China is rapidly gaining ground in the Central Asian defense market, but the region is wary of replacing dependence on Moscow with dependence on Beijing.

In July, Uzbekistan attracted attention for reports that it might buy Chinese-made Chengdu J-10 Vigorous Dragon fighter jets. The J-10 is the Chinese version of the United States’ F-16 Fighting Falcon and is used for patrols, interceptions, ground attack, and air superiority. It’s the kind of jet that is the workhorse of any air force. Outside of China, only Pakistan uses J-10s. Uzbekistan would be the third country ever to use them.

Arms sales should not be analyzed in a strategic vacuum. A country’s decision to buy military equipment signals strategic alignment with its seller. It also heralds future engagement, especially for life-cycle maintenance, repairs, and the purchase of other technology that synchronizes with existing kit. Sales beget sales. Buying outside a military alliance is, hence, controversial. Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system in 2019 was a case in point, entailing backlash from NATO nations and its expulsion from the F-35 program, a decision that Turkey is trying to reverse now by offloading the S-400.

Uzbekistan, like the rest of Central Asia, is in a comparable position. As former Soviet republics, they have historically been part of Russia’s military community. Most of these countries are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led counterpart to NATO. Russian assets—tanks, artillery, aircraft, and small arms—dominate these countries’ inventories, and their largely Russophone officers receive Russian military staff training. It is no understatement to say that Central Asia relies on Russia for its defense.

Therefore, a major decision to buy fighters from China, rather than a Russian supplier such as Sukhoi or Mikoyan, would depart from the norm and signal a shift in the Central Asian defense market, creating new opportunities for the rest of the world.

It should come as no surprise that the Russian defense industry is strained because of the war in Ukraine. This strains supply chains for new parts and replacements needed elsewhere, including for assets Central Asia already owns. Russian arms exports to the region, as to the rest of the world, have thus declined.

Capacity is just one problem. The Ukraine War has also exposed the poor quality of Russian military hardware, especially when used against Ukraine’s NATO-supplied weaponry. Russia’s newest missiles, including its much-touted hypersonic missiles, have been easily shot down by Ukraine’s older anti-missile batteries supplied by the West. 

Russian tanks and armored vehicles, meanwhile, have gotten stuck in muddy terrain or lost power in the field, undermining their reliability. They’ve also been easy targets for Ukrainian drone attacks. Based on their performance in the field, Russian military hardware is less likely to attract Central Asian militaries. 

These problems are compounded by heavy Western sanctions against Russia’s arms industry, which are designed to prevent other countries from dealing with them. Secondary sanctions, especially under the United States’s CAATSA legislation, deter buyers from doing business with Russia, since they fear the impact of US sanctions. Central Asian countries have no waiver from such sanctions, and they pose a significant liability for any new contracts with Russian suppliers.

These sanctions have also revealed the limits of Russian defense supply chain security. A significant share of the components used for Russia’s defense industry are foreign goods, particularly electrical components, including some from Western countries. Sanctions have curtailed the direct purchase of these components. It has prompted reliance on cheaper alternatives, such as from China, which has undermined the quality of Russian equipment.

In Russia’s place, China is becoming a top military supplier for the Global South, including Central Asia. China is already deeply integrated into Central Asian economies as a trading partner and sells the region most of its heavy goods and infrastructure. Selling defense products is a natural progression for China’s relationships in Central Asia.

Chinese defense goods have some competitive advantages for Central Asian buyers. First, they cost less than products from European, American, Israeli, and even Russian suppliers. They also come with more flexible payment terms than Western suppliers, which are often more concerned about securing transactions. The West cannot match Chinese affordability.

Chinese products are also easier for Central Asia to obtain. China’s manufacturing prowess, land contiguity with Central Asia, and strong connectivity through the Belt and Road Initiative mean it can deliver military hardware on schedule, on budget, and with minimal transportation costs. In defense procurement, where cost overruns and late arrivals are common, these factors make Chinese suppliers attractive. Although the Chinese defense sector has a mixed track record in quality, the ease of trade is hard to avoid.

For these reasons, China’s share of the Central Asian arms market increased nearly tenfold before the war in Ukraine, when it was the region’s second-biggest arms supplier after Russia. The purchases have been considerable. In 2022, Kazakhstan ordered $5 million of military drones entirely from China. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have also acquired surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries such as the short-range FM-90, the medium-range KS-1C, and the long-range HQ-9, which is growing in popularity among non-Western countries. Tajikistan, meanwhile, has introduced the Chinese-made HQ-17AE SAM battery for its high-altitude aerial defense.

Still, even as Central Asian countries buy Chinese, they are wary of merely replacing Russia with another suzerain as their top supplier of defense goods. Dependency on Russia was not by choice, but a legacy of Soviet rule, and Central Asia would prefer to avoid a similar experience. 

Moreover, while China can produce at scale and sell competitively, its weapons quality is largely untested in combat. China’s military-industrial complex does not yet have the same reputation for innovation and reliability as Russia’s once did. Central Asian buyers should therefore beware. Furthermore, Chinese instability, especially during a possible war over Taiwan, may pose the same supply problems as Russia has encountered apropos Ukraine

As a new marketplace, Central Asia has attracted interest from other defense manufacturers. The need to avoid dependency has also pushed its countries to build indigenous production of certain defense goods.

The United States’s role in Central Asian defense is limited, and the US government is likely wary of deeper integration to avoid upsetting China and Russia in a sensitive zone for those powers. Moreover, the United States is reluctant to share sensitive technologies with third countries, and strict export controls often hamper deals. For Central Asian countries, this limitation is especially acute because of their proximity to Russia and China.

However, the United States has modestly sought to increase arms sales there, primarily through its Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, where the US government loans funds to purchase defense goods from US companies. Under the second Trump administration, the total value of FMF sales to Central Asia has been just under $80 million, with Uzbekistan accounting for around half of that amount. During the first Trump administration, the United States had agreed to sell airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to Kazakhstan for $128 million.

Other US allies with large arms industries, such as South Korea, have been courted by Central Asian defense ministries. Turkey, meanwhile, has sought to supply Central Asia with combat drones and small arms, leveraging their shared Turkic ethnicity and financing agreements to seal deals. In Turkmenistan, Turkey has already displaced Russia as the top arms supplier, followed by Italy. Interest in Turkish arms in the region is likely to grow.

Perhaps the longest-term investment in defense underway in Central Asia is indigenous production. The region has not been known for defense manufacturing but is scaling up new industries to meet domestic needs. Kazakhstan has led the way, starting a $1 billion project to build four factories for NATO-standard ammunition instead of Russian ammunition and establishing a combat drone manufacturing facility to meet domestic supply needs. Amid cost concerns and wartime shortages from bigger suppliers, these investments will probably pay the biggest dividends for Central Asia’s long-term defense.

About the Author: Arjun Singh

Arjun Singh is a journalist and political columnist in Washington, DC. He has written for The Wall Street Journal, National Review, The Epoch Times, National Post, and The Daily Caller. He previously lived in India for several years and worked for a member of Parliament in the Lok Sabha.

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