Saudi Arabia’s conventional air force would crush Iran’s—yet Iran has invested heavily in asymmetric ways to strike back against its more powerful southern rival.

As tensions increase across the Middle East, it becomes tempting to compare the relative forces of regional powers, like Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Iran and Saudi Arabia are ancient rivals, with a shared history too long to recount. In the modern era, Saudi Arabia under the Saud family and Imperial Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty were longtime rivals; after the Iranian monarchy was overthrown in 1979, the new regime began to vigorously oppose the Sauds, leading them to support Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988. In the modern era, the two nations have continued to face off across the Persian Gulf; although a China-negotiated rapprochement briefly improved relations from 2023 to 2026, Iran restored them to hostility by launching missiles at Saudi Arabia after the US-led “Operation Epic Fury” against Iran. So far, Saudi Arabia has not retaliated in kind.

In a full-on air war between the two regional powers, Saudi Arabia enjoys an overwhelming advantage owing to a sophisticated, Western-supplied fleet, the most capable in the Middle East. But in a broader air campaign, Iran would leverage its asymmetric missile and drone force, which would partially offset its aging air force.

Saudi Arabia and Iran: An Airpower Comparison

Nation	Royal Saudi Air Force (Saudi Arabia)	Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (Iran)
Number of Personnel	~30,000	~37,000
Number of Aircraft (Total)	917	~550*
Fighter Jets	364	~209*
Bombers / Special Mission Aircraft	17	~10*
Support Aircraft	~535 (includes trainer jets, transport aircraft, aerial tankers, helicopters)	~330 (includes trainer jets, transport aircraft, aerial tankers, helicopters)

* Numbers as of February 28, 2026; likely smaller now

A Conventional Air War Between Iran and Saudi Arabia Wouldn’t Be Close

The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is composed mostly of modern Western assets. With roughly 360 frontline combat aircraft, the backbone of the fleet consists of the F-15 Eagle, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Panavia Tornado strike aircraft. These jets are equipped with modern AESA radars, advanced electronic warfare suites, and precision-guided weapons.

The RSAF has an edge in other, less tangible ways. It benefits from extensive training integration with US and NATO partners, and from a strong logistics and maintenance capability relative to regional peers. The RSAF enjoys not just isolated higher-quality aircraft, but an entire ecosystem calibrated for air war. Various force multipliers make its fighters more lethal—E-3 AWACS aircraft providing long-range radar pictures, Link-16 networking, and more. RSAF fighters can receive target tracks before detecting threats themselves, helping to lift the fog of war. And in addition to their superior aircraft, the RSAF has better weapons; its fighters are equipped with AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, which facilitate engagements well beyond visual range.

The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF), Iran’s air force, looks paltry by comparison. With only about 150 operational combat aircraft, the IRIAF fleet includes F-14 Tomcats, MiG-29 Fulcrums, Su-24 Fencers, F-4 Phantoms, and F-5 Tigers. All of these planes are well and truly outdated; the most recent among them date back as far back as the 1970s and early 1980s, and others are older still. Maintenance on these older aircraft is complicated—and has become far more so thanks to decades of sanctions. Indeed, Iran’s conventional air force is generally viewed as the weakest component of its overall military.

Iran’s Asymmetric Strengths Compensate for Its Weaknesses

But Iran’s real air power doesn’t rest with its air force.

Iran has no intention of competing fighter-for-fighter. Instead, Iran has built an asymmetric force around ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, Shahed drones, loitering munitions, mobile launchers, and underground facilities. Rather than attempt to establish air superiority, Iran simply tries to make offensive operations prohibitively expensive—as demonstrated during Epic Fury, during which it has fought the United States to essentially a draw.

So while Saudi Arabia would attempt to destroy Iranian air defenses and establish air superiority—as is standard in an air war—Iran would likely respond with minimal fighter sorties and a general effort to preserve IRIAF aircraft while launching large missile salvos and employing hundreds of drones. Rather than responding to Saudi Arabia on warfighting terms, Iran would target Saudi “soft targets” such as oil facilities, desalination plants, military bases, airfields, and ports, punishing it for starting the war and making its conduct too costly to continue.

In a traditional head-to-head fighter contest, Saudi Arabia gains air superiority. It has better aircraft, sensors, training, and networking. But as Epic Fury demonstrated, these conflicts are increasingly irrelevant when it comes to Iran. As warfare changes, advanced fighters are increasingly asked to share the battlefield with cheaper, mass-produced drones and missiles. And while advanced fighters remain quite capable, cheaper systems are mitigating the effectiveness of traditional air power, imposing significant fiscal and strategic costs against superior forces—which an air war between Saudi Arabia and Iran would likely demonstrate.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a writer and attorney focused on national security, technology, and political culture. His work has appeared in Tablet, City Journal, The Hill, The Spectator, and The Cipher Brief. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global & Joint Program Studies from NYU. More at harrisonkass.com.

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