Omani neutrality stems from the country’s unique geography and history, and it is, in fact, incredibly useful for US diplomacy.

There have been many geopolitical consequences resulting from the war with Iran, from high gas prices and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz to the strain the conflict is placing on air-defense interceptors. But another consequence has received far less attention: the strain on some longstanding American relationships in the Persian Gulf. 

A good example is the recent problems facing the US-Oman relationship. 

Perhaps the low point came last month when President Donald Trump, discussing Oman’s negotiations with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, said: “If Oman gets in the way, we’ll bomb the shit out of them.” 

This is not exactly something one expects to hear about a country like Oman. And like it or not, any long-lasting solution to keep the Strait of Hormuz open will have to include Oman. 

Located on the southeastern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman sits across the Strait of Hormuz from Iran. Modern Oman is the successor to what was once a powerful and influential maritime empire in the Indian Ocean dating to the late seventeenth century. At its height in the nineteenth century, Omani influence stretched from the coast of East Africa to parts of what are today Iran and Pakistan.  

The empire began its decline after a succession dispute following the death of Sultan Said bin Sultan in 1856, which eventually led to its division between Oman and Zanzibar. But remnants of the empire endured. For example, the port of Gwadar, now in Pakistan, remained in Omani hands until 1958, when Oman sold it to Pakistan.

Oman today has a population of just over 5 million. Most Omanis follow Ibadism, a branch of Islam distinct from both Sunni and Shia Islam. This has helped Oman navigate some of the sectarian complexities of the Sunni-Shia divide in the Middle East.

Oman’s economy has never had the same scale of oil and gas wealth enjoyed by some of its fellow Gulf states. But it has made up for this in other ways, particularly through its strategic location and its ability to serve as a platform for bringing different sides together. This allows Oman to often punch above its weight on the global stage.

One of the most misunderstood aspects of Oman’s foreign policy has been its continuing engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Part of the motivation stems from Oman’s policy of “active neutrality,” but geography and history also play an important role. Oman and Iran, of course, sit on opposite sides of the Strait of Hormuz. This geographic reality alone means that Muscat has an interest in maintaining workable relations with Tehran regardless of who is in power. However, Washington should not interpret Oman’s engagement with Iran as an endorsement of Tehran’s actions.

History matters too. During the Dhofar Rebellion, a Marxist insurgency that threatened the Omani state from the 1960s through the mid-1970s, the United Kingdom provided major military assistance that helped Oman defeat the uprising. Like Britain, pre-revolutionary Iran also came to Oman’s aid. Beginning in 1973, Shah Reza Pahlavi deployed Iranian forces to Oman, eventually totaling 15,000 troops, to help defeat the rebellion. 

The rebellion was an existential crisis for Oman’s ruling elite, and Oman has not forgotten the assistance provided by both Britain and pre-revolutionary Iran. This helps explain why Oman maintains an enduring and close relationship with both the United Kingdom and Iran to this day.

The US-Omani relationship also runs deep. In 1833, the United States and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman signed a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, laying the foundation for almost two centuries of engagement and cooperation. In 1980, Oman became the first Gulf state to allow the US military access to its facilities. The two countries later signed a free-trade agreement that took effect in 2009. Oman is one of only 20 countries with a comprehensive free-trade agreement with the United States.

In recent years, Oman has played a particularly important role for the United States, especially behind the scenes. Oman has served as a convening force, bringing US and Iranian officials together for negotiations across successive administrations. President Trump has also used Oman’s services to convey messages to Iranian authorities. In recent years, Oman has been instrumental in negotiating the release of Americans held in Iran and neighboring Yemen. 

The security relationship is important too. Oman operates billions of dollars’ worth of US military hardware, including F-16 fighters. The strategic relationship was deepened in 2019 when the two countries signed an agreement expanding US military access to facilities and ports at Duqm and Salalah, providing important resupply and logistical options for the US military operating in the region. 

Like other Gulf states, Oman has not been immune from the consequences of Iran’s strikes during the current war. Oman has been targeted on at least six occasions since February, including attacks on the strategically important ports of Duqm and Salalah. The attack on Duqm was particularly noteworthy. Just weeks before combat operations began, the US guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., part of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, had made a port call there. Days after leaving Duqm, the destroyer participated in the opening US strikes against Iran.  

But with the war with Iran lasting far longer than many in Washington hoped, and with the global impact of the disruption to the Strait of Hormuz, much of Washington’s frustration has spilled over into the relationship with Oman. This culminated in President Trump’s unfortunate remarks last month. 

It is time for both sides to come together and get this important relationship back on track. 

The United States needs partners like Oman—countries that sit at critical geopolitical trade and transit chokepoints and, because of their unique history and culture, can engage with governments Washington cannot, or does not want to, engage directly. Used properly, Oman’s unique position can advance American interests. 

It is also naive to think any lasting solution to the current Strait of Hormuz crisis can be achieved without Oman. Geography alone guarantees Muscat a seat at the table. 

The last Omani ruler to visit the United States was Sultan Qaboos in April 1983, during the Reagan administration. More than four decades later, President Trump should invite Sultan Haitham bin Tariq to Washington so the two leaders can meet face-to-face, chart a way to get US-Oman relations back on track, and work toward a lasting solution to reopen the Strait of Hormuz fully. 

The sooner this is done, the better for the US position in the Middle East. 

About the Author: Luke Coffey

Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson analyzes national security and foreign policy, focusing on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations. Mr. Coffey served as director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation from 2015 to 2022, during which he oversaw a team responsible for most of Heritage’s foreign policy and international affairs work. From 2012 to 2015, he was the Margaret Thatcher fellow at Heritage, focusing on relations between the United States and the United Kingdom and on the role of NATO and the European Union in transatlantic and Eurasian security. Before joining Heritage, Mr. Coffey served at the UK Ministry of Defence as senior special adviser to then-British Defense Secretary Liam Fox.

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