On paper, the F/A-18 Super Hornet easily destroys the Su-22 Fitter—but in June 2017, sensitive rules of engagement over Syria negated its major range advantage.

It has been almost 10 years since any fighter jet shot down another fighter jet in the air. The “air-to-air kill” was for many decades the bread and butter of a fighter jet’s role in the skies, and the absence of such kills is revealing about the ways in which modern air wars are fought. And even when air-to-air kills take place, they bear very little resemblance to the way they are depicted in the movies—notably in Top Gun: Maverick, whose climactic dogfight between a US F-14 Tomcat and enemy Su-57s is thrilling, if wildly unrealistic.

In reality, the last air-to-air kill took place on June 18, 2017, when a US Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet shot down a Syrian Su-22 Fitter near Tabqa, Syria. Even though this was an air-to-air kill, calling it a “dogfight” would be misleading; the engagement was decided by missiles and radar, not a close-in turning fight.

The F/A-18E vs. the Su-22 Fitter: Not Much of a Contest

Aircraft	F/A-18 Super Hornet (USA)	Su-22 Fitter (Syria)
Year Introduced	2001	1970
Number Built	~630	2,867
Length	60 ft 1 in (18.31 m)	62 ft 5 in (19.02 m)
Wingspan	44 ft 8 in (13.62 m)	Variable sweep:33 ft (10.02 m) swept44 ft 11 in (13.68 m) unswept
Weight (MTOW)	66,000 lb (29,937 kg)	42,836 lb (19,430 kg)
Engine(s)	Two General Electric F414-GE-400 turbofans, 13,000 lbf (58 kN) thrust each dry	One Lyulka AL-21F-3 afterburning turbojet, 17,200 lbf (76.4 kN) thrust dry
Top Speed	1,330 mph (2,140 km/h) / Mach 1.8	87- mph (1,400 km/h) / Mach 1.13
Range	1,348 mi (2,346 km)	710 mi (1,150 km)
Service Ceiling	52,300 ft (15,940 m)	46,600 ft (14,200 m)
Loadout	One 20mm M61A2 Vulcan rotary cannon; 11 hardpoints; 17,750 lb (8,050 kg) payload capacity	Two 30mm Nudelman-Rikhter NR-30 autocannons; 10 hardpoints; 8,800 lb (4,000 kg) payload capacity
Aircrew	1–2, depending on configuration	1

The Last Air-to-Air Kill, as It Happened

The engagement took place near Ja’Din, south of Tabqa, where the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were operating against the Islamic State (ISIS). At the time, an Su-22 in the Syrian Arab Air Force—the air force of the internationally-recognized government of longtime dictator Bashar al-Assad, who viewed the SDF as a far more pressing challenge to his rule than ISIS—entered the area and dropped ordnance near SDF positions.

The US had reportedly used deconfliction channels to warn against attacking in the area, which the Su-22 neglected. So a pair of US Navy F/A-18Es from VFA-87, the “Golden Warriors,” operating from the nearby USS George H.W. Bush aircraft carrier, moved to intercept. The lead jet was flown by Lt. Cmdr. Michael “Alie” Tremel, who closed on the Su-22 to visually confirm that the aircraft was Syrian before receiving authorization to engage.

On paper, the contest between the F/A-18E and Su-22 was deeply mismatched. The F/A-18 is outfitted with modern AESA radar, AIM-9X Sidewinders, AIM-120 AMRAAMs, advanced electronic warfare, and sensor fusion—giving the pilot much stronger situational awareness and offensive capabilities. The Su-22, on the other hand, is a variable-sweep-wing strike aircraft primarily optimized for ground attack, with Soviet-era avionics and only limited air-to-air capability. This suited it fine in its normal mission set, as neither the SDF nor ISIS possessed an air force. But against the F/A-18, the Su-22 was decisively outmatched.

Tremel fired an AIM-9X Sidewinder at close range, but the Syrian pilot deployed flares and the AIM-9X failed to score a hit. Rather than continue to engage with short-range weapons, Tremel reconfigured for an AMRAAM shot. Deploying the AIM-120 AMRAAM, an active-radar-guided missile, Tremel struck the Su-22, destroying it; the Syrian pilot ejected and was later rescued. The engagement shows that while the AMRAAM is more closely associated with longer-range engagements, it can still be effective at shorter ranges.

Rules of Engagement over Syria Negated US Range Advantages

In theory, the F/A-18 could have fired the missiles at the Su-22 at a far longer range. The reason the engagement was so close was because of the rules of engagement and visual identification requirements in place at the time. 

These rules were perhaps frustrating for US pilots, but they were indispensable for political reasons. In Syria, the US was operating in extraordinarily complicated airspace containing American aircraft, Russian aircraft, Syrian aircraft, coalition aircraft, and civilian traffic. Detecting an aircraft on radar was often not enough to justify firing, and the risk of accidentally shooting down a mistaken target—a Russian jet, a friendly aircraft, and particularly a civilian airliner—was significant enough that visual confirmation was needed.

Still, the incident serves as evidence of how rare the traditional dogfight has become. Modern air combat increasingly depends on radar, infrared search and track, airborne early warning, datalinks, electronic warfare, stealth, and long-range missiles. That the F/A-18 was so close to the Su-22 was remarkable; in a future air war in the Indo-Pacific, such short-range engagements would likely be the rare exception rather than the rule.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a writer and attorney focused on national security, technology, and political culture. His work has appeared in Tablet, City Journal, The Hill, The Spectator, and The Cipher Brief. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global & Joint Program Studies from NYU. More at harrisonkass.com.

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