Oil, gas, and mining deals could revive Venezuela’s economy, but inflation, instability, and an uncertain democratic transition could squander the windfall.

Venezuela is attracting a potentially enormous wave of foreign investment commitments. Reuters, Financial Times, and others covered several of these this month, but we have tallied them up to provide a comprehensive picture. We also provide the regional and strategic context to understand where these new developments might be headed. 

This historic potential investment surge already includes energy, mining, and infrastructure projects. 

How Much Foreign Investment Is Flowing into Venezuela

As we published two weeks ago, the largest proposal is from North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), anticipated to explore $100 billion across 17 oil fields. NABEP claims the 100-year lease could produce more than one million barrels per day, in turn generating royalties and taxes for the Venezuelan government. 

Chevron, which already operates in Venezuela, separately announced plans to expand its operations with a $7 billion investment over the next five years. This would double its production in the country to 600,000 barrels per day. American giant ExxonMobil is reported to be nearing an agreement with Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) to also explore undeveloped oil fields, with the details currently undisclosed. 

Italian company Eni received a 25-year contract through PDVSA to operate the Junín-5 field, containing an estimated 35 billion barrels. Similarly, Continental Resources signed a memorandum of understanding with PDVSA to develop the Ayacucho 2 oil block in the Orinoco oil belt. Florida-based Denarius Holding Group plans a $400 million phased investment in the CEMA Oil Field over 20 years. French company TotalEnergies signed an agreement with interim President Delcy Rodríguez on an undisclosed oil deal. Meanwhile, Halliburton signed an agreement with Brazil’s Eneva and Venezuela’s WESCA to develop energy opportunities for an undisclosed figure. BP has teamed up with United Arab Emirates’ XRG and Qatar’s UCC to explore the Loran gas field, containing an estimated 7.3 trillion cubic feet of gas. 

There are possibilities beyond hydrocarbons for foreign investment. In April, Venezuela changed its mining law to allow foreign concessions of up to 30 years. Subsequently, Heeney Capital and Mercuria announced a $1 billion gold-mining arrangement. In September, GE Vernova agreed with PDVSA and Corpoelec to stabilize the country’s electrical grid within 12 months and expand the current power supply by 33 percent in four years. Negotiations are also ongoing on infrastructure improvements in ports, airports, housing, water, and roads. Untapped potential for foreign investment in tourism, agriculture, and livestock provides additional possibilities for economic growth.

The headlines signal a sea change for Venezuela’s economy and could help restore basic governance functions in a failed state. However, the future of Venezuela remains uncertain. Left-wing actors across the region have condemned US intervention as foreign exploitation, providing a platform for potential resistance. Even if the deals produce an economic windfall, it will take years for Venezuela to rebuild its economy and address systemic unemployment. An August Congressional Research Service report raises concerns about the lack of transparency surrounding Venezuela’s oil revenue. In July, the Financial Times reported that the United States collected more than $13 billion from oil sales, but the process for holding and disbursing those funds remained unclear. Improvements in the quality of life of the average Venezuelan are far from assured.

Within Venezuela, surveys show division and skepticism concerning recent events. A solid majority are thankful that Nicolás Maduro’s dictatorship has ended. But there also appears to be a solid majority who believe the recent deals favor foreign interests, not the people of Venezuela. All relevant actors agree elections will be held, but timelines range from 2027 to as late as 2028. These actors recognize that the systems and political organization needed for free and fair elections will take time to rebuild. From an internal political perspective, these deals have time to come to fruition and, ideally, positively impact the average Venezuelan. But opposition to them could build political momentum in a future election and possibly lead to changes or even cancellation of the agreements. 

Will Venezuela’s Investment Wave Fuel Anti-American Propaganda?

The January military intervention in Venezuela generated extensive anti-imperialist propaganda from left-wing movements across Latin America. The Partido Comunista de México (PCM), for example, characterized US actions as imperialist aggression intended to seize Venezuela’s “oil, lands and natural resources.”

The subsequent influx of foreign investment could provide additional material for such propaganda. Revolutionary movements, such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which exercises territorial influence in Colombia and Venezuela, regularly produce anti-US messaging. For example, ELN’s Insurrección 1049 portrayed the United States as an imperial power using war, sanctions, and political pressure to seize Latin American resources with the cooperation of compliant regional elites.

The ELN has therefore established an ideological framework readily applicable to the new oil, gas, and mining agreements. Nevertheless, its publications issued between August 28 and September 21 do not appear to address the NABEP framework or the other recently announced investments directly. Our research likewise found little discernible commentary from organizations such as Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) or the PCM.

This relative silence is notable, but it should not necessarily be interpreted as acceptance of the investments. The agreements are recent, and these organizations may be preoccupied with domestic political and security issues, waiting to assess how the projects develop, or communicating through channels not captured by this review. For now, the evidence demonstrates limited public reaction, but not ideological approval.

Why Venezuela’s Economic Recovery May Remain Slow

World organizations continue to evaluate Venezuela’s economic progress, which is certainly positive. Two of the most consequential organizations conducting this type of research include the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 

The UNDP’s Desempeño Macroeconómico De Venezuela report assesses the economic performance of the country from January to the end of June 2026. It details that Venezuela’s economy grew 2.5 percent year-over-year in the first quarter of 2026 and projects 6.5 percent growth for the full year, driven by estimated expansions of 11 percent in petroleum and 5.6 percent in non-petroleum activity. Oil exports averaged 1.052 million barrels per day during the first half, up 27.6 percent. Meanwhile, the average price of Merey crude, Venezuela’s benchmark heavy crude, increased 18.9 percent to $71 per barrel, raising the estimated gross value of petroleum exports by 71.6 percent to $14.51 billion. 

Tempering this good news, Venezuela also experienced some potentially serious obstacles on its road to recovery. Inflation remained the principal weakness. Monthly inflation declined from 32.6 percent in January to 6.3 percent in May before rebounding to 13.8 percent in June. The UNDP projects end-of-year inflation at approximately 385 percent. Additionally, the World Bank estimates that the tragic June earthquakes caused $19.6 billion in direct damage. That equates to roughly 17.5 percent of the country’s estimated nominal annual GDP. On a positive note, petroleum production infrastructure reportedly avoided direct physical damage.

In contrast, based on analysis completed in April 2026, the IMF provides a more cautious assessment of Venezuela’s recovery in its World Economic Outlook. It expects Venezuela’s economy to grow by 4 percent in 2026, versus the UNDP’s 6.5 percent, and projects an annual-average increase in consumer prices of 387.4 percent.

Of note, both the UNDP and IMF assessments predate the most recently announced foreign investment agreements and therefore do not incorporate their potential economic effects. Whether these commitments produce a substantial windfall will depend on the extent and pace of their implementation. Even the IMF cautioned that its Venezuelan projections should be interpreted carefully because incomplete economic statistics, hyperinflation, and the absence of regular consultations with the government make the country’s economic trajectory unusually difficult to assess.

Why the Risk of State Collapse in Venezuela Remains High

What remains of the Chavista regime faces enormous challenges to properly govern and administer the country. These weaknesses were exacerbated by the earthquakes in June. Even prior to this catastrophe, food insecurity was extreme. In February, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) estimated that between 1.5 and 2 million people required humanitarian food assistance. Stressed conditions were widespread, with poorer households experiencing crisis conditions. The cost of a minimum survival ration in bolívares had increased nearly 800 percent over the previous year. FEWS NET nevertheless projected that improving oil revenue and greater currency stability could gradually reduce food-assistance needs, although stressed conditions nationwide and crisis conditions among particularly vulnerable households were expected to persist.

The conditions for state collapse in Venezuela, whether triggered by a coup, popular uprising, or another abrupt change in government, remain dangerously high. Widespread food insecurity, low government legitimacy, sustained brain drain, and degraded public services have left the state increasingly vulnerable to political unrest. Political unrest has repeatedly fueled the coups and government breakdowns of the last five years, mainly in Africa’s Sahel region. Restoring stability is essential to any democratic transition but, under present conditions, mass mobilization might trigger a sudden and fundamental transformation of Venezuela’s government before elections that might enhance perceived legitimacy can be organized and held.

Will Venezuela Make a Democratic Transition?

While all relevant actors have stated that elections will eventually be held, both the US Congress and Venezuela’s opposition movement are questioning the current administration’s strategy and its collaboration with the Chavista holdouts. 

The direction of Venezuela’s democratic transition remains uncertain. On a positive note, an amnesty law advanced by interim President Delcy Rodríguez and approved by the National Assembly facilitated the release of more than 800 political prisoners between January and May 2026. However, opposition figures claim that approximately 382 political prisoners remained incarcerated as of August 3.

Representatives of the opposition-controlled 2015 National Assembly and the Rodríguez administration began US-backed transition talks on August 6. However, Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia, whom the United States recognizes as the president-elect following the disputed 2024 election, have not participated.

The State Department has identified freedom of the press, unrestricted political-party activity, and reform of the National Electoral Council as prerequisites for credible elections. Yet major opposition leaders remain in exile, restrictions on nongovernmental organizations and independent media remain in force, and the United Nations reported in March that the institutional structures responsible for political persecution had not been dismantled. On September 18, Sofía Macher, chair of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, reported to the United Nations that there is no evidence of a genuine, lasting break with Maduro-era repression. 

What to Watch Next in Venezuela

Venezuela now has its best opportunity for economic recovery in decades. Foreign investment could rebuild energy infrastructure, increase government revenue, create jobs, and alleviate the food insecurity and institutional decay that have pushed the country toward collapse. The resilience of the Venezuelan people, the strength of the democratic opposition, the release of political prisoners, and the beginning of reconciliation talks provide additional reasons for hope. 

As we have argued throughout our previous reporting, however, removing Maduro was only an inflection point, not the completion of Venezuela’s democratic transition.

Our prediction is that foreign investment will reduce the likelihood of near-term state collapse and produce measurable economic growth. Yet improvements in household living standards will come slowly, while inflation, earthquake recovery, weak public services, armed groups, and political uncertainty continue to constrain progress. The Rodríguez government will likely retain power during this period because Washington and foreign investors need a functioning partner capable of implementing agreements and maintaining stability.

There is a distinct possibility that commercial stabilization becomes a substitute for democratic transition, undermining the region’s commitment to democracy. Oil wealth has shaped Venezuela’s history before, often strengthening the state without strengthening democracy. The decisive indicators of a return to democracy will therefore not be investment announcements or production figures but the unhindered emergence of opposition leadership, freedom for political parties and the press, reform of the electoral system, transparent management of petroleum revenue, and a credible timetable for elections. 

In short, the investment rush offers genuine hope, but its success must ultimately be measured by whether it helps Venezuelans recover both their prosperity and their political rights. Blue skies are possible, but only if the oil boom becomes a bridge to democracy rather than another means of postponing it.

About the Authors: Robert S. Burrell and Homer Harkins

Dr. Robert Burrell is a senior research fellow with the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida. From 2020 to 2024, he taught irregular warfare at the Joint Special Operations University, and earlier served as US Special Operations Command’s Editor-in-Chief for irregular warfare doctrine. A retired Marine with multiple combat tours, Dr. Burrell has spent 12 years living and working across Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, plus a diplomatic tour at the US Embassy in Australia. He holds a PhD in History from the University of Warwick, and master’s degrees from San Diego State University and the US Naval War College.

Dr. Homer Harkins is a faculty member at the United Arab Emirates War College in Abu Dhabi. Prior to this role, Dr. Harkins served on the faculty of the Joint Special Operations University at MacDill Air Force Base, where he held positions from instructor to Dean of Academics and Director of the Center for Irregular Warfare. A retired Army Lieutenant Colonel, he served as an infantry officer, an Army Ranger, and a Latin American Foreign Area Officer. In 2015, Dr. Harkins earned his Doctorate in Education, and his earlier education includes a BBA, an MA in Computer Resources and Information Management, and an MS in International Relations.

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