Iran’s string of attacks on US bases in Jordan underscores Tehran’s perception that the country is a particularly vulnerable component of the US-led regional security system.

The tit-for-tat Iranian attacks last July and again on August 30 on American military facilities in Jordan have underscored the fact that Tehran is aware of a vulnerability in the American strategy that has received far less attention in the United States than the strategic importance of the Gulf monarchies or Israel. While Washington has long regarded Jordan as one of its most dependable Arab allies, the strikes have highlighted a deeper political reality: the greatest threat to the American position in Jordan may not come from Iranian missiles but from the widening gulf between the perceptions of the Jordanian monarchy and large sections of Jordanian society regarding the war against Iran.

Many Jordanians interpret the Iranian attacks as an inevitable consequence of Jordan’s close military partnership with Washington. The anger generated by Israel’s military campaign in Gaza and the intensification of Israeli operations and settler violence in the occupied West Bank have magnified these sentiments, placing the Hashemite monarchy in an increasingly difficult position because its strategic orientation runs counter to public opinion.

Jordan has long been considered one of Washington’s greatest diplomatic successes in the Middle East. It has maintained peace with Israel since 1967, even through the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and signed a peace agreement with the Jewish state in 1994. It has cooperated extensively with US intelligence and counterterrorism efforts and hosted American forces for decades. The kingdom has been one of the largest recipients of American aid per capita, receiving billions of dollars in military and economic assistance.

But beneath this image of stability lies a structural fragility rooted in history. Unlike Egypt, Iran, Turkey, or even Saudi Arabia, Jordan emerged not from an established historical state but from the post-World War I partition of the Ottoman Empire. British imperial calculations, rather than a coherent national movement, shaped Transjordan’s borders. Winston Churchill’s famous, if apocryphal, remark that the Emirate of Transjordan (renamed Jordan in 1949 after it incorporated the West Bank of the Jordan River at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war) was created “with the stroke of a pen, one Sunday afternoon in Cairo” is often cited to illustrate the artificial nature of the state’s origins.

The Hashemite monarchy itself was transplanted. After the British ally Sharif Hussein’s family lost control of the Hijaz to Ibn Saud (the founder of the Saudi state) in the 1920s, Britain installed Hussein’s son Abdullah as the emir of Transjordan, which Britain had been entrusted with under the League of Nations’ mandate system. The dynasty therefore did not emerge organically from Jordanian society but owed its survival initially to British and, after World War II, American support.

Since its inception, the monarchy’s survival has rested on a combination of external backing and carefully managed domestic coalitions primarily based on tribal federations rather than on broad democratic participation.

Jordan’s demographic realities exacerbate these structural characteristics. Although precise figures remain unavailable, most of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin. Their families were displaced during the wars of 1948 and 1967, and many have close relatives living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 

For these Jordanians, the Palestinian issue is not simply a foreign policy concern. It is a deeply personal national question. The devastation and de facto ethnic cleansing of Gaza by Israel since October 2023 and continuing Israeli military operations and escalating settler violence in the West Bank leading to Palestinian displacement and deaths have therefore generated extraordinary anger throughout Jordanian society. 

The public mood increasingly views American policy as inseparable from Israeli military actions. Washington’s military assistance, diplomatic protection of Israel, and repeated use of its veto in the UN Security Council to save Israel from condemnation have reinforced perceptions that the United States bears direct responsibility for Palestinian suffering. Consequently, many Jordanians regard the American confrontation with Iran as a struggle driven by Washington’s commitment to maintaining Israel’s military predominance in the Middle East rather than a genuine threat to the region posed by Iran. 

Iran occupies a complicated place in Jordanian public opinion. Jordanians certainly do not uniformly support the Islamic Republic or endorse its regional ambitions. At the same time, Iran’s consistent rhetorical and material support for the Palestinian cause has earned it considerable sympathy among segments of the Jordanian public. 

This creates an uncomfortable political environment for the monarchy because its continuing economic and security dependence on Washington limits its room to maneuver. King Abdullah II bears the political costs of association with American regional strategy while possessing little capacity to influence Washington’s decisions regarding Israel, Iran or the region. 

Another factor complicating Jordan’s domestic landscape is the enduring influence of Islamist currents. Although the authorities have significantly restricted the activities of organizations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and recently banned its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, the movement has historically maintained one of the kingdom’s strongest social and political networks through its social and charitable activities. 

State repression has not eliminated the underlying social constituencies from which it draws support. Consequently, Islamist narratives emphasizing resistance to Israel and opposition to Western influence continue to resonate among substantial segments of society. 

Together, these factors create structural vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit. Iran does not need to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy to weaken the American regional position. Simply increasing domestic pressure on Amman by highlighting the costs of alignment with Washington could complicate US military planning and regional diplomacy. 

Washington therefore confronts a dilemma of its own making. The very policies that reinforce the bilateral security relationship also erode the partnership’s domestic legitimacy in Jordan. The Iranian strikes on Jordan are reminders that the contest between Washington and Tehran is not fought solely through weapons but also through competing narratives. In that contest, Jordan is the most vulnerable link in America’s Middle Eastern chain. If it breaks under pressure, it could trigger a domino effect across the region. 

About the Author: Mohammed Ayoob

​Mohammed Ayoob is a university distinguished professor emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University. His books include The Many Faces of Political Islam (Second Edition, 2020), Will the Middle East Implode? (2014), and, most recently, From Regional Security to Global IR: An Intellectual Journey (2024). He was also the editor of Assessing the War on Terror (2013).

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