Houthi strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure could reignite Yemen’s brutal civil war.

Missiles flew across the Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border last week, followed by a Houthi declaration of a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia on Monday, drawing the Yemeni front in the regional conflict closer to renewed hostilities across the Middle East. The situation escalated rapidly after the Houthis challenged Yemeni air restrictions returning from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s belated funeral, compounded by reports that Iran has urged the Houthis to close the Red Sea if the United States strikes its power network.

This escalation no longer just risks Red Sea shipping. With the war’s increasing targeting of energy infrastructure, a scaling of the conflict could place Saudi Arabia’s key oil pipeline and supporting infrastructure in the Houthis’ sights. Such an escalation could risk initiating another high-intensity phase of the war in Yemen.

A little over 500 miles north of the Houthis’ territory is a key piece of strategic infrastructure: the East-West Pipeline. Today, this 750-mile oil pipeline has helped hedge the Saudi and global energy market against this crisis by providing an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz. On paper, the pipeline can move up to 7 million barrels a day (bpd), though in practice its export total is likely lower, closer to 3.75 million bpd.

Though the Houthis were previously the main perpetrators of past energy infrastructure attacks, they’ve halted such strikes since Yemen’s 2022 truce. However, with more than 80 energy facilities being attacked in the war’s first months alone, the norm behind this restraint may be collapsing. 

This norm’s decay was furthered by Iran’s own prior strikes on the pipeline and on other energy targets like Qatar’s critical LNG facilities. Iran’s new message to the Houthis, urging them to close the Bab el-Mandeb, signals both Tehran’s rising tolerance for escalation and its waning confidence that its own infrastructure will be spared under current deterrence dynamics around Hormuz shipping. Should a Houthi offensive on Red Sea shipping fail to deter US strikes, Iran may see pushing the Houthis toward attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure as its next-best tool for punishing the West.

Hitting the pipeline’s above-ground segments could prove difficult for current Houthi technology, given its thin profile, making the pipeline itself a less attractive target than supporting infrastructure such as pumping stations or even desalination plants that sustain Saudi Arabia’s workforce. In 2019, the Houthis claimed to have successfully struck two of the pipeline’s pumping stations, displaying their munitions’ range, even if their success was due to counter-drone limitations at the time. 

Damage to key infrastructure, such as generators, could delay the installation of replacements. Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in air defense systems against a threat like this, but a sufficiently coordinated barrage can still overwhelm even the best-prepared layered defenses. Beyond direct pipeline strikes, the Houthis could alternatively strike at the waters around Yanbu in a purposeful attempt to raise tanker war risk insurance premiums. The economic impact of prolonged infrastructure damage or severed shipping access would be significant, especially if China proves unable to continue to reduce its imports. Declining Suez traffic would also directly impact Egypt, as the canal accounts for 8 percent of its revenue.

The Houthi leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi’s speech following the Sana’a airport bombing was fiery, spanning its focus across Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. His remarks did not center around the Iran War but rather on the Houthis’ own frustrations over Saudi policy: “All Saudi oil facilities and vital installations are a target for our missiles and drones…Our siege must end this despicable interference and meddling in all our affairs, down to the smallest grain of wheat entering our country, down to the smallest pill of medicine reaching our land, which requires Saudi authorization.”

While his remarks were aggressive, the Houthi media apparatus is known for its bluster, having teased the Houthis’ entrance into the conflict for months without following through. 

At the time of writing, shipping continues through the Bab el-Mandeb, despite Houthi efforts to reroute vessels bound for Saudi Arabia over VHF radio. However, the market is reacting, with Yanbu crude increasingly routing away from Yemen towards Egypt’s Sumed pipeline, and five tankers have been identified as rerouting their course away from the strait thus far. Some analysts are seeing a growing number of vessels now transmitting Chinese affiliation data—likely in the hope that the association will shield them.

Beyond the geoeconomic fallout, a Saudi-Houthi tit-for-tat could tear open the stitches that have restrained the Yemen Civil War since 2022. In the hot phase of the conflict, Yemen saw over 377,000 deaths, 359,561 items of unexploded ordnance, mass food insecurity, and the largest cholera outbreak in modern history. A renewed and prolonged Saudi campaign punishing the Houthis for energy or shipping strikes could potentially see even worse humanitarian consequences due to new constraints on humanitarian organizations.

The 2025 Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation of the Houthis creates a significant roadblock for aid trying to reach the Yemeni population, the majority of whom live under Houthi rule. The closure of USAID and the funding cuts to organizations like the World Food Program significantly reduce what aid can still reach Yemenis. The Houthi regime’s own paranoia over its fragile political position makes conditions worse, as they routinely detain UN staff over accusations of spying. The suffering would be immense, and the price to the US and Saudi reputations would be steep.

US policymakers should take steps to flex strength to deter Houthi action while preparing to protect service members and partners in a potential second phase of the Red Sea crisis. Air defense platforms should be ready and equipped for a prolonged engagement. Beyond the kinetic, efforts to display unity in the anti-Houthi coalition, both in Yemen and the wider GCC, would help mend fissures exposed by the January STC conflict. Diplomatically, de-escalation efforts through Oman and the UN should continue, as their success would preserve military resources and protect innocent lives.

The current Houthi internal calculations about joining a war over Iran are very different from their prior calculations to join a conflict supporting Palestine after October 7, 2023. Policymakers conflating the two risk misreading Houthi intent. While receiving significant backing from Iran, the Houthis are independent of Tehran. Regime survival, not Iranian ambitions, is their primary priority.

The stakes of this new round of the US-Iran war will prove significant for both the global energy market and the geopolitical balance of the Middle East. If deterrence fails and the Houthis choose to act, the United States and its partners must be prepared to sustain a second front in this conflict.

About the Author: Luke Zakedis

Luke Zakedis is a graduate researcher at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service, where he studies international security, focusing on conflict stabilization in the Middle East and supply chain security. He has previously worked as a geocommerce risk consultant, advising multinational firms on geopolitical risk stemming from the Houthi Red Sea crisis, and as a staffer for the Chair of the US House Middle East and Counterterrorism Subcommittee.

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