The Iran War is unlikely to encourage the formation of a Gulf State NATO.

The Iran War has forced the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to reconsider some of their most deeply held security assumptions. For decades, their strategies rested on a combination of American military protection, national defense acquisitions, and carefully calibrated relations with Tehran. The underlying expectation was that US forces would deter a large-scale Iranian attack, that bilateral diplomacy could insulate individual Gulf states from wider confrontations, and that advanced missile defenses could contain whatever limited retaliation nevertheless occurred.

All three assumptions have been weakened. Iran attacked all six GCC members, including Oman and Qatar, despite their longstanding engagement with Tehran and efforts to remain outside the conflict. The attacks also extended beyond US bases to civilian airports, energy facilities, commercial infrastructure, residential areas, and desalination plants. The GCC formally reaffirmed that an attack on one member constituted an attack on all, but the military response remained predominantly national rather than genuinely collective. The war thus showed that neither neutrality, rapprochement, nor the presence of American forces could guarantee immunity.

The renewed Houthi escalation has reinforced this lesson. After the Iran-aligned group captured strategically important territory near the Bab el-Mandeb and intensified missile and drone attacks against Saudi territory, shipping, and energy infrastructure, Riyadh launched an extensive air campaign but has yet to reverse the Houthi gains. 

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman repeatedly urged President Donald Trump to authorize US strikes, but Washington ultimately withheld direct military intervention, limiting its support largely to intelligence and targeting assistance. The United Kingdom, however, has since agreed to provide temporary aerial refueling for Saudi aircraft while defining its role as defensive. The episode illustrates that Western support remains important but is increasingly selective, conditional, and divided among different partners.

However, Gulf capitals are unlikely to conclude that diplomacy with Iran was misguided or that the United States has become dispensable. Rather, no single instrument can provide adequate deterrence. The emerging Gulf strategy will be layered, reliant on continued American protection, stronger national capabilities, more practical GCC coordination, diversified partnerships, guarded engagement with Iran, and a far greater emphasis on economic and infrastructural resilience.

Gulf State Deterrence by Denial

The central difficulty is that Iran does not need to defeat either the United States or the GCC conventionally. It only needs to create enough uncertainty and disruption to impose disproportionate costs. A temporary airport closure, damage to a desalination or energy installation, interference with shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, or even a sustained rise in insurance premiums can affect investment, tourism, trade, and public confidence across the Gulf.

This asymmetry is reinforced by the economics of defense. Patriot and THAAD systems, combat aircraft, and naval assets intercepted a high proportion of incoming threats and almost certainly prevented much greater casualties and destruction. But no defensive shield is impenetrable when confronted with combinations of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, inexpensive drones, cyberattacks, sabotage, and operations by Iran-aligned groups. 

Deterrence should consequently not be assessed only through interception rates. The more important measure is whether Iran can alter Gulf political behavior. Even a technically impressive defensive performance may represent an incomplete strategic success if attacks compel Gulf governments to restrict US operations, interrupt investment, suspend aviation, or modify foreign policy. Conversely, a limited number of successful strikes need not amount to Iranian strategic success if essential services continue, damaged infrastructure is restored quickly, and Gulf governments refuse to be coerced.

The most realistic Gulf objective is not perfect deterrence but deterrence by denial. This rests on convincing Tehran that attacks will not produce meaningful political or economic gains. This will require layered missile and drone defenses, integrated sensors, electronic warfare, less expensive counter-drone systems, dispersed aircraft, hardened command centers, protected energy and water facilities, and larger reserves of interceptors and spare parts.

Resilience must also be understood as an instrument of deterrence, not merely a matter of emergency management. If airports reopen quickly, data systems fail over to alternative locations, energy exports are redirected, and water and electricity remain available, Iran’s coercive leverage declines. Disrupting the Strait of Hormuz has similarly strengthened the case for alternative export terminals, expanded pipeline capacity, strategic stockpiles, redundant ports, interconnected electricity grids, backup desalination facilities, and geographically distributed data centers.

Defensive measures alone, however, may not be sufficient. If Tehran believes attacks carry no direct cost, it may continue to regard missiles, drones, cyber operations, and proxy warfare as relatively inexpensive instruments. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are therefore likely to develop more credible stand-off weapons, intelligence and cyber capabilities, and the capacity to target launch infrastructure directly associated with an attack.

This capacity must remain calibrated as Iran is geographically close, while the Gulf states possess highly concentrated infrastructure and ambitious economic-transformation agendas that would suffer severely from uncontrolled escalation.

An Indispensable but Incomplete US Umbrella for the Gulf States

The war did not render the United States irrelevant. American intelligence, air and missile defenses, naval power, logistics, aerial refueling, and command-and-control capabilities substantially limited the damage. No other external actor can reproduce this combination. China is not positioned to replace the United States militarily, Russia cannot, and European states lack the necessary scale and political cohesion.

The failure was assuming that hosting US forces automatically guaranteed territorial immunity. Washington’s immediate priorities were protecting American personnel and assets, sustaining operations against Iran, and defending Israel. These did not always coincide perfectly with Gulf priorities: protecting airports, ports, desalination plants, energy and data infrastructure, tourism centers, and the reputation of Gulf cities as secure commercial hubs.

The war therefore exposed a gap between military presence and political guarantee. A US base may deter certain forms of aggression, but it can also make its host part of the battlespace. Nor does it automatically establish which categories of civilian infrastructure Washington will defend or what Iranian action will trigger American retaliation.

Gulf governments consequently confront two opposite risks. They fear abandonment if Washington reduces its protection. Still, they also fear entrapment if a US-Israel-centered strategy pulls them into wars they did not initiate and cannot control. Their preferred outcome is neither American withdrawal nor unconditional alignment. It is continued US protection combined with greater consultation, clearer guarantees, and stricter political control over the use of Gulf territory.

Donald Trump’s Middle East Security Plan

Recent reporting that the Trump administration is considering a larger postwar alignment to contain Iran, expand the Abraham Accords, and connect several regional security arrangements suggests that Washington may be seeking to reorganize rather than abandon its role. The proposal remains preliminary, and its reception will depend on whether it reflects Gulf priorities or appears designed principally around American and Israeli objectives.

Trump’s September 22 meeting with Gulf and other regional representatives in New York sharpened this ambiguity. He combined threats of overwhelming further action against Iran with claims that momentum was building toward an agreement following mediated US-Iranian contacts. For the GCC states, this mixture of coercion and diplomacy reinforces their preferred role: not as automatic participants in an anti-Iranian coalition, but as interlocutors seeking to shape its objectives, prevent renewed escalation, restore freedom of navigation, and ensure that any settlement addresses their own security concerns.

The idea reveals a deeper competition between two visions of Gulf security. One is an exclusionary containment structure linking the United States, Israel, and selected Arab and Muslim partners against Iran. The other combines external deterrence with a regional nonaggression framework and continued engagement with Tehran. Most GCC governments will try to operate between these models: participating in US-backed defensive cooperation without defining Iran as a permanent enemy or committing automatically to future offensive operations.

The Trump administration’s “Economic D-Day” campaign, formally designated Operation Economic Outcast, adds another layer to Gulf deterrence. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has threatened secondary sanctions against foreign banks, shipping companies, insurers, airlines, and other entities facilitating Iranian commerce, including possible exclusion from the dollar-based financial system. Such measures possess genuine coercive force because access to dollars and international clearing is far more valuable to Gulf institutions than commerce with Iran.

Economic pressure can reduce Iran’s resources, but it does not automatically produce political capitulation. Iran has spent decades developing smuggling networks, shell companies, barter arrangements, and alternative payment channels. More importantly, an attempt to collapse the Iranian economy may contradict Gulf interests. Economic breakdown could trigger refugee flows, smuggling, maritime insecurity, and greater Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reliance on asymmetric retaliation.

Pressure will be most effective when tied to clear, attainable conditions, such as freedom of navigation, restraint in missile attacks, limits on proxy activity, or renewed nuclear negotiations. Sanctions without a diplomatic off-ramp may impoverish and destabilize Iran without creating durable deterrence.

Why a Gulf NATO Remains Unlikely

Iran’s attacks created a strong incentive for GCC coordination, but they did not erase the political obstacles that have historically impeded collective defense. The principal constraints are not a shortage of money or weapons. GCC members maintain different threat perceptions, procurement systems, external relationships, and positions toward Iran and Israel. They are also reluctant to delegate sovereign decisions about war to a supranational command.

The GCC does not need to become NATO to achieve meaningful progress. A common air and missile picture, automatic radar and intelligence sharing, joint interception protocols, shared reserves of interceptors and spare parts, coordinated critical-infrastructure protection, and a permanent GCC crisis cell would materially improve collective security. The decisive test is operational integration rather than treaty language: who attributes an attack, authorizes an interception, determines priority assets, contributes which capabilities, and controls escalation?

A Gulf State Ecosystem, Not Alliance

A more plausible structure is “variable geometry”: different coalitions addressing different threats. A maritime crisis could involve Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the United States, Britain, and France. Air defense might draw on GCC states, Türkiye, Pakistan, and selected Western partners. Qatar and Oman would more naturally lead mediation with Iran.

Britain, France, Türkiye, Pakistan, South Korea, and other partners can supply valuable capabilities, technology, and training. Yet diversification should not be confused with replacing Washington. None can provide the full package of intelligence, logistics, early warning, naval power, and escalation dominance the United States provides. The emerging model is partnership pluralism, not patron substitution.

Despite the attacks, Gulf diplomacy with Iran will continue. Geography makes permanent confrontation unsustainable, while communication channels help establish red lines, facilitate ceasefires, manage maritime incidents, and constrain proxy activity. Engagement, however, will increasingly be treated as risk management rather than evidence that the Iranian threat has disappeared.

A longer-term regional nonaggression framework could begin with modest commitments: crisis hotlines, missile-launch and military-exercise notifications, maritime protocols, protection of civilian infrastructure, and limits on support for armed groups. Such an arrangement would require verification, attribution mechanisms, and consequences for violations, particularly because Iran’s civilian institutions, the IRGC, and aligned organizations may not always act coherently.

Economic relations could support this framework through “conditional enmeshment”: offering trade, investment, and regional integration in exchange for verifiable restraint, while retaining penalties for aggression. Economic ties are not a substitute for deterrence, but they can provide constituencies inside Iran with something tangible to lose and give Gulf diplomacy a positive instrument alongside military pressure.

The six GCC states will pursue this transformation differently. Saudi Arabia will seek regional leadership while preserving dialogue and protecting Vision 2030. The UAE is likely to emphasize active defense, intelligence, counter-drone systems, and infrastructure resilience while maintaining pragmatic channels with Iran. Qatar will combine its close US military relationship with mediation and flexible partnerships. Oman will continue to prioritize dialogue and maritime deconfliction. Bahrain will remain closely aligned with Washington and Riyadh, while Kuwait will balance territorial defense with domestic sensitivities regarding foreign forces.

These differences make a single alliance improbable. The emerging architecture will instead contain four interconnected layers. For one, a recalibrated US relationship providing high-end capabilities and some form of extended deterrence. Second, a practical GCC coordination in air defense, intelligence, maritime security, and crisis response. Third, bilateral and minilateral partnerships with regional and European powers; and lastly, a diplomatic framework involving Iran.

This will not be a collective-security order based on trust. It will be a system of managed coexistence based on deterrence, communication, and mutual vulnerability. Its success will depend less on the number of agreements signed than on whether participants can see the same threat, make decisions quickly, and deliver promised support during the next crisis.

The Gulf states cannot eliminate the Iranian threat, defeat Iran independently, or replace the United States with another strategic partner. They can, however, make attacks more difficult, less effective, and costlier while strengthening their economic resilience, developing a measured capacity for retaliation, and maintaining diplomatic channels to prevent or contain escalation. The postwar Gulf order will therefore be neither purely American nor genuinely autonomous. It will be an ecosystem rather than an alliance, and its principal danger is that it could become a dense collection of impressive agreements that remains operationally fragmented.

About the Author: Kristian Alexander

Dr. Kristian Alexander is a geo-economic security and foreign-policy analyst based in the UAE. He previously served as senior fellow and lead researcher at the Rabdan Security and Defense Institute (RSDI), as well as at Trends Research & Advisory (Abu Dhabi), where he was the head of the Strategic Studies Department, and before that as an Assistant Professor at Zayed University (Abu Dhabi).

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