After a successful raid in Alaska, the Japanese fleet returned southward—unaware that it had left behind a fully intact aircraft for the Americans to capture.

In June 1942, Imperial Japan launched a diversionary attack against Alaska’s Aleutian Islands—intended to divide US forces and distract from the more consequential campaign then underway near the island of Midway in the Pacific. The campaign has often been described as the “forgotten battle,” as events farther south soon eclipsed it in importance.

However, the fight in the Aleutians led to one of the greatest American intelligence wins of the Pacific War, with major consequences for the larger conflict: the capture of a virtually intact Mitsubishi A6M Zero, the first flyable Zero ever captured by the Allies. After attaining the Zero, the US flight tested the aircraft, revealing weaknesses that fundamentally changed how American pilots fought against Japan’s premier fighter plane.

The A6M Zero Terrified US Troops at the Start of the War

• Year Introduced: 1940
• Number Built: 10,939
• Length: 9.06 m (29.7 ft)
• Wingspan: 12.0 m (39.4 ft)
• Weight: 2,796 kg (6,164 lb) maximum takeoff
• Engines: One Nakajima NK1C Sakae 12 14-cylinder radial (940 hp)
• Top Speed: 533 km/h (331 mph; 288 knots)
• Range: 1,870 km (1,160 mi; 1,010 nmi) with drop tank
• Armament: 2 × 20 mm Type 99 cannons, 2 × 7.7 mm Type 97 machine guns, up to 2 × 60 kg (132 lb) bombs
• Crew: 1

Designed by legendary Japanese aircraft engineer Jiro Horikoshi, the A6M was the successor to the Japanese A5M “Claude,” one of the earliest carrier-based monoplanes. Mitsubishi began work on the new aircraft in 1937; it was completed in 1940, corresponding to the year 2600 in the Japanese imperial calendar—an anniversary that gave it its codename “Zero.”

Zero aircraft participated in a secondary role in Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, but dominated the early air war over the Pacific during Japan’s rapid conquests in late 1941 and early 1942. The aircraft’s all-aluminum design gave it incredible speed and maneuverability, allowing it to easily rout antiquated early competitor aircraft such as the P-26 “Peashooter” and F2A Buffalo. By the time of the Battle of Midway in June 1942, the Zero had racked up an astonishing 12-to-1 kill ratio against the Americans—leading to a full-on crisis in the United States, which desperately sought a better understanding of the aircraft and its weaknesses.

How the United States Captured a Fully Intact Zero Fighter

During June 1942, Japan launched simultaneous operations—against Midway Atoll, to draw out the US fleet, and a diversionary attack against the Aleutian Islands. The objective of the latter attack was to draw American naval forces north, to attack the port of Dutch Harbor in Alaska, to occupy the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska, and generally to reduce America’s ability to interfere with the primary attack at Midway.

The Zero that would eventually be eventually captured by the Americans was flown from the Japanese carrier Ryujo by Flight Petty Officer Tadayoshi Koga. The aircraft in question, a late-model A6M2 Zero, participated in the attack on Dutch Harbor, but suffered fuel line damage during the raid, making it unable to return to the Ryujo. Koga diverted toward Akutan Island, the designated emergency landing site, and attempted a wheels-down landing. But marshland caused the landing gear to dig in. The aircraft flipped over, and Koga was killed instantly by a broken neck. The Japanese fleet assumed that the aircraft had been lost in the battle, and withdrew without attempting to recover or destroy it.

Five weeks later, an American patrol spotted the inverted fighter. The marshlands that had caused the crash had also served to cushion the crash, and the airframe remained fully intact. The Americans recognized the intelligence value immediately, and the aircraft was shipped to Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego, where Navy test pilots flew it extensively. 

What the Americans Learned from the Zero

Engineers at North Island exhaustively documented the Zero’s specifications, including its turning performance, climb characteristics, dive limitations, roll response, and control behavior at higher speeds. More importantly, the engineers spotted a handful of serious problems with the aircraft: it became much less responsive at higher dive speeds, its roll rate deteriorated above 200–250 miles per hour, and it was extremely vulnerable to damage, with its light aluminum frame—giving it tremendous maneuverability, its greatest strength—also its greatest weakness.

Flight testing confirmed that American pilots were almost certain to lose close-in dogfights with the Zero. Instead, they concluded that pilots should exploit their advantages—namely faster speed and better altitude performance from more powerful engines—to carry out hit-and run dives with high-speed slashing attacks. The key, generally, was to maintain altitude and energy, to attack, fire, and climb away. These lessons reinforced tactics such as the “Thach Weave,” allowing American fighters to offset the Zero’s maneuverability advantage.

Subsequent battles vindicated these tactical changes. The Zero remained dangerous throughout the conflict, but with a better understanding of its capabilities, American pilots knew what they were up against. 

As the war went on, Japan ran up against a second problem: its doctrine generally did not prioritize the lives of the pilots above all other considerations. Unlike American fighters, the Zero did not have self-sealing fuel tanks, and its pilots were not encouraged to wear parachutes, as American pilots were. As a result of these foundational differences, Japan increasingly struggled to replace the experienced pilots it had at the start of the war, who were steadily lost through attrition at battles such as Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Meanwhile, the United States introduced newer, improved aircraft like the F6F Hellcat, F4U Corsair, and improved P-38 Lightning variants. These fighters featured greater horsepower, heavier armor, self-sealing fuel tanks, and improved firepower. Combined with the better tactics informed in part by the Akutan Zero, they helped push the balance of air superiority steadily towards the Allies. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a writer and attorney focused on national security, technology, and political culture. His work has appeared in Tablet, City Journal, The Hill, The Spectator, and The Cipher Brief. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global & Joint Program Studies from NYU. More at harrisonkass.com.

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