Azerbaijan has devoted far greater resources to a modern drone fleet, while Armenia has largely remained dependent on Soviet-era fighter jets and doctrine—with predictable results.

Today, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are at a historic peak. Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev signed a peace agreement at the White House in 2025, and Armenia is now in the process of amending its constitution to abandon its claim to the Nagorno-Karabakh region within Azerbaijan.

It is hard to believe that only six years ago, from September to November 2020, the two nations were locked in a bloody war for control over that territory—a war that killed thousands of soldiers on both sides and led to the depopulation of Nagorno-Karabakh in a campaign that some organizations have characterized as ethnic cleansing. The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War has been better remembered, however, for demonstrating to the world how drones, loitering munitions, and electronic warfare would reshape the modern battlefield—serving in some ways as a dress rehearsal to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a little more than a year later.

Aided by that drone fleet, Azerbaijan won the 2020 war, and ultimately took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Armenia’s peace deal with Azerbaijan may have been borne out of a recognition that a future air war with Azerbaijan would likely look very different from the classic Cold War air battle. While Armenia still fields a handful of modern combat aircraft and Soviet-era air defenses, Azerbaijan has invested heavily in unmanned systems and precision strike capabilities—creating a significant advantage over Armenia in both force structure and doctrine. 

How Do Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s Air Forces Stack Up?

On paper, Azerbaijan is simply a stronger country than Armenia. Its population is more than three times larger; there are 10.7 million Azerbaijanis against only around 3 million Armenians, giving Baku a larger manpower pool to choose from. Azerbaijan’s GDP is also around two and a half times larger (~$75 million vs. ~$30 million), allowing it to spend more heavily on a small but cutting-edge air force. Finally, Azerbaijan’s foreign relations are better; it has improbably secured friendships with both Turkey and Israel, while Armenia has had a historic falling-out with its main foreign patron, Russia, in the post-Ukraine era.

Today, Azerbaijan’s air force is built around a mixture of conventional aircraft and extensive unmanned capabilities. The hallmark is roughly a dozen upgraded MiG-29 Fulcrums, for air defense and fighter missions, and the Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft for close air support.

Yet the most important arrow in Baku’s quiver is its large inventory of unmanned systems. The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed drone provides persistent ISR and precision strike capability while the Israeli Harop loitering munitions and SkyStriker systems add long-range precision attack against high-value targets. Azerbaijan is also moving toward the introduction of the JF-17 Thunder Block III fighter with more modern avionics and multirole capability. 

Armenia has a significantly smaller combat aviation force. The most capable aircraft in Yerevan’s inventory is the Su-30SM Flanker-H multirole fighter; however, Armenia has only four of these. While the Su-30 is a capable aircraft, Armenia has struggled to fully exploit its capabilities because of limitations in weapons integration and supporting command-and-control infrastructure. For ground attack, Armenia also has the Su-25 Frogfoot. But overall, Armenia’s combat aviation inventory is considerably smaller than Azerbaijan’s.

Azerbaijan’s Drones Annihilated Armenia in the Last War

From a doctrinal perspective, the two countries are running very different playbooks. Azerbaijan has shifted its warfighting strategy towards drones, precision strike, electronic warfare, persistent ISR, and the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), rather than relying on manned aircraft as air forces have historically done. Armenia has remained more dependent on traditional surface-to-air missile systems, fixed radar sites, and legacy Soviet doctrine.

The result is two very different approaches to modern air warfare, and one decidedly in Azerbaijan’s favor. One of the defining features of the 2020 war was the Bayraktar TB2, which Azerbaijan used to conduct surveillance for hours over the battlefield, relay targeting data, and strike armored vehicles, artillery, and logistics targets. Azerbaijan’s Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions also played a crucial SEAD role in that war, searching for emitting radar systems before diving directly onto them. Persistent surveillance makes it difficult for opposing forces to maneuver undetected. Rather than a single large air strike. Azerbaijan can maintain continuous pressure through the battlespace.

Armenia faces significant structural challenges in a rematch. The country’s smaller air force has older supporting infrastructure and a heavy reliance on fixed air-defense systems. Armenia would struggle to replace combat losses quickly. And if its key radar sites were degraded early, Armenia’s overall integrated air defense would become difficult to sustain.

Since the 2020 conflict, Azerbaijan’s investment in Turkish and Israeli defense tech has produced a force designed around continuous surveillance, precision engagement, and distributed unmanned operations—allowing for a shift in power that gives Azerbaijan advantages over Armenia. In a renewed conflict, without outside intervention, Azerbaijan’s combination of conventional fighters, extensive drone fleets, loitering munitions, and modern SEAD tactics would allow for the rapid establishment of air superiority. It is likely fortunate for Armenia, then, that the two sides have mostly decided to bury the hatchet.

Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Comparison

Country	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Population	2.96 million	10.69 million
GDP	$31.87 billion	$76 billion
Number of Aircraft in Air Force	~70 (fighter jets, training jets, helicopters, transport aircraft)	~167 (fighter jets, training jets, helicopters, transport aircraft), not including drones
Number of Personnel in Air Force (Active Duty)	~5,000	~15,000
Aircraft	Fighter Jets: Su-25 Frogfoot Su-30SM Flanker-H Trainer Aircraft:  Aero L-39 (trainer jet) Mil Mi-2 (helicopter) Transport Aircraft: Ilyushin Il-76 Helicopters:  Mil Mi-17 Mil Mi-24 Airbus H145 UAVs: Mix of Chinese, American, Russian, and indigenous Armenian UAVs; number unknown	Fighter Jets: JF-17 Thunder MiG-29 Fulcrum Su-25 Frogfoot Trainer Aircraft: Aero L-39 (trainer jet) MFI-17 Mushshak (trainer turboprop) Mil Mi-2 (helicopter) Transport Aircraft:  Boeing 767 Ilyushin Il-76 C-27J Spartan Helicopters:  Bell 407 Bell 412 Mil Mi-8 Mil Mi-17 Mil Mi-24 Kamov Ka-27 MD 500 (USA) UAVs: Mix of Turkish and Israeli UAVs; number unknown

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a writer and attorney focused on national security, technology, and political culture. His work has appeared in Tablet, City Journal, The Hill, The Spectator, and The Cipher Brief. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global & Joint Program Studies from NYU. More at harrisonkass.com.

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