The memory of October 7, 2023, will still drive Israeli politics no matter which government comes to power after this month’s election.

Three years have passed since Hamas’ murderous 2023 onslaught on Israel. Many observers refer to October 7 without understanding its ongoing psychological effect on Israelis. The Israeli people are suffering from what amounts to post-traumatic stress syndrome—feeding both a deep sense of insecurity and an inability to feel anything but their own pain. Without understanding the depth of Israel’s shock and paralysis, it will prove very difficult to influence Israel’s behavior toward the Palestinians or its approach toward perceived threats. Of course, the Palestinians’ trauma is no less acute, particularly given the death and destruction that Israel inflicted on Gaza after Hamas’s 2023 attack. Yet Israel’s looming election creates at least the possibility of change, provided that the psychic context in which Israelis are operating is understood. 

I have long been deeply involved with Israel’s leaders and its people, but I too failed to grasp the depth of the country’s trauma. That became clear to me only after I took part in a “not for attribution” brainstorming session with a small number of Arabs and Israelis. At one point, one Arab participant said that he understood the impact of October 7. His Israeli counterparts responded, “No, you don’t.” One Israeli described the enduring horror in his head: “Seeing what Hamas was doing and would do if we were overrun, I felt I would have no choice but to kill my children.” 

It is hard to comprehend the fear and desperation that could lead anyone to contemplate something so unthinkable. Yet the person who said it was no extremist; in fact, he is one of the most thoughtful, moderate Israelis I know—someone with genuine empathy for the Palestinians’ own anguish. But this Israeli saw Hamas killers videotaping every act of murder, taking sadistic pleasure in slaughtering children in front of parents and parents in front of their children. This man did not have to imagine what Hamas would do to his kids; he knew. And so he had concluded that he would have to do the unimaginable to spare them certain torture. 

Three years later, along with the suffering of the hostages—who were traumatized, sexually abused, and starved—this is the Israeli image of October 7 and of Hamas. This magnifies threats and makes ensuring security the overwhelming preoccupation. 

The Israeli military feels extraordinary guilt for having failed in its most basic responsibility to protect the public on October 7. For the IDF’s leaders, October 7 has produced a new security doctrine: no surprises and new buffer zones. But the former is impossible to guarantee, and the latter offers only the illusion of security. Buffer zones become newly occupied territories that make Israeli forces targets for attack and legitimize rejectionists like Hezbollah and Hamas, who can now claim that only they are willing to resist Israeli expansionism. 

Still, the views of the IDF—and the Israeli public, 59 percent of whom believe that even now Gaza could be the source of a second October 7—need to be recognized and not dismissed. These perceptions of Hamas are grounded in reality, not fantasy. Similarly, Israel continues to face genuine threats from Iran and Hezbollah, whose leaders have declared that Israel will disappear and aim to hasten its eradication.

To make any diplomatic progress after October 7, acknowledging Israeli fears is necessary but not sufficient. Concrete plans are needed too. The new Board of Peace’s 15-point plan for decommissioning Hamas’ weapons in Gaza offers some good principles. However, Israelis doubt those good intentions will ever be translated into reality. Israelis will need to see that the fledgling International Stabilization Force for Gaza and the vetted, newly recruited, and trained Palestinian police are capable and determined to oversee Hamas’s relinquishing of its weapons—and equally determined to prevent Hamas from reconstituting itself militarily. Israelis will also need to see that the proposed technocratic government for Gaza, the Palestinian-led National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), can govern free of Hamas intimidation and threats. 

Moreover, to make any headway, Israelis must see that the ceasefire’s mediators are not making excuses for Hamas and are willing to criticize them in public—especially since Turkey, Qatar, and Egypt have no problem criticizing Israel publicly but won’t criticize Hamas or call it out for seizing humanitarian assistance for suffering Palestinian civilians in Gaza. The NCAG and the mediators can act in a way that produces a hopeful starting point, but there should be no illusions: the effect of October 7 has made the Israeli public deeply distrustful that coexistence with an independent Palestinian state is possible, with only 17 percent believing that now. 

Meanwhile, the Lebanese government is saying the right things publicly. Still, Israelis must see it actually fulfill written commitments to disarm and dismantle Hezbollah and prevent the Iran-backed group from re-establishing itself in areas where the IDF has destroyed its weaponry and military infrastructure. The Trump administration has taken it upon itself to preside over Israeli-Lebanese peace talks. Still, the United States has been far too passive in monitoring implementation of the 2026 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire framework. 

So any progress hinges on tangibly addressing legitimate Israeli fears—and proving that there are credible alternatives to buffer zones. But this cannot be a one-way street. Israelis must understand that they too have responsibilities and obligations. Israel’s collective trauma may explain but cannot excuse indifference to the suffering of Palestinians. Today’s traumatized Israel has also traumatized its Palestinian and Lebanese neighbors—and ordinary Palestinians and Lebanese see little sign that Israelis care about their ongoing anguish. 

Israel’s government made a profound strategic mistake in withholding humanitarian assistance intended for Gaza. Yes, Hamas was frequently seizing and monetizing that aid, and yes, the United States and the international community did not assume responsibility for securing delivery to Palestinians in Gaza who were in desperate need of it. But Israel is not an island and should not act in a way that embitters its neighbors and ensures its isolation. 

Regrettably, the Netanyahu government’s tolerance of pogroms against Palestinians in the West Bank suggests that Israel has not learned that lesson. Moshe Karadi, a former Israeli Police Commissioner, has described the violence from extremist West Bank settlers against Palestinian civilians as “illegal, unethical, immoral, and also un-Jewish.” He added that if given unequivocal directives by their government, the IDF and the Israeli police would stop these reprehensible actions. But as one senior Israeli IDF officer told me, orders from Israel’s current political leadership are inconsistent and ambiguous—signaling acquiescence in some cases and active encouragement in others, especially from two ultra-right Israeli leaders, Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich. 

Israel must act responsibly and demonstrate that it is a state governed by law. Israel’s leaders must also distinguish between threat and opportunity. In Syria, Israel should seize the possibility of progress with a new, post-Assad leadership that (like Israel) sees Iran as a threat. But the new Israeli insistence on buffer zones will undermine the chances of building understandings among Syria, Lebanon, and Israel that could strategically be far more effective in countering Iran and Hezbollah’s threats. 

Israel’s PTSD deepens its feeling of insecurity and vulnerability. Even if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is replaced by Gadi Eisenkot, a new Israeli government, like its public, will still harbor those feelings. Those wounds must be acknowledged and addressed, even as Israelis need to be reminded that the Palestinians, the Lebanese, and others carry insecurities and vulnerabilities that must also be addressed to move beyond the nightmares of October 7. 

About the Author: Dennis Ross

Ambassador Dennis Ross is a counselor and William Davidson distinguished fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Ambassador Ross’s distinguished diplomatic career includes service as special assistant to President Barack Obama; National Security Council senior director for the Central Region; special advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Middle East envoy to President Bill Clinton; and director of policy planning for President George HW Bush. Follow him on X: @AmbDennisRoss.

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