oil cooperation covering Kazakh crude supplies and joint responses to disruptions in the global market.

At the other end of the continent, European countries are feeling the consequences. After the disruption to Saudi supplies, ORLEN, the largest energy company in Central and Eastern Europe, urgently bought 16 additional crude cargoes from suppliers including Algeria, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The diesel situation has also deteriorated. European diesel prices rose more than twofold between late February and mid-September, reaching their highest level since 2007. In the first half of 2025, the Middle East supplied 43 percent of Europe’s diesel imports, and in September shipments from the region fell to a 6-year low. 

The situation in Hormuz compounds the crisis. Before the war, about 125 commercial vessels passed through the strait each day. On September 19 and 20, only 17 vessels transited it. On September 9, Brent climbed back above $100 per barrel for the first time since late July and held near $104 a few days later.

Meanwhile, the cost of protecting sea lanes is rising. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that Operation Aspides, which has protected commercial shipping in the Red Sea since 2024, needs more than 10 ships instead of its current six, and asked member states to contribute more. Meanwhile, the fighting continues. By October 5, al-Alimi’s government forces claimed to have retaken Mokha, Dhubab, and positions around the Bab el-Mandeb, though these claims have not been independently verified. Ansar Allah continues its offensive around Taiz, so the outcome of the struggle for southwestern Yemen remains open. 

Throughout the war, the Houthis’ opponents have repeatedly outmatched them in resources and weaponry, yet have never defeated them. Today, Ansar Allah itself sets the rules of the game. As long as the Houthis can use geography as leverage over the region and world trade, they have little reason to lower the stakes. 

About the Author: Rassul Kospanov 

Rassul Kospanov is an international relations specialist and senior researcher at the National Analytical Center under Nazarbayev University (Astana). He is a fellow at the political foresight agency Nightingale Int., a member of the Central Asia and Azerbaijan expert community, and the author of the Telegram channel Kazakhstan Politics. 

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