The United States has world-class nuclear technology, but Russia and China sell something it cannot—financing, construction, fuel, and training bundled into a single state-backed package.

The United States cannot compete with Russian and Chinese nuclear exports. It has all the components of a world-class nuclear export industry, some of the world’s most advanced nuclear technology, decades of experience designing and operating reactors, a sophisticated financial system, elite universities and laboratories, and a thriving startup scene delivering new innovative technologies. But a country purchasing a nuclear power plant is not buying a reactor in isolation. Countries willing to commit to a project that could cost billions of dollars and last for decades require a level of coordination that the American nuclear export system does not offer.

How America’s Decentralized Nuclear Industry Sells Reactors Abroad

The United States pioneered the commercial nuclear industry and built the world’s largest nuclear fleet. American companies developed many of the technologies that became the global standard, and US laboratories, universities, engineering firms, utilities, and reactor vendors retain considerable technical expertise.

The American nuclear sector is also highly decentralized. Reactor companies develop technologies. Utilities or independent developers develop projects. Private investors provide capital. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses reactors. The Department of Energy (DOE) supports research and development. The State Department conducts diplomatic engagement. The Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can provide export financing. These capabilities exist across separate institutions rather than as a single integrated package. 

The American model relies on individual companies selling individual technologies. Russia and China, by contrast, have organized their nuclear programs to deliver comprehensive project packages.

How Rosatom Bundles Financing into Russian Nuclear Exports

Russia’s nuclear-export model is centered on Rosatom, the state nuclear corporation that integrates much of the country’s civilian nuclear industry.

Rosatom‘s international offering extends well beyond reactor technology. Its export model can encompass engineering, procurement and construction, nuclear fuel, training, infrastructure development, regulatory assistance, services, and financing. The Russian government also maintains a diplomatic infrastructure dedicated to promoting Russian nuclear technology abroad.

Most importantly, Russia has demonstrated a willingness to make financing part of the nuclear product itself.

The Akkuyu project in Turkey is perhaps the clearest example. Rather than simply selling Turkey four reactors, Rosatom structured the project around a build-own-operate model in which Russian entities finance, build, own, and operate the plant. The project is supported by a long-term power purchase agreement with Turkey’s state-owned electricity wholesaler.

Egypt provides another example. Russia agreed to construct four VVER-1200 reactors at El Dabaa and arranged a Russian state export loan covering 85 percent of the project’s cost. The agreement also encompasses fuel supply, used-fuel arrangements, training, and development of regulatory infrastructure.

Bangladesh‘s Rooppur project similarly relies on Russian financing that covers approximately 90 percent of its construction cost.

In addition to technology and financing, Russia provides construction, fuel, training, and long-term services packaged into a single government-supported proposition. For a country trying to build its first nuclear plant, that can dramatically reduce the number of institutions it must assemble on its own.

How China’s Domestic Reactor Buildout Powers Its Nuclear Exports

China’s nuclear industry is dominated by large state-owned enterprises, including China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN). These companies operate within a national system that has been building reactors at a scale unmatched by any other country.

As of January 2026, China had 36 reactors under active construction, more than half of the 66 reactors under construction worldwide. Nine of the 10 reactors whose construction began in 2025 were in China.

That domestic construction machine is itself a source of international competitiveness. Every reactor constructed at home generates another cohort of engineers, project managers, construction workers, manufacturers, suppliers, regulators, and technicians with experience delivering a nuclear project. Repeated construction allows companies to standardize designs, develop supply chains, accumulate institutional knowledge, and refine project execution.

China has also demonstrated its willingness to combine this industrial capacity with export financing. In Pakistan, Chinese companies have supplied multiple reactors, including the Hualong One. For the fifth Chashma unit, CNNC agreed to provide approximately 85 percent of the estimated construction cost. Chinese companies have similarly provided substantial financing for previous Pakistani reactors.

China therefore possesses something the United States currently lacks at comparable scale—a huge domestic market in which its nuclear industry can repeatedly build standardized reactors while simultaneously developing an export industry. China does not need every foreign project to serve as a test of whether its nuclear industrial base can function. Its industrial base is continuously exercised at home.

What the US Nuclear Exporters Are Actually Competing Against

The nuclear export competition is not a contest between reactor designs. A project requires technology, financing, construction capability, fuel, regulatory support, a workforce, supply chains, political agreements, and confidence that the vendor will still be there decades after the first concrete is poured.

Russia has constructed an export system around providing those pieces together. China is constructing one around the combination of enormous domestic deployment, state-owned enterprises, financing, and increasingly capable export projects.

The United States has many of the individual pieces. Its difficulty assembling them into a consistently competitive package is the central weakness of the American position. 

Nuclear power plants are decades-long industrial infrastructure projects. The American system offers flexibility and choice, while international developers prefer certainty and standardization. As long as America refuses to recognize this disconnect, its nuclear export industry will be unable to compete.

About the Author: Randall Schmollinger 

Randall Schmollinger is the CEO of Aule Materials, a company designing software in tandem with partners at the Idaho National Lab for nuclear engineering applications. He holds a BA in computer science from the University at Albany and a master’s in international affairs from Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs.

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