The European Union has been reluctant to assert or protect its interests in the Caucasus. When it does, the region does not see it as a reliable mediator.

It is not often that a prime minister offers to show the head of his country’s church his member during an election campaign. It may seem more bizarre still to argue that the European Union must now show comparable courage to help Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan keep the faith—and find peace.

The recent Armenian election, at times unseemly, at others absurd, was nonetheless geopolitically critical. The country lies at the crossroads of Eurasia, where one of the world’s most important emerging corridors for trade, energy, and critical minerals is taking shape. At a time when maritime freight is under strain, the South Caucasus offers the only overland route between Europe and Asia that bypasses both Russia to the north and Iran to the south.

Armenia has never enjoyed the fruits of its geography. A long-standing territorial conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan has left it regionally isolated. Peace would allow Armenia to join the budding regional trade corridors, giving Europe a broader, more resilient overland route to Asia. Yet despite Europe’s obvious stake, it was President Donald Trump who brokered a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan last year, complete with a Trump Road for International Peace and Prosperity linking the two nations.

Armenia’s election may determine whether Europe and Asia can finally unlock the trade route’s full potential. At its heart, the vote was a referendum on two connected issues.

First, whether to support Prime Minister Pashinyan’s peace agreement with Azerbaijan in the wake of Baku’s recovery of territory occupied by Armenian forces for nearly three decades.

Second, as Armenia weighed whether to lean to the West or back towards Russia, one question became grafted onto the other: the Moscow-aligned opposition denounced the peace agreement as a betrayal. The pro-Russian Armenian Apostolic Church even accused Pashinyan of being circumcised, and by implication, Muslim like the Azerbaijanis and their Turkish allies (hence his offer to reveal himself). When the votes were chalked up, peace—and the West—had won.

In the post-Soviet era, Armenia was the principal bastion of Russian influence in the South Caucasus. The centerpiece of Pashinyan’s westward turn was a bid to join the EU, which would require Armenia to leave Russia’s rival economic bloc. By staking his political future on EU membership, Pashinyan has handed Brussels real leverage. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen embarks on a visit to the region this week, Brussels should use that leverage to ensure Pashinyan follows through on the peace process.

The last major hurdle to peace remains Armenia’s constitutional territorial claim to Azerbaijani territory. Removing it will require a referendum. The EU should make progress towards membership conditional on holding—and winning—that vote.

The United States has done the hard diplomatic work. The EU, for once, has the bargaining power to lock in that peace—rather than watch from the sidelines. From Ukraine to Libya, Europe has too often left others to shape negotiations in its own neighborhood. The same was true in the South Caucasus: Brussels came to be seen in Baku as Armenia’s advocate, appearing to take Yerevan’s side rather than acting as an honest broker—and losing the trust needed to bridge the divide.

That perception did not emerge from nowhere. France’s longstanding advocacy for Armenia, reflecting the political influence of its large Armenian diaspora, has often set the tone for the European debate. In the run-up to the election, senior European figures flew to Yerevan to endorse Pashinyan. By contrast, when senior US officials visit the region, they make a point of visiting both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Washington succeeded where Brussels had not because it focused on the practical steps needed to reach an agreement, rather than appearing to be invested in one side’s cause.

Ironically, the very closeness that once undermined Brussels’ credibility as a mediator now gives it leverage over the final act of the peace process. The Armenian parliamentary arithmetic complicates matters. Pashinyan fell short of the two-thirds majority needed to make constitutional reform easier. But Brussels should not allow this to become a convenient pretext for delay. Other constitutional pathways remain open.

It presents a rare opportunity for Europe to advance its own strategic interests. The bloc lacks the military weight to coerce, the financial firepower to impose unilateral sanctions, and too often the credibility to lead mediation. Served on a plate by Washington and the Armenian electorate, it remains anyone’s guess whether Brussels can digest the implications—and act on them.

About the Author: Taras Kuzio

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and the author of Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War (2022) and Crimea 2014-2024: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win (2024). He is also co-editor of Russia and Modern Fascism: New Perspectives on the Kremlin’s War Against Ukraine (Columbia University Press, 2025) and co-author of The Four Roots of Russia’s War Against Ukraine (Cambridge University Press, 2025).

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