Once it became clear the Iranian regime would not collapse, an American victory was unattainable.

It’s hard to muster much enthusiasm for the new interim deal between Iran and the United States. The memorandum of understanding, the signing of which triggered a 60-day period to negotiate the deal’s final terms, seems to concede to Iran everything: sanctions relief, vague language on nuclear issues, effective control of theStrait of Hormuz, and an eye-watering $300 billion economic development plan. Already, US officials have distanced themselves from the document, claiming that it was designed to be palatable to the Iranian public and doesn’t reflect backchannel negotiations.

To the American public, these claims have a whiff of desperation. Regardless of what’s happening along backchannels, and despite heavy damages imposed on Iran’s military and nuclear program, it’s clear that the United States failed to accomplish its major objectives: the Iranian regime has not been toppled, nor has the country been purged of nuclear material. Instead, through leveraging control of Hormuz, Iran managed to secure a deterrent, while the United States spent over $130 billion and ran down stockpiles of advanced weapons. Both sides lost blood, much of it innocent, and some of it due to unforgivable US negligence.

Despite all this, or perhaps because of it, the signing of the agreement should come as a relief.

This was a misguided war from the beginning. The Trump administration’s initial rationale was founded partly on the belief that regime change in Iran would be swift and driven by popular uprisings. Once it became clear that the regime was entrenched and that Iran could inflict massive, global economic pain by blockading the Strait of Hormuz, there was no clear path to anything resembling victory for the United States. So, yes, the agreement is less than ideal, but positioned among a menu of even worse options, it becomes palatable. Ending the war now, even if it means concessions like dropping maximalist nuclear demands, is the best course of action for the United States.

First, the United States cannot afford to continue depleting stockpiles of key munitions that cost $2–29 million per unit and have years-long delivery timelines. Extended involvement in Iran, whose regime does not pose a threat to Americans at home, is a dangerous and costly distraction from threats elsewhere.

Second, the Strait of Hormuz must reopen. Despite the strait’s hosting of20 percent of global oil flows, its closure did not result in the catastrophic supply shock forecast by many analysts. However, an extended closure would strain supply chains, drive inflation, and put increased pressure on other regional chokepoints.

Third, no one was prepared for a long conflict—not US officials seduced by Israeli predictions of a swift regime collapse, not surrounding Gulf countries suffering collateral damage, and certainly not the American public, who were sold the promise of an operation lasting “four to five weeks” and instead received several hundred American casualties and inflation surpassing 4 percent.

Regarding fissile material stockpiles and nuclear issues more broadly, policymakers now seem to accept that we are unlikely to reach a perfect deal, and Iran will likely keep its enriched uranium. Counterintuitively, this development is good news: striving for complete denuclearization is unrealistic and shouldn’t be allowed to obstruct an agreement and risk rekindling further conflict and regional instability.

These realities notwithstanding, some critics have argued that the war could have had a more favorable outcome had it been allowed to continue. In an assessment that was absurd even at the start of the war, one analysis speculated that the campaign might “be remembered as the fight that finally brought peace to the Middle East.” These are fantasies. They refuse to account for either the steep costs or the low feasibility of attaining the United States’ original objectives, particularly after it became clear that a Venezuela-style regime decapitation would not prove effective in this case.

Where to go from here? The Iran War’s relative brevity could point to lessons learned from previous “forever wars” and a decreased appetite in Washington for protracted conflicts. More likely, it reflects how a shifting global order and rapid advances in warfighting techniques have upended traditional hierarchies, making outcomes less certain and more dangerous for the United States. As for Iran, there’s a chance that the country’s reformists will come to occupy some of the vacancies left by the deaths of hardliners killed in the war, although this will be difficult.

Iran may also prove more amenable on nuclear issues than we expect. After all, the country has discovered a very effective tool of influence in Hormuz and stands to profit handsomely should a toll eventually be instated in the strait. With a weapon like that, the appeal of a nuclear arsenal may even recede somewhat. Regardless, US allies are already showing support for the agreement and the end of the war. Washington will have a hard time framing this debacle as a victory, but the decision to take the off-ramp was the correct choice.

About the Author: Sarah Dimichino

Sarah Dimichino holds an MA from Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy and International Relations and was a 2025 Harold W. Rosenthal Fellow at the Department of the Treasury and an intern at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She received her BA from Montclair State University.

The post The Iran Deal Is Flawed. The Alternatives Are Worse. appeared first on The National Interest.