Unfortunately, the recent war has obstructed international visibility into Iran’s nuclear program—and re-establishing an inspection regime is likely to be a priority in future US-Iran talks.

The recent US-Iran negotiations in Switzerland may have reduced the immediate risk of renewed fighting. But it has left the most important issue between the two nations unresolved: Iran’s nuclear program, the stated cause of President Donald Trump’s launching of Operation Epic Fury in the first place.

Unfortunately, there is little reliable information on the status of Iran’s nuclear program, which had already been significantly degraded during the Israeli-led “Operation Rising Lion” and US-led “Operation Midnight Hammer” strikes of June 2025. Despite the Trump administration’s stated goal of dismantling the Iranian nuclear program, and despite the clear evidence that Iranian facilities were indeed damaged, it remains unknown whether Iran’s nuclear capabilities were actually eliminated or merely disrupted. 

Before the War, Iran Was Right on the Nuclear Threshold

Before the onset of Operation Epic Fury, Iran’s nuclear war had reached unprecedented levels of sophistication. Iran had roughly 9,400 kilograms of uranium stockpiled. Of this, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that around 440 kilograms were enriched to 60 percent U-235, the isotope used in nuclear weapons—enough fissile material for roughly 10 bombs. Although only uranium with 90 percent or more U-235 can be used in nuclear weapons, it is far easier to enrich uranium from 60 percent U-235 to 90 percent.

Iran also had advanced IR-6 centrifuges replacing older systems, with facilities at Natanz and Fordow forming the backbone of the enrichment enterprise. So Iran had decisively settled the question of whether it could enrich, leaving only a more concerning question: how quickly could it weaponize? Breakout timelines had shrunk dramatically relative to the JCPOA era, with estimates in the weeks. The IAEA continued to monitor Iran’s nuclear program, and could have quickly detected a breakout, but it might have been difficult for the international community to arrange a coherent response before weaponization was complete. After weaponization, kinetic action against Iran to disrupt its program would have likely been taken off the table, as it has been in North Korea.

Operation Epic Fury was a classic shock-and-awe campaign, achieving significant levels of destruction. Natanz was heavily damaged. Isfahan was also struck. Administrative and research infrastructure was disrupted, and advanced centrifuge networks were degraded. But destroying buildings is far from destroying the nuclear program itself. Nuclear expertise and technical knowledge survive in the form of Iranian scientists, who can stand up another laboratory if one is destroyed.

The War Hurt International Visibility into Iran’s Nuclear Program

The problem now, from the US perspective, is that nobody knows where everything is; the US suffers from significant intelligence gaps. The IAEA had their access suspended after the war began, so inspectors lacked full visibility. Uncertainty now surrounds the location of portions of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. This matters because verification becomes difficult, allowing assumptions to replace tangible observation. Instead, policymakers are forced to operate with incomplete information.

The Swiss deal largely declined to address the nuclear issues, with a framework focused instead on ceasefire mechanics, maritime security, oil exports, and economic normalization. The deal did not resolve enrichment disputes or anything related to inspection of enriched uranium disposal. Over the next few months, Iran may use the nuclear issue as a bargaining chip to seek additional concessions, with the US likely seeking further transparency measures—and likely being willing to extend concessions in other areas in return.

Could the US and Iran Sign a New Nuclear Agreement?

In one prospective scenario, the most optimistic outcome, Iran enters a negotiated freeze. Under this scenario, Iran would accept long-term limits on high-level enrichment while retaining some elements of its civilian nuclear program. Existing stockpiles could be diluted, monitored, or placed under enhanced inspection regimes. In exchange, Iran would receive economic relief and sanctions reductions. This would allow Washington to claim it prevented an Iranian bomb while allowing Tehran to preserve its scientific expertise and much of its nuclear infrastructure. 

The alternative outcome is that diplomacy collapses. Several issues could trigger a collapse: renewed disputes over maritime transit and shipping, disagreements over inspections or sanctions relief, or Israeli military action in Lebanon. If negotiations do collapse, Tehran could plausibly conclude that diplomacy won’t guarantee regime security—at which point the hardliners will argue that only a nuclear deterrent can prevent future crises like Epic Fury. At that point, it is assumed that Iran would use whatever enriched uranium, centrifuge components, and technical expertise that survived the war to attempt to cross the nuclear threshold once and for all. 

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a writer and attorney focused on national security, technology, and political culture. His work has appeared in Tablet, City Journal, The Hill, The Spectator, and The Cipher Brief. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global & Joint Program Studies from NYU. More at harrisonkass.com.

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