This is not the first time the US defense industry has lost vital F-35 components, but it is the first known time that they were shipped directly to a US adversary.

The fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II fighter jet is the most advanced American fighter in service today, and the United States has gone to great lengths to protect its security. But as in many industries, years of caution can be undone by simple mistakes—and it is unclear what the consequences will be for its secrecy after components for the advanced fifth-generation stealth fighter were mistakenly redirected to Hong Kong.

The parts were being shipped to the United States from Australia for repairs, but while crossing the Pacific Ocean, they were “unexpectedly diverted to Hong Kong this summer,” Politico first reported. The magazine added that it is not clear what caused the shipment to be rerouted, but more alarmingly, it also isn’t known “who has possession of it now.”

The Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) has acknowledged the shipment issue, but described the components as “unserviceable,” basically contending that the components were too broken to be of much use. The JPO is now working with US authorities and industry partners in an effort to retrieve the shipment. It has also launched an investigation and will add safeguards to avoid a future occurrence.

China has gone to great lengths to obtain sensitive information on the F-35. Washington has alleged that Chinese hackers breached Lockheed Martin’s computer networks in 2011 and again in 2014, stealing critical data related to the Joint Strike Fighter program that spawned the F-35.

Losing an F-35 Canopy Could Be a Big Problem for America

The exact details of the shipment haven’t been fully disclosed, but it reportedly included a canopy, the cover for the aircraft’s cockpit. That canopy “contains stealth technology that only the US and its allies have access to,” Politico reported, citing two people familiar with the matter.

The concern is that an adversary could study the components and possibly even “reverse-engineer the prized technology.”

The F-35 canopy is made from a single stretched acrylic piece coated with highly classified, restricted radar-absorbing materials (RAM) that alter the radar cross-section of the stealth fighter. The United States has tightly controlled the technical data and intellectual property (IP) required to apply or even fix the low-observable coating, and gaining access to an intact canopy could be an intelligence windfall for China, allowing it to study the RAMs in use and replicate them.

One saving grace for the United States could be that the canopy was damaged in a way that made local repair impossible, negating some of its intelligence value. Australia operates several maintenance depots for the F-35 Lightning II, but none are capable of repairing the aircraft’s canopies, which is why the components were being shipped back to the United States. Commercial shippers rather than the US military or the military of foreign partners are currently charged with transporting parts.

In addition, while there is a Final Assembly and Check-Out (FACO) facility in Nagoya, Japan—operated by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries—that serves as the North Asia-Pacific regional hub for heavy airframe Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul, and Upgrade (MRO&U), its depot-level capabilities do not extend to canopy dome refurbishment or repair.

The FACO facility in Japan, as well as the other FACO facility in Cameri, Novara, Italy, lacks the complex testing equipment, laser alignment tools, and specialized cleanroom structure that are required to perform the structural canopy work. Unserviceable and/or damaged canopy components need to be shipped back to the United States.

Even in America, the options for repair are limited. The Ogden Air Logistics Complex at Hill Air Force Base (AFB), Utah, operates the dedicated F-35 Canopy Shop. It is the US military’s central source for refurbishment and testing of the assemblies. In addition, complex structural repairs can be addressed by approved defense contractors.

The F-35’s Vast Supply Chain Increases the Risk of Mistakes

It should be stated that it isn’t surprising that such a sensitive component of the F-35 was misrouted—but it is almost a wonder that it hasn’t happened before!

The F-35 has one of the largest and most complex global supply chains of any modern military or commercial aircraft, relying on more than 2,100 suppliers spanning a dozen countries. Lead contractor Lockheed Martin works alongside a number of large-scale partners, including Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems, but it relies on a vast number of tier-based suppliers that produce specific parts.

The supply chain was built across eight partner nations and multiple foreign military sales customers. Many specialized components, such as BAE Systems’ electronic warfare system, are built overseas and shipped globally to the production facilities.

A 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that more than one million F-35 spare parts had gone missing over the lifespan of the Joint Strike Fighter program. In addition to the intelligence value of the parts, they had a clear financial value as well; the watchdog study called out the Pentagon for doing a poor job of keeping track of spare parts collectively worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The report noted that since May 2018, one unnamed F-35 prime contractor had incurred losses that exceeded one million spare parts totaling more than $85 million.

A third problem with leaky supply chains is military readiness, and a shortfall of spare parts has contributed to terrible readiness rates among US F-35 fleets. Earlier this year, Lockheed Martin announced it would invest $1 billion to stockpile spare parts for the Lightning II as part of efforts to increase mission readiness and drive cost-reduction initiatives.

About the Author: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu has contributed to dozens of newspapers, magazines and websites over a 30-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a contributing writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. He is based in Michigan. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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