The agreement opens a carefully regulated legal pathway for American nuclear exports. It neither grants Saudi Arabia an enrichment capability nor materially advances a Saudi weapons program.

The new US-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement has had an unusually confusing debut.

On July 22, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2153. The agreement was accompanied by two side letters and a separate arrangement providing for additional safeguards and verification measures. The package was then submitted to Congress for the review prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act.

One day later, President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that the agreement would be “totally subject” to Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing relations with Israel. He also declared that there would be “no enrichment of material.” The White House subsequently reinforced the first point, stating that without Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords, “the deal is off.”

Those statements have created understandable uncertainty about the agreement’s political future. Saudi Arabia has long maintained that normalization with Israel would require a credible pathway toward Palestinian statehood—a condition the current Israeli government appears unlikely to accept. Nor has the Trump administration explained how the president’s newly announced condition relates legally to an agreement the two governments had already negotiated and signed.

Whatever its force as a statement of presidential policy, a Truth Social post does not, without more, amend the text of a bilateral agreement already executed by the parties. The Trump administration might intend to withhold the steps necessary to bring the agreement into force, refuse the licenses and authorizations needed to implement it, obtain an additional Saudi commitment, or formally amend the negotiated package. For now, its intended course remains unclear.

But the resulting political drama should not obscure a more fundamental question: What does a Section 123 agreement actually do?

Much of the public criticism of the deal rests on a basic category error. A nuclear cooperation agreement is not a nuclear project. It does not give Saudi Arabia a reactor, an enrichment plant, or access to weapons-sensitive technology. It does not award a contract to Westinghouse or any other American company. It does not finance or authorize construction, transfer nuclear material, or compel the US government to approve a future export.

The agreement opens a gate. It does not determine what will eventually pass through it.

A Statutory Framework for Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia, not a Project Authorization

Section 123 establishes the legal prerequisites for significant peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and another country. Section 123(a) prescribes nine nonproliferation criteria that ordinarily must be incorporated into an agreement for cooperation before the United States may undertake the forms of nuclear cooperation specified elsewhere in the Atomic Energy Act.

Those criteria include guarantees that transferred material and equipment will not be used for nuclear explosives or other military purposes; the maintenance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; adequate physical security; restrictions on retransfers; US approval rights over reprocessing and other alterations in the form or content of covered nuclear material; controls on the storage of plutonium and highly enriched uranium; and limitations on the production of special nuclear material through the use of material or equipment subject to the agreement.

These requirements establish an enduring legal interest in what is often described as “US-obligated” material and equipment. American consent rights do not necessarily disappear when a physical export reaches the recipient state. They follow the material, equipment, and, in some circumstances, special nuclear material produced through their use.

What Section 123 does not do is authorize a particular commercial transaction. A 123 agreement removes a threshold statutory prohibition; it does not displace the transaction-specific licensing, consent, and export-control authorities through which the United States decides what cooperation may actually occur.

Exports of nuclear reactors, reactor components, source material, or special nuclear material would require separate licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10 C.F.R. Part 110. Transfers of unclassified nuclear technology and assistance remain subject to Department of Energy controls under 10 C.F.R. Part 810. Reprocessing, enrichment, retransfers, and other post-export actions would require approval as “subsequent arrangements” under Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2160. Applicable transactions may also be subject to licensing requirements implemented by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4812–4813, through the Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. parts 730–774, including the nuclear-nonproliferation controls in 15 C.F.R. § 742.3 and the restrictions applicable to certain nuclear end uses in 15 C.F.R. § 744.2.

The legal point is therefore straightforward: the existence of the 123 agreement does not establish that any particular export satisfies these downstream requirements. It merely makes it legally possible for an applicant to seek the necessary approvals.

Before approving the Saudi agreement, Trump issued Presidential Determination No. 2026-18 on July 16. Exercising the authority conferred by Section 123(b), he determined that performance of the proposed agreement “will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”

Congress may disagree with that assessment as a matter of policy. But there is no persuasive basis for calling the agreement unlawful or in some manner improper merely because it does not contain every additional nonproliferation commitment that its critics would prefer. Most importantly, Section 123 does not require every cooperating state to renounce every possibility of domestic uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing, regardless of the origin of the relevant material, equipment, or technology.

Congress could impose such a requirement. It has not done so.

The UAE Nuclear Agreement Was the Exception, Not the Rule

Much of the criticism compares the Saudi agreement with the 2009 US–United Arab Emirates agreement. Under Article 7 of that agreement, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made a legally binding commitment not to possess sensitive nuclear facilities—including facilities for enrichment or reprocessing—within its territory. That undertaking became known as the “gold standard” for peaceful nuclear cooperation.

The UAE’s commitment was significant and valuable. But it was not the historical legal baseline from which the Saudi agreement now departs. It was an exceptional restriction added to the conventional requirements of Section 123.

The United States has concluded agreements for cooperation with numerous countries without obtaining a comparably comprehensive renunciation. Treating the UAE formula as though Congress subsequently incorporated it into Section 123 confuses an unusually successful negotiating outcome with a universally applicable legal requirement.

Critics are entitled to argue that the United States should now demand a UAE-style commitment from every prospective partner. But that is an argument for a new negotiating policy or an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act—not a description of existing law.

Indeed, one cost of treating the UAE agreement as the minimum legally acceptable arrangement would be to exclude American companies from countries unwilling to make that exceptional commitment, even when cooperation could proceed under the substantial nonproliferation protections Congress actually enacted. It would transform a diplomatic achievement into a market-closing precondition without the benefit of congressional legislation.

Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Safeguards Position Has Materially Changed

Saudi Arabia’s international safeguards obligations also deserve more precise treatment than they have received in much of the public debate.

Saudi Arabia acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1988 as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA entered into force on January 13, 2009, and is reproduced as IAEA document INFCIRC/746. That agreement follows the general model contained in INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), under which a non-nuclear-weapon state accepts safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, jurisdiction, or control.

Until recently, however, Saudi Arabia’s agreement operated with an original Small Quantities Protocol. Developed for states possessing little or no nuclear material and no nuclear facilities, the protocol held many of the detailed reporting and inspection procedures of the comprehensive safeguards agreement in abeyance.

That abbreviated arrangement was plainly inappropriate for a country contemplating a commercial nuclear power program. In July 2024, Saudi Arabia therefore requested rescission of its original Small Quantities Protocol. The rescission became effective on December 31, 2024. Saudi Arabia is now therefore subject to full implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement rather than the substantially limited procedures applicable under the original protocol.

This is not a cosmetic change. The IAEA has repeatedly identified original Small Quantities Protocols as a weakness in the safeguards system because they limit the agency’s access to information and ability to conduct verification. Saudi Arabia’s rescission materially strengthened the legal and institutional basis for IAEA safeguards in the kingdom.

Saudi Arabia has not, however, signed and implemented an Additional Protocol based on the model contained in INFCIRC/540 (Corrected). That omission is a legitimate subject for congressional scrutiny. An Additional Protocol supplies the IAEA with broader information concerning a state’s nuclear fuel-cycle activities and expanded rights of complementary access. It materially strengthens the agency’s ability to investigate possible undeclared nuclear material and activities.

But the distinction between a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol must be stated accurately. Saudi Arabia is not outside the international safeguards system. Its comprehensive safeguards agreement obligates it to declare nuclear material and allows the IAEA to verify that declared material has not been diverted from peaceful activities. An Additional Protocol would provide greater assurance regarding the possible existence of undeclared material or activities. The latter supplements the former; it does not render the underlying comprehensive agreement meaningless or incomplete.

Nor is an Additional Protocol among the nine substantive conditions that Section 123(a) requires every agreement for cooperation to contain. Congress has, however, made it procedurally more difficult to conclude a new agreement with a country lacking one. Section 1264 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 restricts the executive branch from submitting the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement required by Section 123 for a proposed agreement with such a country. The statute nevertheless permits that restriction to be overcome through a presidential report to the relevant congressional committees followed by a 90-day waiting period.

The precise manner in which the administration satisfied or invoked that procedure should be included in, or ascertainable from, the materials submitted to Congress. That is an appropriate question for congressional oversight. It does not follow, however, that the absence of an Additional Protocol automatically renders the agreement contrary to law.

The new US-Saudi package also includes a separate Agreement for the Application of Additional Safeguards and Verification Measures. Public reporting indicates that these measures would be implemented by the IAEA in connection with US-Saudi cooperation. The IAEA has stated that it is awaiting a request from Washington and Riyadh before seeking authorization from its Board of Governors to implement them.

This bilateral arrangement is not the IAEA Model Additional Protocol and should not be represented as one. But neither should it be dismissed as a replacement for comprehensive international safeguards. On the available information, it is intended to supplement Saudi Arabia’s INFCIRC/746 comprehensive safeguards agreement with additional IAEA-administered verification applicable to activities arising from US-Saudi cooperation.

Saudi adherence to the Model Additional Protocol would be a welcome further measure and should remain an American diplomatic objective. Its absence, however, does not mean that Saudi Arabia is free of meaningful safeguards obligations or that the present agreement is devoid of verification mechanisms.

What the US-Saudi Nuclear Agreement Does—and Does Not Do—About Enrichment

The loudest controversy concerns uranium enrichment. Here, at least three legally distinct questions have often been collapsed into one.

First, does the agreement contain a Saudi-wide renunciation of enrichment? Apparently, it does not. Unlike the UAE, Saudi Arabia has not agreed to forgo enrichment using any material or technology, regardless of its source.

That omission preserves Saudi Arabia’s juridical position that neither the NPT nor its comprehensive safeguards agreement categorically prohibits peaceful enrichment under safeguards. It does not, however, confer access to American enrichment technology or eliminate US consent rights over material and equipment supplied pursuant to the agreement.

Second, does the 123 agreement itself authorize Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium? Nothing publicly released demonstrates that it does. News reports indicate that the parties may conduct a two-year study of the technical and economic feasibility of producing nuclear fuel in Saudi Arabia. But an agreement to study the feasibility of enrichment is not authorization to construct or operate an enrichment facility.

Section 123(a)(7) requires prior US approval before nuclear material subject to an agreement for cooperation may be reprocessed or otherwise altered in form or content. In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 2153a provides that, except as specifically provided in an agreement for cooperation, source or special nuclear material exported from the United States may not be enriched after export without prior American approval. Proposals involving enrichment could also implicate the subsequent-arrangement procedures of Section 131.

The absence of a categorical Saudi renunciation therefore does not erase the United States’ legal control over US-obligated material.

Third, does the agreement authorize the transfer of American enrichment technology? Again, nothing publicly available establishes that it does. Authorization to transfer enrichment technology would present a distinct and extraordinarily sensitive legal question. It could not be inferred from the existence of a 123 agreement and would implicate the Atomic Energy Act’s special treatment of “sensitive nuclear technology,” DOE authorization under Part 810, the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines, and potentially the subsequent-arrangement procedures of Section 131.

The United States does not ordinarily export enrichment technology. Nothing about establishing a legal framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation obligates it to begin doing so in Saudi Arabia.

The agreement may leave open a future discussion about whether some carefully controlled fuel-cycle activity could take place in the kingdom. Leaving a question open is not the same thing as answering it in Saudi Arabia’s favor. And Trump’s subsequent declaration that there will be “no enrichment of material” may indicate that his administration does not intend to approve even the possibility reportedly contemplated by the feasibility study.

Until the complete agreement, side letters, and safeguards arrangement are publicly available, categorical claims that the United States has granted Saudi Arabia an enrichment capability are premature.

The US-Saudi Nuclear Agreement Does Not Create a Material Saudi Weapons Pathway

Saudi Arabia’s ultimate nuclear intentions are a legitimate concern. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will seek one as well. That statement cannot simply be ignored.

But the analytically relevant question is not whether a future Saudi government could ever decide to acquire nuclear weapons. It is whether this agreement materially improves Saudi Arabia’s ability to implement such a decision.

Ordinary cooperation involving American-supplied light-water reactors would do very little to establish a plausible weapons pathway. Their fresh fuel would consist of low-enriched uranium subject to Saudi Arabia’s comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement, the additional controls of the US-Saudi framework, material-accounting requirements, physical-protection obligations, and continuing American consent rights.

Spent light-water-reactor fuel would contain plutonium, but it would be intensely radioactive and unsuitable for weapons use without chemical separation in a substantial reprocessing facility. Construction and operation of such a facility would be technically demanding, difficult to conceal, and inconsistent with Saudi Arabia’s safeguards and nonproliferation obligations. Reprocessing US-obligated material would also require prior American consent.

Saudi Arabia could theoretically seize safeguarded American-origin material, expel inspectors, and repudiate its obligations under the NPT, its comprehensive safeguards agreement, and the bilateral agreement. But that would be among the most conspicuous, diplomatically costly, and technically cumbersome routes by which it could attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. It would immediately precipitate an international crisis while offering neither a rapid nor a concealed path to a bomb.

If Saudi Arabia ever made the political decision to acquire nuclear weapons, the more serious and credible risks would arise from clandestine activities, assistance from less restrictive foreign partners, or the independent acquisition of unsafeguarded fuel-cycle capabilities—not from the ordinary operation of American-supplied light-water reactors under international safeguards and continuing US legal controls.

The relevant policy comparison is therefore not necessarily between US cooperation and the absence of a Saudi nuclear program. Saudi Arabia is likely to pursue nuclear power whether American companies participate or not. The realistic choice is likely better identified as being between a program developed with extensive American involvement, and a program supplied principally by countries potentially including China and/or Russia, over which Washington has far less influence.

Nuclear energy exports create relationships extending far beyond the initial construction contract. They involve regulatory cooperation, operator training, fuel supply, material accounting, physical security, emergency preparedness, maintenance, and technical support. Those relationships can endure for the operating life of a reactor and through its eventual decommissioning. They give the United States continuing visibility, influence, and legal leverage.

Walking away would not extinguish Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions. It would surrender much of America’s ability to shape them.

Congress Should Keep the Nuclear Cooperation Gate Open

Congress should scrutinize the agreement carefully. It should demand publication and explanation of the two side letters and the additional safeguards arrangement. It should determine how the administration complied with the procedural requirements imposed by Section 1264 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. It should ask exactly what the proposed enrichment study will examine, whether reprocessing is separately addressed, what happens if the United States ultimately refuses to support Saudi enrichment, and whether any future proposal involving sensitive fuel-cycle technology will receive additional congressional consideration.

Congress should also require the administration to explain how Trump’s newly announced Abraham Accords condition is supposed to operate. If the administration intends to alter the agreement materially, it should do so transparently, with Saudi consent, and through the appropriate statutory process.

But Congress should not mistake legitimate questions about future implementation for defects in the underlying legal framework. Nor should it treat the absence of the UAE’s exceptional enrichment renunciation as illegality or assume that a 123 agreement automatically transfers whatever nuclear capability Saudi Arabia might someday request.

Section 123 opens a carefully regulated legal pathway for American nuclear exports. Parts 110 and 810, the subsequent-arrangement process, US consent rights, IAEA safeguards, and transaction-specific executive-branch review still determine what may pass through it.

The agreement neither grants Saudi Arabia an enrichment capability nor materially advances a Saudi weapons program. It permits American companies to seek participation in Saudi Arabia’s emerging nuclear market while preserving the legal mechanisms through which the United States can approve, condition, or reject particular forms of cooperation.

Congress should insist that those mechanisms be applied rigorously. It should not close the gate before American companies have any opportunity to enter.

About the Author: Daniel Joyner 

Daniel Joyner is the Elton B. Stephens Professor of Law at the University of Alabama School of Law and the founder and principal at Prometheus Nuclear LLC. Prior to joining the Alabama Law faculty in 2007, Dr. Joyner taught for four years on the faculty of the University of Warwick School of Law. He is the author of International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Oxford University Press, 2009); Interpreting the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Oxford University Press, 2011); and Iran’s Nuclear Program and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2016).

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