The US-led Palestinian peace framework is increasingly at odds with reality.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is a master of buying time, much at the expense of Palestinians and any would-be pressure on his government. That dynamic proved itself once again in early August and throughout the Israeli election cycle, as he and his fellow senior Israeli officials have repeatedly rejected a would-be “deal” to disarm Hamas in Gaza while withdrawing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Gaza Strip.

The rejection and subsequent, but hardly surprising, deferment to that decision in Washington reflects a simple reality: Netanyahu and Israeli political leaders writ large will continue to find reasons to refuse any plan that forces them to end their genocide of the Gaza Strip, let alone the broader illegal occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) without material consequences from the international community.

Consider the context: Israel has now killed at least 1,375 Palestinians since the so-called “ceasefire” in October 2025, injuring another 4,600. In total, it has killed at least 73,700 Palestinians and injured 174,800—both likely undercounted figures. Israeli strikes have consistently rained down on Palestinians in Gaza, destroying what remains of infrastructure and shelter for a community in which at least 1.9 million people remain displaced. It continues to block humanitarian access in the Strip as food insecurity lingers. It has gradually occupied more territory over time, with senior officials threatening to take as much as 70 percent of Gaza and more.

Amid the devastation, American and Israeli leaders claim “progress,” ignoring that the August 9 agreement that saw a public willingness for Hamas to disarm alongside Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza merely restated the outlines of US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace. Indeed, those details are central to his 20-point plan underpinning the so-called ceasefire in October 2025. On paper, that effort aims to end Israeli military operations against Hamas and other Palestinian resistance groups in the Strip.

Never mind that Netanyahu’s government itself agreed to those terms, which included a phased withdrawal from Gaza in parallel with a phased disarmament of Hezbollah. Never mind that the entirety of the Israeli political apparatus rejects any concessions on the OPT ahead of the October 2026 elections that would hardly see a significant change in Israel’s approach to Palestine in what is purely a competition over who can most harm Palestinians.

As has long been custom, these details are wished away for political expediency and replaced with excuses. Officials in Washington argue that the “deal” constituted a win in and of itself, laying the groundwork for yet another Potemkin agreement ahead of the impending and obvious political defeat that came just hours later. Yet it is spin and optics, not policy coherence, that have long dictated American politics for the worse, especially on Israel and Palestine.

That, of course, assumes that the White House prefers a deal that would remotely consider Palestinian interests in the first place. Most signs suggest the opposite. The Board of Peace itself is more of an investment community’s dream than a real reconstruction plan placing the survivors of a genocide at the center, purely relying on their labor in a dystopian techno-colony defined by concentration camps, constant surveillance, and obedience to what is certain to be an Israel-controlled colonial statelet at best.

Palestinian land rights, alongside broader human and civil rights, are hardly even secondary considerations. Those chairing the Board talk more of investment opportunities and money-making schemes than basic conceptualizations of humanity, with Israel’s security interests front and center whenever the broader conflict is raised on the fringes of such conversations.

Yet Israeli politics best explains why the new deal and the broader Board of Peace will fail. Consider US officials’ explanation that Netanyahu must use hawkish rhetoric and take harsh actions ahead of Israeli elections. To be sure, the nature of Israel’s politics dictates a hawkish line on the issue of Palestine. The country’s further rightward turn draws its roots from an already-hawkish electorate on the issue, today reaching a fever pitch that heavily supports the expulsion of Palestinian from Gaza and annexation of Palestinian land, including the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from that land. In this context, Israeli politicians are incentivized to adopt hawkish platforms to win a Knesset majority, with even the would-be leftist Democrats struggling to even utter the term “occupation.”

Yet it is this very dynamic that undermines any argument that a deal on Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza amid Hamas’ disarmament will occur after Israeli elections. After Netanyahu’s Likud party won the 2022 election, it took 46 days to form a governing coalition, from the November 1 election to his announcement of a 64-seat coalition on December 21. Those negotiations were difficult and pulled Netanyahu further to the right to appease his far-right parliamentary allies, including messianic and overtly racist political leaders like Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. What those politicians received was influence over the platform and in day-to-day decision-making, especially over issues of Israel’s occupation of the OPT and its apartheid system over Palestinians.

These politicians regularly threatened to leave the government and collapse Netanyahu’s tight majority in the Israeli Knesset after October 7, and often when agreements were reached on issues like increasing humanitarian flows to Gaza amid famine conditions or over previous so-called “ceasefires.” They did the same during budget fights, garnering major political wins to expand Israel’s settlement enterprise in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Simply put, Israel’s far-right owns Netanyahu, especially considering that his corruption trial could see his legacy tarnished and his final years in jail—outcomes he desperately hopes to avoid.

In this context, it is difficult to believe any space will be available to advance the 20-point plan and its reiteration reached on August 9. Should the elections favor Netanyahu, coalition-building negotiations will almost certainly place a hard line on Israel’s Gaza strategy. Even if the platform from those negotiations adopts the withdrawal plan, the coming 2027 budget fight will raise the issue, as it has in the past.

Indeed, at every stage of the Israeli political process, the messianic far-right will undermine any plan short of the status quo of creeping annexation in Gaza. That outcome is likely with an opposition win as well, given the Israeli public’s support for occupation, ethnic cleansing, and annexation of Gaza and the presence of right-wing parties and absence of Arab parties in the leading opposition framework.

While some argue that Israel’s Arab parties can perhaps stifle opposition hawkishness on this front, the reality is that most opposition leaders have rejected forming an alliance with them, citing three of the four parties’ rejection of Zionism. Any opposition’s amenability to US coercion is also hardly guaranteed given the inconsistency—at best—of real US pressure on Israel to tow its preferred strategy.

Ultimately, all roads lead down the same path: an indefinite and creeping Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip as the status quo hardens over time. Only real, material pressure from Washington can change this reality, including efforts to restrict or, preferably, end arms sales; cut diplomatic support in all international fora; sanction, boycott, and divest from the Israeli economy; and end military and policing ties and support. United States domestic law, international law, and decisions by the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court provide the basis for these moves. The only real impediment is political will and radical ideological support for Israel at the expense of Palestinians.

About the Author: Alexander Langlois

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst, the senior editor at DAWN, and a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities. He is focused on the geopolitics of the Levant and the broader dynamics of West Asia. Langlois holds an MA in International Affairs from American University. He has written for various outlets, including The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Sada, the Atlantic Council’s MENASource, the Lowy Institute, the Gulf International Forum, The New Arab, The Nation, and Inkstick. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.

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