Opening Saudi Arabia’s path toward uranium enrichment may put Saudi nuclear development on US terms, or it could trigger a Middle East arms race.

President Donald Trump’s approval of a 30-year civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia marks a potentially transformative moment in Middle Eastern politics. A major Saudi demand that has been in the works for years, it has the potential to act as a double-edged sword. It may strengthen Washington’s influence in Riyadh, but permitting Saudi enrichment could intensify Iran’s nuclear ambitions, alarm Israel, and weaken the barriers to nuclear proliferation across the Middle East.

According to reports, the agreement could eventually permit the kingdom to enrich uranium on its own territory, subject to further studies and safeguards negotiated between Washington and Riyadh. At the same time, it apparently does not require Saudi Arabia to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which would give inspectors considerably greater access to nuclear facilities and information.

The agreement has yet to complete the congressional review required under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Its final provisions may therefore change. However, it is highly unlikely that Congress will be able to derail or alter the agreement given the onerous process of overriding a presidential veto. The outlines of the agreement already reported raise a fundamental question: Can the United States help Saudi Arabia develop nuclear energy without contributing to a regional competition for nuclear latency—the capacity to produce nuclear weapons relatively quickly without actually possessing them?

The strongest argument for the agreement is that Saudi Arabia intends to build a nuclear-energy program regardless of whether Washington participates in it. The kingdom wants to diversify its energy mix, conserve more oil and natural gas for export, and develop the technological foundations of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 modernization program. Saudi Arabia has discussed nuclear cooperation with China, Russia, France, and South Korea, and the United States cannot prevent it from purchasing reactors and technical assistance elsewhere indefinitely.

An American agreement would therefore allow Washington to shape a program that might otherwise develop under much weaker controls. US-supplied nuclear material and equipment would be subject to legally binding peaceful-use commitments, accounting requirements, physical-security standards, and inspection arrangements. American companies would also gain access to a commercially valuable market while Washington strengthened its strategic relationship with the most influential Arab state and potential counterweight to Iran. From this perspective, the agreement can be perceived as an attempt to keep the kingdom’s nuclear development within an American-led regulatory framework.

A Saudi civilian program could also provide Washington with additional leverage over Riyadh. Reactor construction, fuel supply, maintenance, personnel training, and waste management create relationships lasting several decades. Dependence on American technology could also make Saudi Arabia more responsive to US concerns. These are substantial advantages. However, they do not resolve the central problem posed by uranium enrichment.

Civilian reactors do not require a country to enrich its own uranium. Fuel can be purchased from international suppliers, just as the United Arab Emirates does under its nuclear agreement with the United States. The UAE accepted what became known as the “gold standard”: a legally binding renunciation of domestic enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing. Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to accept the same restrictions suggests that its objectives extend beyond simply generating power for civilian use.

Enrichment is a dual-use technology. The same centrifuges that produce low-enriched uranium for reactors can, if reconfigured and operated for longer periods, produce highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons. A state possessing enrichment plants, trained specialists, uranium stocks, and advanced centrifuges can remain formally within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while substantially shortening the time needed to manufacture weapons.

This concern is magnified by Mohammed bin Salman’s repeated declaration that Saudi Arabia would acquire a nuclear weapon if Iran did so. His statement was intended to deter Tehran, but it also confirmed that Riyadh views its nuclear choices through a strategic rather than purely commercial lens. The distinction between a civilian program and a weapons option could therefore become increasingly blurred.

The reported absence of a Saudi commitment to the IAEA Additional Protocol is equally troubling. Standard safeguards are principally designed to monitor declared nuclear material and facilities. The Additional Protocol gives inspectors broader authority to investigate undeclared activities, obtain environmental samples, and gain access to associated research and manufacturing sites. Permitting domestic enrichment without requiring this more intrusive inspection system would combine a sensitive technology with insufficient transparency.

The agreement’s most immediate geopolitical impact will be felt in Iran. Tehran is almost certain to cite the Saudi arrangement as evidence of American double standards. Washington has demanded that Iran surrender or sharply curtail its enrichment activities while apparently accepting that Saudi Arabia might eventually operate an enrichment facility. Iranian leaders will argue that the United States objects not to enrichment itself but to enrichment only by adversaries.

This argument will resonate domestically in Iran. Iranian politicians who favor accommodation with the West will find it difficult to defend permanent restrictions if Washington accords a regional rival more permissive treatment. It will strengthen Tehran’s argument that any future nuclear agreement recognize an unrestricted Iranian right to enrich uranium on its own soil. The Saudi agreement may consequently undermine American bargaining power in future negotiations with Iran.

At the same time, the deal could exert useful pressure on Tehran. Iranian leaders have long assumed that their technological advantages give them a privileged position in the Gulf region. The prospect of Saudi Arabia acquiring an internationally supported nuclear infrastructure might demonstrate that continued Iranian nuclear advances will generate countervailing capabilities among its neighbors.

Israel’s reaction is likely to be ambivalent. Israeli leaders welcome closer US-Saudi strategic cooperation and regard Saudi Arabia as an important potential partner in containing Iran. A nuclear agreement could deepen Riyadh’s dependence on Washington and perhaps support broader Saudi-Israeli normalization in the future. However, this is unlikely to happen in the absence of a clear path toward Israel’s acceptance of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. President Trump’s announcement on Thursday that the nuclear deal is contingent on Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of the Abraham Accords may cast doubt on the deal. 

More importantly, Israel has historically opposed the emergence of advanced nuclear capabilities in neighboring states. Its doctrine of maintaining its position as the sole nuclear weapons power in the Middle East led to attacks on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s suspected reactor at al-Kibar in 2007. Saudi Arabia is not currently an enemy, but governments and alignments change. Israeli strategists must consider what Saudi enrichment facilities might mean 10, 20, or 30 years from now. They may conclude that its negative implications outweigh its positive ones.

The broader consequences of proliferation could also be profound. Turkey and Egypt are unlikely to accept permanently a regional order in which Iran possesses an advanced enrichment program, Israel maintains an all but acknowledged nuclear arsenal, and Saudi Arabia enjoys an American-approved enrichment capability. Both possess substantial scientific institutions and aspirations to regional leadership. The Saudi precedent could encourage them to seek similar rights to develop and maintain a nuclear program, including the right to nuclear enrichment on their territories.

The result would not necessarily be an immediate cascade of nuclear weapons. A more probable outcome is the proliferation of threshold capabilities: several states developing the technology, materials, and expertise needed to produce weapons relatively quickly. Such an arrangement might appear stable because no government openly crosses the nuclear threshold. In reality, it would make the region more vulnerable to crises, miscalculation, preventive war, and rapid arms races.

The decisive issue, therefore, is not whether Saudi Arabia should possess nuclear power for civilian uses. It is whether Washington should help create another nuclear-threshold state in the world’s most volatile region. Unless the agreement draws a firm and verifiable boundary between civilian energy and weapons capability, it may end up planting the seeds of a much more dangerous nuclear order in the Middle East.

About the Author: Mohammed Ayoob

 ​Mohammed Ayoob is a university distinguished professor emeritus of International Relations at Michigan State University. His books include The Many Faces of Political Islam (Second Edition, 2020), Will the Middle East Implode? (2014), and, most recently, From Regional Security to Global IR: An Intellectual Journey (2024). He was also the editor of Assessing the War on Terror (2013).

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